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iPreface
The general picture of game theoretic modeling dealt with in this book is characterized by
a set of big players, also referred to as principals or major agents, acting on the background
of large pools of small players, the impact of the behavior of each small player in a group
on the overall evolution decreasing with the increase of the size of the group.
Two approaches to the analysis of such systems are clearly distinguished and are dealt
with in Parts I and II.
(1) Players in groups are not independent rational optimizers. They are either directly
controlled by principals and serve the interests of the latter (pressure and collaboration
setting) or they resist the actions of the principals (pressure and resistance setting) by
evolving their strategies in an ’evolutionary manner’ via interactions with other players
subject to certain clear rules, deterministic or stochastic. Such interactions, often referred
to as myopic or imitating, include the exchange of opinions or experience, with some given
probabilities of moving to more profitable strategies. They can also evolve via the influence
of social norms.
The examples of the real world problems involved include government representatives
(often referred to in the literature as benevolent dictators) chasing corrupted bureaucrats,
inspectors chasing tax-paying avoidance, police acting against terrorist groups or models
describing the attacks of computer or biological viruses. This includes the problem of
optimal allocation of the budget or efforts of the big player to different strategies affecting
small players, for instance, the allocation of funds (corrected in real time) for the financial
support of various business or research projects. Other class of examples concerns appro-
priate (or better optimal) management of complex stochastic systems consisting of large
number of interacting components (agents, mechanisms, vehicles, subsidiaries, species,
police units, robot swarms, etc), which may have competitive or common interests. Such
management can also deal with the processes of merging and splitting of functional units
(say, firms or banks) or the coalition building of agents. The actions of the big players
effectively control the distribution of small players among their possible strategies and
can influence the rules of their interaction. Several big players can also compete for more
effective pressure on small players. This includes, in particular, the controlled extensions
of general (nonlinear) evolutionary games. Under our approach the classical games of
evolutionary biology, like hawk and dove game, can be recast as a controlled process of
the propagation of violence, say in regions with mixed cultural and/or religious traditions.
For discrete state spaces the games of this kind were introduced in [135], [136],[138]
under the name of nonlinear Markov games. Similar models with continuous state space
were developed in [40] under the name of mean-field-type games, see also [72].
(2) Small players in groups are themselves assumed to be rational optimizers, though
in the limit of large number of players the influence of the decisions of each individual
player on the whole evolution becomes negligible. The games of this type are referred to
as mean field games. They were introduced in [118] and [159], with the finite state space
version put forward in [95], and since then developed into one of the most active direc-
tions of research in game theory. We shall discuss this setting mostly in combination with
the first approach, with evolutionary interactions (more precisely, pressure and resistance
framework) and individual decision making taken into account simultaneously. This com-
bination leads naturally to two-dimensional arrays of possible states of individual players,
one dimension controlled by the principals and/or evolutionary interactions and another
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dimension by individual decisions.
Carrying out a traditional Markov decision analysis for a large state space (large
number of players and particles) is often unfeasible. The general idea for our analysis
is that under rather general assumptions, the limiting problem for a large number of
agents can be described by a well manageable deterministic evolution, which represents
a performance of the dynamic law of large numbers (LLN). This procedure turns the
’curse of dimensionality’ to the ’blessing of dimensionality’. As we show all basic criteria
of optimal decision making (including competitive control) can be transferred from the
models of a large number of players to a simpler limiting decision problem.
Since even the deterministic limit of the combined rational decision making processes
and evolutionary type models can become extremely complex, another key idea of our
analysis is in searching for certain reasonable asymptotic regimes, where explicit calcula-
tions can be performed. Several such regimes are identified and effectively used.
We will deal mostly with discrete models, thus avoiding technicalities arising in gen-
eral models (requiring stochastic differential equations or infinite-dimensional analysis).
Extensions dealing with general jump-type Markov processes are often straightforward,
see e.g. [140].
From the practical point of view the approaches developed here are mostly appropriate
for dealing with socioeconomic processes that are not too far from an equilibrium. For
those processes the equilibria play the role of the so-called turnpikes, that is, attracting
stationary developments. Therefore much attention in our research is given to equilibria
(rest points of the dynamics) and their structural and dynamic stability. For processes
far from equilibria other approaches seem to be more relevant, for instance the methods
for the analysis of turbulence. Another problem needed to be addressed for concrete
applications of our models lies in the necessity to get hold of the basic parameters enter-
ing its formulation, which may not be that easy. Nevertheless, the strong point of our
approach is that it requires to identify really just a few real numbers, which may be de-
rived in principle from statistical experiments or field observations, and not any unknown
multi-dimensional distributions.
In the first introductory chapter we explain the main results and applications with the
minimal use of technical language trying to make the key ideas accessible to readers with
only rudimentary mathematical background. The core of the book is meant for readers
with some basic knowledge of probability, analysis and ordinary differential equations.
For the sake of transparency we systematically develop the theory with the sequential
increase of complexity, formulating and proving results first in their simplest versions and
then extending generality.
Basic notation
Notations introduced here are used in the main text systematically without further re-
minder.
Z, C, R, N denote the sets of integer, complex, real and natural numbers, Z+ and
R+ the subsets of non-negative elements of the corresponding sets.
Letters E, P are reserved for the expectation and probability with respect to various
Markov chains.
For a convex closed subset Z of Rd, let C(Z) denote the space of bounded continuous
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functions equipped with the sup-norm: ‖f‖ = ‖f‖sup = supx |f(x)|, and C∞(Z) its closed
subspace of functions vanishing at infinity.
The vectors in x ∈ Rd can be looked at as functions on {1, · · · , d}, in which case the
natural norm is the sup-norm ‖x‖sup = maxi |xi| (rather than more standard rotation
invariant Euclidean norm). But much often we shall interpret these vectors as measures
on {1, · · · , d}, in which case the natural norm becomes the l1-norm or the integral norm
‖x‖ = ‖x‖1 =
∑
j |xj |. This norm will be used as default in Rd, unless stated otherwise
in specific cases. Accordingly, for functions on Z ⊂ Rn we define the Lipschitz constant
‖f‖Lip = sup
x 6=y
|f(x)− f(y)|
‖x− y‖ . (1)
As is easy to see, this can be equivalently rewritten as
‖f‖Lip = sup
j
sup
|f(x)− f(y)|
|xj − yj| , (2)
where the last sup is the supremum over the pairs x, y that differ only in its jth coordinate.
By CbLip(Z) we denote the space of bounded Lipschitz functions with the norm
‖f‖bLip = ‖f‖+ ‖f‖Lip. (3)
Norms of d × d-matrices are identified with their norms as linear operators in Rd:
‖A‖ = supx 6=0 ‖Ax‖/‖x||. This depends on the norm in Rd. We will look at matrices
as acting by usual left multiplications x → Ax in Rd equipped with the sup-norm or
as acting by the right multiplications x → xA = ATx in Rd equipped with the integral
norm, so that in both cases (as is checked directly)
‖A‖ = sup
i
∑
j
|Aij |. (4)
By Ck(Z) we denote the space of k times continuously differentiable functions on Z
with uniformly bounded derivatives equipped with the norm
‖f‖Ck(Z) = ‖f‖+
k∑
j=1
‖f (j)(Z)‖,
where ‖f (j)(Z)‖ is the supremum of the magnitudes of all partial derivatives of f of order
j on Z. In particular, for a differentiable function, ‖f‖C1 = ‖f‖bLip (by (2)). For a
function f(t, x) that may depend on other variables, say t, we shall also use the notation
‖f (j)‖ = ‖∂
jf
∂xj
‖ = ‖f(t, .)(j)‖,
if we need to stress the variable x with respect to which the smoothness is assessed. We
shall also use shorter notations ‖f (j)‖, Ck or CbLip for the norms ‖f (j)(Z)‖ and the spaces
Ck(Z) or CbLip(Z), when it is clear which Z is used.
The space C(Z,Rn) of bounded continuous vector-valued functions f = (fi) : Z → Rn,
Z ⊂ Rd, will be also usually denoted C(Z) (with some obvious abuse of notations), their
norm being
‖f‖ = sup
x∈Z
‖f(x)‖ = sup
x∈Z
∑
i
|fi(x)|, ‖f‖sup = sup
i,x
|fi(x)|.
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Similar shorter notation will be used for spaces of smooth vector-valued functions f =
(fi) : Z → Rn equipped with the norm
‖f‖Ck(Z) = ‖f‖+
k∑
j=1
‖f (j)‖, ‖f (j)‖ = ‖f (j)(Z)‖ =
∑
i
‖f (j)i (Z)‖.
In chapter 4 we will work with the functions on infinite sequences, namely on the space
l1 of sequences {x = (x1, x2, · · · )} having finite norm ‖x‖ =
∑
j |xj |. All the notations
above will be used then for closed convex subsets Z of l1.
Standard abbreviations
r.h.s. right-hand side
l.h.s. left-hand side
LLN law of large numbers
ODE ordinary differential equation
PDE partial differential equation
PDO partial differential operator
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Chapter 1
Introduction: main models and LLN
methodology
First sections of this chapter are devoted to a brief introduction to our basic model of
controlled mean-field interacting particle systems, its main performance in the pressure
and resistance framework, and to the fundamental paradigm of the scaling limit (dynamic
law of large numbers) allowing one to reduce the analysis of these Markov chains with
exponentially large state spaces to a low dimensional dynamic system expressed in terms
of simple ordinary differential equations (ODEs), so called kinetic equations. The rigorous
mathematical justification of this reduction being postponed to the next chapter, in the
rest of this chapter we describe various classes of real life socio-economic processes fitting
to the general scheme: inspection, corruption, cyber-security, counterterrorism, coalition
building, merging and splitting, threshold control behavior in active network structures,
evolutionary games with controlled mean-field dependent payoffs and many other. In
fact, our general framework allows us to bring a big variety of models (often studied
independently) under a single umbrella amenable to simple unified analysis. Moreover,
many standard socio-economic models, dealt with traditionally via small games with 2
or 3 players, arise in our presentation in new clothes allowing for the analysis of their
many-player extensions. In the last section we give a brief guide to further content of the
book.
1.1 What is a Markov chain
The notion of Markov chains, the simplest models of random evolutions, is a cornerstone
of our analysis. Here we describe the basic ideas with the minimal usage of technical
terms.
One distinguishes Markov chains in discrete and continuous time.
The Markov chains in discrete time are characterized by a finite set {1, ..., d}, called the
state space, of possible positions of an object under investigation (particle or agent), and
a collection of non-negative numbers P = {Pij}, i, j from {1, ..., d}, called the transition
probabilities from i to j, such that Pi1 + · · · + Pid = 1 for any i. Collection of numbers
P = {Pij} satisfying these conditions is called a matrix of transition probabilities, or a
transition matrix or a stochastic matrix. The Markov chain specified by the collection
P is the process of random transitions between the states {1, ..., d} evolving in discrete
1
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times t = 0, 1, 2, · · · by the following rule. If at some time t the object is in a state i,
in the next moment t+ 1 it migrates from state i to some other state j, choosing j with
the probability Pij . Then the process repeats starting from j at time t+ 1, and the same
procedure continues ad infinitum.
The Markov chains in continuous time are characterized by a finite set {1, ..., d}, called
the state space, of possible positions of an object under investigation (particle or agent),
and a collection of non-negative numbers Q = {Qij}, i 6= j, i, j from {1, ..., d}, called
the transition rates from i to j. To circumvent the restriction i 6= j it is convenient to
introduces the negative numbers
Qii = −
∑
j 6=i
Qij . (1.1)
The positive numbers |Qii| = −Qii are called the intensities of jumps at state i. The
collection Q = {Qij}, i, j ∈ {1, ..., d}, is then called a Q-matrix or a Kolmogorov’s matrix.
The Markov chain specified by the collection Q is the process of random transitions
between the states {1, ..., d} evolving by the following rule. If at some time t the object
is in a state i, the object sits at i a random time τ characterized by the following waiting
probability:
P(τ > s) = exp{−s|Qii|},
such random time being referred to as |Qii|-exponential waiting time. At time τ the
object instantaneously migrates from state i to some other state j, choosing j with the
probability Qij/|Qii|. Then the process repeats starting from j, and the same procedure
continues ad infinitum.
Models with discrete or continuous time are chosen from practical convenience. If
we observe a process with some fixed frequency (say, measure a temperature in the sea
every morning), discrete setting is more appropriate. If we observe a process steadily,
continuous-time-setting is more appropriate.
It is useful and popular to represent Markov chains geometrically via oriented graphs.
Namely, the graph of a continuous time chain with the rates Qij , i, j ∈ {1, · · · , d}, is a
collection of d vertices with the oriented edges eij (arrows directed from i to j) drawn for
the pairs (i, j) such that Qij 6= 0. To complete the picture the values Qij can be placed
against each edge eij .
The typical examples of Markov chains with two states represent radioactive atoms
that can decay after some random time (decay time) or firms that can be defaulted after
some random time (time to default). In fact, Markov chains are indispensable tools in all
branches of science. For instance, in genetics they model the propagation of various genes
through the reproduction (that can be randomly chosen from father of mother), in biology
they control the processes of evolution, in finances they model the dynamics of prices of
financial instruments (say, stocks or options), in economics they are used to model firms’
growth and creditability or the competitions between banks or supermarkets, etc.
The state spaces of Markov chains that we will be mostly concern with here are the
strategies of individuals (say, being corrupted or honest inspector, level of illegal activity,
etc) or the working conditions of agents or devices (say, infected or susceptible computer
or individual, level of defence, etc).
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1.2 Mean-field interacting particle systems
Let us turn to the basic setting of mean-field interacting particle systems with a finite
number of types. We want to model a large number N of particles or agents evolving
each according to a Markov chain on some common state space {1, ..., d}, but with the
transition rates depending on the overall distribution of agents among the states. Thus
the overall state of the system of such agents is given by a collection of integers n =
(n1, · · · , nd), where nj is the number of agents in the state i, so that N = n1 + · · ·+ nd.
Usually it is more convenient to work with frequencies, that is, instead of n, to use
the normalized quantities x = (x1, · · · , xd) = n/N , that is, xj = nj/N . All such vectors
x belong to the unit simplex Σd, defined as the collections of all d non-negative numbers
summing up to unity:
Σd = {x = (x1, ..., xd) : xj ≥ 0 for all j and
d∑
j=1
xj = 1}.
To describe transitions of individuals depending on the overall distribution x, we have to
have a family {Q(x)} = {(Qij)(x)} of Kolmogorov’s matrices depending on a vector x
from Σd.
Thus, for any x, the family {Q(x)} specifies a Markov chain on the state space
{1, ..., d}. But this is not what we are looking for. We are interested in a system with
many agents, i.e. a Markov chain on the states n = (n1, · · · , nd). Namely, the mean-field
interacting particle system with N agents specified by the family {Q(x)} is defined as the
Markov chain on the set of collections n = (n1, · · · , nd) with N = n1 + · · ·+ nd evolving
according to the following rule. Starting from any time and current state n one attaches
to each particle a |Qii|(n/N)-exponential random waiting time (where i is the type of
this particle). These N times are random and their minimum is therefore also a random
time, which is in fact (as can be shown) a
∑
i ni|Qii(n/N)|-exponential random waiting
time. If this minimal time τ turns out to be attached to some particle of type i, this
particle jumps to a state j according to the probability law (Qij/|Qii|)(n/N). After such
a transition the state n of our system turns to the state nij, which is the state obtained
from n by removing one particle of type i and adding a particle of type j, that is ni and
nj are changed to ni − 1 and nj + 1 respectively. After any such transition the evolution
continues starting from the new state nij , etc.
Equivalently the transition from a state n can be described by a single clock, like in the
standard setting for Markov chains. Namely, to a state n one attaches a
∑
i ni|Qii(n/N)|-
exponential random waiting time. Once the bell rings one chooses the transition i → j,
i 6= j, with the probability
P(i→ j) = niQij(n/N)∑
k nk|Qkk(n/N)|
. (1.2)
These are well defined probabilities, since∑
i
∑
j 6=i
P(i→ j) = 1.
As was mentioned, as the number of particles N becomes large, the usual analysis
of such Markov chain becomes unfeasible, the situation often referred to as the ’curse
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of dimensionality’. To overcome this problem one is searching for a simpler limiting
evolution as N → ∞. The situation is quite similar to the basic approaches used in
physics to study the dynamics of gases and liquids: instead of following the random
behavior of immense number of individual molecules, one looks for the evolution of the
main mean characteristics, like bulk velocities or temperatures that often turns out to be
described by some deterministic differential equations.
As will be shown, the limiting evolution of the frequencies x = (x1, · · · , xd) evolving
according to the Markov chain described above is governed by the system of ordinary
differential equations
x˙k =
∑
i 6=k
(xiQik(x)− xkQki(x)) =
d∑
i=1
xiQik(x), k = 1, ..., d (1.3)
(the last equation arising from (1.1)), called the kinetic equations for the process of inter-
action described above.
More precisely, under some continuity assumptions on the family {Q(x)} one shows
that if XNx (t) is the position of our mean-field interacting particle system at time t when
started at x at the initial time and Xx(t) is the solution of system (1.3) at time t also
started at x at the initial time, then the probability for the deviation |XNx (t)−Xx(t)| to
be larger than any number ǫ tends to zero as N →∞:
P(|XNx (t)−Xx(t)| > ǫ)→ 0, N →∞. (1.4)
Let us stress again that system (1.3) is deterministic and finite dimensional, which is
an essential simplification as compared with Markov chains with increasingly large state
spaces.
In this most elementary setting the result (1.4) is well known. We will be interested in
more general situations when the transition rates Q are controlled by one or several big
players that can influence the dynamics of the chain to their advantages. Moreover, we
are concerned with the rates of convergence under mild regularity assumptions on Q. The
rates are better characterized in terms of the convergence of some bulk characteristics
(so-called weak convergence), rather than directly via the trajectories.
The convergence rates are crucial for any practical calculations. For instance, if the
difference of some characteristics of Markov chain XNx (t) and its limit Xx(t) is of order
1/N , then applying the approximation Xx(t) to the chain X
N
x (t) yields the error of order
1% for N = 100 players and the error of order 10% for N = 10 players. Thus the number
N does not have to be very large for the approximation (1.3) of ’infinitely many players’
to give reasonable predictions.
An important question concerns the large-time-behavior of mean-field interacting par-
ticle systems with finite N . It is usually possible to show that this system spends time
t of order of the number of particles, t ∼ N , in a neighborhood of a stable set of fixed
points of dynamics (1.3). Often more precise conclusions can be made.
1.3 Migration via binary interaction
An important particular case of the scheme above occurs from the setting of binary in-
teractions. Namely, let us assume that any player from any state i can be influenced by
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any player in any other state j to migrate from i to j, the random events occurring with
some given intensity Tij(n/N)/N (the appearance of the multiplier 1/N being the mark
of the general approach according to which each individual’s contribution to the overall
evolution becomes negligible in the limit of large number of players N). More precisely,
to any ordered pair of agents A, B in different states, say i 6= j, one attaches random
Tij(n/N)/N -exponential waiting time. The minimum of all these waiting time is again a
random waiting time. If the minimum occurs on a pair (A,B) from some states i and j
respectively, then A migrates from the state i to the state j, and then the process con-
tinues from the state nij. Equivalently, this process can be again described by one clock
with
∑
i 6=j ninjTij(n/N)/N -exponential waiting time, attached to a state n. When such
clock rings, the transition i→ j, i 6= j, is chosen with probability
P(i→ j) = ninjTij(n/N)/N∑
k 6=l nknlTkl(n/N)/N
=
nixjTij(x)∑
k 6=l nkxlTkl(x)
.
As is seen directly, the process is the same as the one described above with the matrix
Qij(x) of the type
Qij(x) = xjTij(x), i 6= j.
Remark 1. The possibility of such full reduction of binary interaction to a mean-field
interaction model is due to the simple model of pure migration that we considered here,
and it does not hold for arbitrary binary interactions.
Remark 2. Another point to stress is that the ability of any pair to meet is the mathe-
matical expression of full mixing. If it were not assumed (say, agent spatially separated
were not able to meet), the number of interactions would not depend essentially on the
size of the population, but rather on the size of a typical neighborhood, and the modelling
would be essentially different.
1.4 Introducing principals
As was already mentioned, the next step is to include a major player or principal that can
influence the evolution of our mean-field interacting particle system. As examples, one can
think about the management of complex stochastic systems consisting of large number
of interacting components: agents, mechanisms, robots, vehicles, subsidiaries, species,
police units, etc. To take this into account, our family of Q(x) matrices should become
dependent on some parameter b controlled by the principle: {Q=Q(x,b)}. This can be a
real parameter (say, the budget used by the principle for management) or a vector-valued
parameter, for instance, specifying resources for various directions of development. In any
case, b is supposed to belong to some domain in a Euclidean space, usually bounded, as
the resources can not be infinite.
We shall also assume that the principal has some objectives in this process, aiming
to maximize some profit or minimize certain costs arising from the functioning of the
Markov chain. In the simplest situation we can assume the principal to be a best response
principal, which instantaneously chooses the value of b∗ maximizing some current profit
B(x, b, N) for given x,N :
b∗ = b∗(x,N) = argmaxB(x, ., N). (1.5)
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This procedure reduces the dynamics to the previous case but withQN(x) = Q(x, b∗(x,N)),
which can now depend on N . Convergence (1.4) can still be shown if b∗ stabilizes as
N → ∞, that is, b∗(x,N) → b∗(x), as N → ∞, for some function b∗(x). The limiting
evolution (1.3) turns to the evolution
x˙k =
d∑
i=1
xiQik(x, b
∗(x)), k = 1, ..., d. (1.6)
More realistic modeling would require the principal to choose the control parameter
strategically with some planning horizon T and a final goal at the end. Moreover, the
model should include costs for changing strategies. This leads to a dynamic control
problem, where the principal chooses controls at fixed moments of time (discrete control
setting) or in continuous time (continuous time setting).
Further extensions deal with several principals competing on the background of small
players, where the pool of small players can be common for the major agents (think about
advertising models, or several states fighting together a terrorist group) or be specific to
each major agent (think about generals controlling armies, big banks controlling their
subsidaries, etc). The development of such models and their dynamic LLN (law of large
numbers), leading to better manageable finite-dimensional systems is the main concern
in this book.
1.5 Pressure and resistance framework
Let us present now a key particular performance of the above general scheme introduced
by one of the authors in [140] and called there the pressure and resistance game. In this
setting the interests of the major player P and the small players are essentially opposite,
and the mean-field dependence of the actions of small players arises from their binary
interactions. Namely, as in the above general setting, the strategies of player P are given
by the choices of controls b(x,N), from a given subset of Euclidean space, based on the
number of small players N and the overall distribution x of the strategies of small players.
The evolution of the states of small players goes as in Section 1.3 with Tij(x, b) depending
also on b, so that
Qij(x, b) = xjTij(x, b), i 6= j. (1.7)
The resulting limiting process described by ODE (1.6) becomes
x˙j = xj
∑
i
xi[Tij(x, b
∗(x))− Tji(x, b∗(x))], j = 1, ..., d. (1.8)
More concrete performance of this model is the following pressure and resistance model.
Let us assume that each small player enters certain interaction with P (small players try
to resist the pressure exerted on them by P ) defined by the strategy j ∈ {1, · · · , d} and
that the result of this interaction is the payoff Rj(x, b) to the small player. Moreover, with
rate κ/N (κ being some constant) any pair of agents can meet and discuss their payoffs,
which may result in the player with lesser payoff Ri switching to the strategy with the
better payoff Rj , which may occur with a probability proportional to (Rj −Ri).
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In other words, this is exactly the scheme described above by (1.7) with
Tij(x, b) = κ(Rj(x, b)−Ri(x, b))+, (1.9)
where we used the standard notation y+ = max(0, y). Therefore, this model is also a
performance of the model of Section 1.4 with
Qij(x, b) = κxj(Rj(x, b)−Ri(x, b))+. (1.10)
The resulting limiting process described by ODE (1.8) becomes
x˙j =
∑
i
κxixj [Rj(x, b
∗(x))− Ri(x, b∗(x))], j = 1, ..., d. (1.11)
Remark 3. We are working here with a pure myopic behavior for simplicity. Introduction
of random mutation on global or local levels (see e. g. [124] for standard evolutionary
games) would not affect essentially the convergence result below, but would lead to serious
changes in the long run of the game, which are worth being exploited.
Thus we are dealing with a class of models, where a distinguished ’big’ player exerts
certain level b of pressure on (or interference into the affairs of) a large group of N
’small’ players that can respond with a strategy j. Often these j are ordered reflecting
the strength or the level of the resistance. The term ’small’ reflects the idea that the
influence of each particular player becomes negligible as N →∞. As an example of this
general setting one can mention the interference of humans on the environment (say, by
hunting or fishing) or the use of medications to fight with infectious bacteria in a human
body, with resisting species having the choice of occupying the areas of ample foraging but
more dangerous interaction with the big player (large resistance levels r) or less beneficial
but also less dangerous areas (low resistance level). Another example can be the level of
resistance of the population on a territory occupied by military forces. Some key examples
will be discussed in more detail in the next sections.
In many situations, the members of the pool of small players have an alternative class
of strategies of collaborating with the big player on various levels. The creation of such
possibilities can be considered as a strategic action of the major player (who can thus
exert some control on the rules of the game). In biological setting this is, for instance,
the strategy of dogs joining humans in hunting their ’relatives’ wolves or foxes (nicely
described poetically as the talk between a dog and a fox in the famous novel [208]).
Historical examples include the strategy of slaves helping their masters to terrorize and
torture other slaves and by doing this gaining for themselves more beneficial conditions,
as described e.g. in the classics [33]. As a military example one can indicate the strategy
of the part of the population on a territory occupied by foreign militaries that joins the
local support forces for the occupants, for US troops in Iraq this strategy being well
discussed in Chapter 2 of [178]. Alternatively, this is also the strategy of population
helping police to fight with criminals and/or terrorists. In the world of organized crime it
is also a well known strategy to play simultaneously both resistance (committing crime)
and collaboration (to collaborate with police to get rid of the competitors), the classic
presentation in fiction being novel [83].
In general pressure and resistance games, the payoff Rj(x, b) has often the following
special features: R increases in j and decreases in b. The dependence of R and b∗ on x
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is more subtle, as it may take into account social norms of various character. In case of
the pressure game with resistance and collaboration, the strategic parameter j of small
players naturally decomposes into two coordinates j = (r, c), the first one reflecting the
level of resistance and the second the level of collaboration. If the correlation between
these activities are not taken into account the payoff R can be decomposed into the sum
of rewards R = R1j (x, b)+R
2
j (x, b) with R
1 having the same features as R above, but with
R2 increasing both in j and b.
Another extension to mention is the possibility to have different classes of small players,
which brings us to the domain of optimal allocation games, but now in the competitive
evolutionary setting, where the principal (say an inspector) has the task to distribute
limited resources as efficiently as possible.
1.6 Nash equilibria and the fixed points of kinetic
equations
Since the limiting behavior of the controlled Markov chain in the pressure-resistance set-
ting is given by the kinetic equations (1.11), one can expect that eventually the evolution
will settle down near some stable equilibrium points of this dynamic systems. This remark
motivates the analysis of these equilibria.
Moreover, these equilibria have an important game-theoretic interpretation, which is
independent of the myopic hypothesis defining the Markov evolution.
Let us consider explicitly the following game ΓN of N + 1 players (that was tacitly
borne in mind when discussing dynamics). When the major player chooses the strategy
b and each of N small players chooses the state i, the major player receives the payoff
B(x, b, N) and each player in the state i receives Ri(x, b), i = 1, · · · , d (as above, with
x = n/N and n = (n1, · · · , nd) the realized occupation numbers of all the states). Thus
a strategy profile of small players in this game can be specified either by a sequence of
N numbers (expressing the choice of the state by each agent), or more succinctly, by the
resulting collection of frequencies x = n/N .
The key notion of the game theory is that of the Nash equilibrium, which is any profile
of strategies (xN , b
∗
N) such that for any player changing its choice unilaterally would not
be beneficial. For the game ΓN , this is a profile of strategies (xN , b
∗
N) such that
b∗N = b
∗
N (xN , N) = argmaxB(xN , b, N)
and for any i, j ∈ {1, · · · , d}
Rj(x− ei/N + ej/N, b∗N) ≤ Ri(x, b∗N). (1.12)
As finding Nash equilibria is a difficult task, one often preforms approximate cal-
culations via some numeric schemes leading to approximate Nash equilibria or ǫ-Nash
equilibria A profile of strategies is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if the above conditions hold up
to an additive correction term not exceeding ǫ.
As it will be shown, the rest points of (1.11) describe all approximate Nash equilibria
for ΓN . These approximate Nash equilibria are ǫ-Nash equilibria with ǫ of order 1/N .
Let us discuss the main concrete examples of the pressure and resistance framework.
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1.7 Inspection and corruption
In the inspection game with a large number of inspectees, see [148], any one from a large
group of N inspectees has a number of strategies parametrized by a finite or infinite set of
nonnegative numbers r indicating the level at which she chooses to break the regulations
(r = 0 corresponds to the full compliance). These can be the levels of tax evasion, the
levels of illegal traffic through a check point, the amounts at which the arms production
exceeds the agreed level, etc. On the other hand, a specific player, the inspector, tries to
identify and punish the trespassers. Inspector’s strategies are real numbers b indicating the
level of her involvement in the search process, for instance, the budget spent on it, which
is related in a monotonic way to the probability of the discovery of the illegal behavior
of trespassers. The payoff of an inspectee depends on whether her illegal behavior is
detected or not. If social norms are taken into account, this payoff will also depend on the
overall crime level of the population, that is, on the probability distribution of inspectees
playing different strategies. The payoff of the inspector may depend on the fines collected
from detected violators, on the budget spent and again on the overall crime level (that
she may have to report to governmental bodies, say). As time goes by, random pairs of
inspectees can communicate in such a way that one inspectee of the pair can start copying
the strategy of another one if it turns out to be more beneficial.
A slightly different twist to the model presents the whole class of games modeling
corruption (see [4], [122], [157], [171] and [145] and references therein for a general back-
ground). For instance, developing the initial simple model of [34], a large class of these
games studies the strategies of a benevolent principal (representing, say, a governmen-
tal body that is interested in the efficient development of economics) that delegates a
decision-making power to a non-benevolent (possibly corrupt) agent, whose behavior (le-
gal or not) depends on the incentives designed by the principal. The agent can deal, for
example, with tax collection of firms. The firms can use bribes to persuade a corrupted
tax collector to accept falsified revenue reports. In this model the set of inspectors can be
considered as a large group of small players that can choose the level of corruption (quite
in contrast to the classical model of inspection) by taking no bribes at all, or not too
much bribes, etc. The strategy of the principal consists in fiddling with two instruments:
choosing wages for inspectors (to be attractive enough, so that the agents should be afraid
to loose it) and investing in activities aimed at the timely detection of the fraudulent be-
havior. Mathematically these two types are fully analogous to preemptive and defensive
methods discussed in models on counterterrorism, see below.
In the standard setting of inspection games with a possibly tax-evading inspectee
(analyzed in detail in [148] under some particular assumptions), the payoff R looks as
follows:
Rj(x, b) = r + (1− pj(x, b))rj − pj(x, b)f(rj), (1.13)
where r is the legal payoff of an inspectee, various rj denote various amounts of not
declared profit, j = 1, · · · , d, pj(x, b) is the probability for the illegal behavior of an
inspectee to be found when the inspector uses budget b for searching operation and f(rj)
is the fine that the guilty inspectee has to pay when being discovered.
In the standard model of corruption ’with benevolent principal’, see e. g. [4], one sets
the payoff of a possibly corrupted inspector (now taking the role of a small player) as
(1− p)(r + w) + p(w0 − f),
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where r is now the bribe an inspector asks from a firm to agree not to publicize its profit
(and thus allowing her not to pay tax), w is the wage of an inspector, f the fine she has to
pay when the corruption is discovered and p the probability of a corrupted behavior to be
discovered by the benevolent principal (say, governmental official). Finally it is assumed
that when the corrupted behavior is discovered the agent not only pays fine, but is also
fired from the job and has to accept a lower level activity with the reservation wage w0.
In our strategic model we make r to be the strategy of an inspector with possible levels
r1, · · · , rd (the amount of bribes she is taking) and the probability p of discovery to be
dependent on the effort (say, budget b) of the principal and the overall level of corruption
x, with fine too depending on the level of illegal behavior. This natural extension of the
standard model leads to the payoff
Rj(x, b) = (1− pj(x, b))(rj + w) + pj(x, b)(w0 − f(rj)), (1.14)
which is essentially identical to (1.13).
1.8 Cyber-security, biological attack-defence and coun-
terterrorism modeling
A ’linguistic twist’ that changes ’detected agents’ to ’infected agents’ brings us directly
to the (seemingly quite different) setting of cyber-security or biological attack-defence
games.
For instance, let us look at the applications to the botnet defense (for example, against
the famous conflicker botnet), widely discussed in the contemporary literature, since bot-
nets (zombie networks) are considered to pose the biggest threat to the international
cyber-security, see e. g. review of the abundant bibliography in [41]. The comprehensive
game theoretical framework of [41] (that extends several previous simplified models) mod-
els the group of users subject to cybercriminal attack of botnet herders as a differential
game of two players, the group of cybercriminals and the group of defenders.
Our approach adds to this analysis the networking aspects by allowing the defenders to
communicate and eventually copy more beneficial strategies. More concretely, our general
model of inspection or corruption becomes almost directly applicable in this setting by
the clever linguistic change of ’detected’ to ’infected’ and by considering the cybecriminal
as the ’principal agent’ ! Namely, let rj (the index j being taken from some discrete set
here, though more advanced theory of the next sections allows for a continuous parameter
j) denote the level of defense applied by an individual (computer owner) against botnet
herders (an analog of the parameter γ of [41]), which can be the level of antivirus programs
installed or the measures envisaged to quickly report and repair a problem once detected
(or possibly a multidimensional parameter reflecting several defense measures). Similarly
to our previous models, let pj(x, b) denote the probability for a computer of being infected
given the level of defense measures rj, the effort level b of the herder (say, budget or time
spent) and the overall distribution x of infected machines (this ’mean-field’ parameter is
crucial in the present setting, since infection propagates as a kind of epidemic). Then, for
a player with a strategy j, the cost of being (inevitably) involved in the conflict can be
naturally estimated by the formula
Rj(x, b) = pj(x, b)c + rj , (1.15)
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where c is the cost (inevitable losses) of being infected (thus one should aim at minimizing
this Rj , rather then maximizing it, as in our previous models). Of course, one can extend
the model to various classes of customers (or various classes of computers) for which
values of c or rj may vary and by taking into account more concrete mechanisms of virus
spreading, as described e. g. in [164] and [167].
Similar models can be applied to the analysis of defense against a biological weapon,
for instance by adding the active agent (principal interested in spreading the disease),
into the general mean-field epidemic model of [165] that extends the well established SIS
(susceptible-infectious-susceptible) and SIR (susceptible-infectious-recovered) models.
Yet another set of examples represent the models of terrorists’ attacks and countert-
errorism measures, see e. g. [13], [211], [212], [52] for the general background on game
-theoretic models of terrorism, and [81] for more recent developments. We again suggest
here a natural extension to basic models to the possibility of interacting large number of
players and of various levels of attacks, the latter extension being in the line with argu-
ment from [65] advocating consideration of ’spectacular attacks’ as part of a continuous
scale of attacks of various levels.
In the literature, the counterterrorists’ measures are usually decomposed into two
groups, so called proactive (or preemptive), like direct retaliation against the state-sponsor
and defensive (also referred to as deterrence), like strengthening security at an airport,
with the choice between the two considered as the main strategic parameter. As stressed
in [202] the first group of action is ’characterized in the literature as a pure public good,
because a weakened terrorist group poses less of a threat to all potential targets’, but
on the other hand, it ’may have a downside by creating more grievances in reaction to
heavy-handed tactics or unintended collateral damage’ (because it means to ’bomb alleged
terrorist assets, hold suspects without charging them, assassinate suspected terrorists,
curb civil freedoms, or impose retribution on alleged sponsors’), which may result in the
increase of terrorists’ recruitment. Thus, the model of [202] includes the recruitment
benefits of terrorists as a positively correlated function of preemption efforts.
A direct extension of the model of [202] in the line indicated above (large number
of players and the levels of attacks) suggests to write down the reward of a terrorist,
or a terrorist group, considered as a representative of a large number of small players,
using one of the levels of attack j = 1, · · · , d (in [202] there are two levels, normal and
spectacular only), to be
Rj(x, b) = (1− pj(x, b))rfailj (b) + pj(x, b)(Sj + rsuccj (b)), (1.16)
where pj(x, b) is the probability of a successful attack (which depends on the level b
of preemptive efforts of the principal b and the total distribution of terrorists playing
different strategies), Sj is the direct benefits in case of a success and r
fail
j (b), r
succ
j (b)
are the recruitment benefits in the cases of failure or success respectively. The costs of
principal are given by
B(x, b) =
∑
j
xj [(1− pj(x, b))b+ pj(b)(b+ Sj)] .
It is seen directly that we are again in the same situation as described by (1.14) (up to
constants and notations). The model extends naturally to account for possibility of the
actions of two types, preemption and deterrence. Also very natural can be the extension
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to several major players For instance, USA and EU cooperation infighting terrorism was
considered in [13].
1.9 Coalition building, merging and splitting, net-
work growth, queues
In a large number of problems it is essential to work with an infinite state-space of small
players, in particular, with the state-space being the set of all natural numbers. Math-
ematical results are much rare for this case, as compared with finite state-spaces. This
infinite-dimensional setting is crucial for the analysis of models with growth, like merging
banks or firms (see [196] and [206]) or the evolution of species and the development of
networks with preferential attachment (the term coined in [27]), for instance scientific
citation networks or the network of internet links (see a detailed discussion in [155]).
Apart from the obvious economic examples mentioned above, similar process of the
growth of coalitions under pressure can be possibly used for modeling the development of
human cooperation (forming coalitions under the ’pressure’ exerted by the nature) or the
creation of liberation armies (from the initially small guerillas groups) by the population
of the territories oppressed by an external military force.
Yet another example can represent the analysis of the financial support of various
projects (developmental or scientific), when the funding body has tools to merge or split
projects and transfer funds between them in certain periods of time.
Our evolutionary theory of coalition building (properly developed in Chapter 4) can
be considered as an alternative to the well known theory of coalitional bargaining, see e.g.
[64].
Models of growth are known to lead to power laws in equilibrium, which are verified in
a variety of real life processes, see e.g. [206] for a general overview and [199] for particular
applications in crime rates. In Chapter 4 we will deal with the response of a complex
system, that includes both the ability of growth and the coalition building mechanisms, to
external parameters that may be set by the principal (say, by governmental regulations)
who has her own agenda (may wish to influence the growth of certain economics sectors).
The modern literature on the network growth is very extensive and we will not try to
review it referring for this purpose, for instance, to [44] and references therein.
Of course these processes of growth have a clear physical analogs, say the formation of
dimers and trimers by the molecules of gas with eventual condensation under (now real
physical) pressure. The relation with the Bose-Einstein condensation is also well known,
see e. g. [216].
We shall pay attention only to infinite spaces that are countable, which are possi-
bly mostly relevant for practical studies of the evolutionary growth. For this class of
models the number N of agents become variable (and usually growing in the result of
the evolution) and the major characteristics of the system becomes just the distribution
x = (x1, x2, · · · ) of the sizes of the groups. The analysis of the evolution of these models
has a long history, see [216], though in the abundant literature on the models of evo-
lutionary growth, the discussion usually starts directly with the deterministic limiting
model, with the underlying Markov model being just mentioned as a motivating heuris-
tics. Mathematically the analysis is similar to finite state spaces, though serious technical
complications may arise. We develop the ’strategically enhanced model’ in Section 4.5
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: MAIN MODELS AND LLN METHODOLOGY 13
analyzing such evolutions under the ’pressure’ of strategically varying parameters set by
the principal.
As another insightful example of games with a countable state space let us mention
the model of the propagation of knowledge from [77] and [60]. In this model an agent
is characterized by a number n ∈ N, which designates the amount of information the
agent has about certain subject. Meetings of two agents with the information n and
m occur with certain intensities (which represent the control parameters) and result in
each of them acquiring the total information m + n. Summation of the information of
agents is based, of course, on a highly idealized assumption of the independent knowledge.
Anyway, unlike the model of merging the number of agents here remains constant, but
their information (the analog of mass) is increasing.
Yet another big class of models with countable state spaces represent various models
of queues parametrized by the sizes of the queues at different servers, see e.g [91], [92]
and references therein for detail.
1.10 Minority game, its strategic enhancement and
sex ratio game
An important example of the pressure and resistance framework represents the famous
minority game designed to model the evolution of financial markets. The remarkable prop-
erties of the minority game were revealed partially by the extensive computer simulations
and partially by the application of the methods of statistical mechanics.
Recall that in the minority game each of N players declares (or adopts) independently
and simultaneously one of the two possible strategies, denoted 0 and 1. The payoff 1 is
paid to all players that declared the strategy that turned out to be in minority, and other
players pay fine of amount 1. In a rare event of equal amounts of declared two strategies,
all payoffs can be set to zero. The game is supposed to be repeated many times, so that
players can learn to apply better strategies.
Let n0, n1 denote the amount of players that have chosen 0 or 1 respectively in one
step of the game. Then n0 + n1 = N . Let x = n0/N . We are exactly in the situation
described in Sections 1.5 1.6 (without the major player) with d = 2 and the payoffs
R1(x) = −R0(x) = sgn (x− 1/2) =


1, x > 1/2
0, x = 1/2
− 1, x < 1/2.
(1.17)
The only specific feature of this setting is the obvious discontinuity of the payoffs
Rj(x). However, for large N the chance of a draw is really negligible, so that the model
will be not changed essentially if one takes a smooth version of the payoffs,
R1(x) = −R0(x) = θ(x− 1/2), (1.18)
where θ(x) is a smooth non-decreasing function such that θ(x) = sgn (x) for |x| ≥ ǫ with
some small ǫ. The kinetic equations (1.3) can be written down in terms of a single variable
x as
x˙ = −x(1 − x)θ(x− 1/2). (1.19)
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The analysis of the dynamics arising from this game is given in Sections 2.12 and 2.13.
Placing the minority game in this general setting suggests various reasonable exten-
sions of this market model, for instance, by including major players (say, a market makers)
that have tools to control the interactions or the payoffs of minor players, or by a more
subtle grouping of players. Moreover, it reveals a nice link with the so-called sex-ratio
game of evolutionary biology. The latter game is designed to explain the common 1/2
probability for births of males and females in basically any population. The rules of the
sex-ratio game arise from the observation that, if there are n0 males and n1 females in a
population (its current generation), then producing a male (resp. female) offspring would
yield to this offspring an expected number of n1/n0 (resp. n0/n1) of its own offsprings.
Thus we find ourselves in the situation described by the rules above with payoff (1.18)
having the form
R1(x) = θ(x− 1/2) = x/(1 − x). (1.20)
1.11 Threshold collective behavior
A similar two-state model arises in a seemingly different setting of the models of threshold
collective behavior, for example, the well known model of mob control (see [53] for the
general introduction). It is assumed there that a crowd consists of a large number N
of agents that can be in two states, excited (say, aggressive) and quiet, denoted 1 and 0
respectively. In discrete time modeling the excitation is supposed to propagate by copying
the neighbors. Namely, each agent i is characterized by the threshold level θi ∈ [0, 1] and
the influence vector wji ≥ 0, j 6= i, where wji is the weight of the opinion of i for agent
j. If at some time t the states of the agents are given by the profile vector {yt1, · · · , ytN},
ytj ∈ {0, 1}, an agent i in the next moment of time t + 1 becomes excited if the weighted
level of excitation of its neighbors exceeds the threshold θi, that is, y
t+1
i turns to 1 or 0
depending on whether
∑
j 6=iwijyj ≥ θi or otherwise, respectively. Thus each agent acts
as a classical perseptron (threshold decision unit) of the theory of neural networks. Quite
similar are more general models of the so called active network structures that are used
to model the propagation of opinion in social media like Facebook or Twitter.
Concerning θj it is often assumed that they are random identically distributed random
variables with some distribution function F (x) = P(θi ≤ x). To fit this process to our
general model it is necessary to assume that the mob is decomposed in a finite number
of classes with the identical weights, so that wij can be characterized as the weights
of influence between representatives of different classes, rather that individual agents,
and in fact the theory usually develops under an assumption of this kind. The standard
simplifying assumption is the so-called anonymity case, where all influences are considered
to be identical, that is wij = 1/(N−1) for all i 6= j. Let us assume this is the case. One can
model the propagation of excitation both in discrete or continuous time. For definiteness,
let us choose the second approach (more in line with our general modeling). Then the
propagation is measured in terms of the rates of transitions, rather than probabilities,
and we naturally assume here that the rate of transition from the state 0 to the state
1 is proportional to P(θi ≤ x) = F (x) and from the state 1 to the state 0 to P(θi >
x) = 1− F (x), where x ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of the excited states among the agents.
Thus we find ourselves fully in our general setting with a two state model, d = 2, and the
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Kolmogorov matrix Qij , i, j ∈ {0, 1} with
Q01 = αF (x), Q10 = α(1− F (x)),
with some constant α, and thus Q00 = −αF (x), Q11 = −α(1−F (x). A constant α can be
used to extend the model to the case when any agent is influenced only by the neighbors,
where α can be characterized by the average number of these neighbors.
As for any model with d = 2, the kinetic equations (1.3) can be written in terms of
just one equation for x:
x˙ = xQ11 + (1− x)Q01 = −xα(1− F (x)) + (1− x)αF (x) = α(F (x)− x),
that is, finally as
x˙ = α(F (x)− x), (1.21)
which is a standard equation used in modeling the threshold collective behavior (see [53]).
1.12 Projects selection, investment policies and op-
timal allocation
As yet another example let us introduce a simple model for project selection. The specific
feature of this model is the necessity to work with a two-parameter family of states. As-
sume an investment body aims at developing several directions j ∈ {1, · · · , d} of business
or science, ordered according to their importance, with some budget allocated to each of
these directions. When a call for bidding for the support of projects is declared, the inter-
ested parties have to choose both the project to bid for and the level of the investment of
their efforts in preparation of the bid, having some possible costs, c ∈ {c1, · · · , cm}, with
c1 < · · · < cm. The probability of a project being selected, p(j, c, xj), will be thus an in-
creasing function of j, an increasing function of c and a decreasing function of xj = nj/N ,
the fraction of bids in the jth direction. Therefore if Aj is an award (the value of a grant)
for a project in the jth direction, the average payoff of small players can be written as
Rj,c(x) = −c+ Ajp(j, c, xj). (1.22)
The kinetic equations, see (1.3) and (1.10), in this two-dimensional index model take
the form
x˙jc =
∑
i,c˜
κxic˜xjc(Ri,c˜(x)−Rj,c(x)). (1.23)
Here both Aj and the functions p(j, c, x) are the parts of the mechanism design of the
principal (investment body). They can be encoded, of course, by certain parameters b
that are chosen by the principal.
The model is a performance of the problem of optimal allocation in a competitive
environment. It can be extended in various direction, for instance, by taking into account
the initial expertise of the bidders and the related costs for switching between the topics.
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1.13 Games on networks and positivity preserving
evolutions
Here we stress two rather trivial aspects of evolution (1.3). The first one is its universality
as a positivity preserving evolution. Namely, it is not difficult to show (see e.g. [136], Sec-
tions 1.1 and 6.8) that any sufficiently regular transformation of Rd preserving positivity
and the ’number of particles’ x1 + · · ·+ xn, in other words any smooth transformation of
the simplex Σd, can be described by an ODE of type (1.3). This is in fact a performance of
a more general representation result for positivity preserving transformations of measures.
The second aspect is just a geometrical rewording. Following the general idea of the
graphical representation of Markov chains (see Section 1.1) we can similarly draw a graph
of the mean-field interacting particle system of Section 1.2, which will be a graph with d
vertices and edges eij drawn whenever Qij(x) does not vanish identically. The evolution
(1.3) can then be looked at as the evolution of the ’weights’ of the vertices. Due to this
geometric interpretation mean-field interacting particle system and their limits (1.3) are
sometimes referred to as the networked models, see e.g. [188] for a concrete epidemic
model presented in this way.
1.14 Swarm intelligence and swarm based robotics
Swarm based robotics is often understood as an attempt to build algorithms or mechanisms
for the functioning of complex systems of interacting robots by the analogy with the
observed behavior in nature, mostly social insects, like ants or bees. The evolutions
of such mechanisms are usually represented as mean-field interacting particle systems,
thus given approximately (in the LLN limit) by kinetic equations (positivity preserving
evolutions on the simplexes, see Section 1.13 above). Typical example (taken from [48])
is as follows. Two types of workers (for instance, so-called minor and major in some
ant species) of amount n1 and n2 respectively, with the total number N = n1 + n2, can
perform a certain task (say, clean the nest from the dead bodies). The level of unfulfilled
task s increases in time during functioning of the nest and decreases proportionally to the
number of workers engaging in it:
s˙ = δ − α(N1 +N2)/N, (1.24)
where Ni is the number of ith type workers performing the job and δ, α some positive
constants. The workers of two types have propensity or inclination to do the task T1(s)
and T2(s) (mathematically the rates with which they take it) depending on the level of
the stimulus specified by s (say, difficulty to move in a nest full of rubbish). If p is the
probability to give up job after starting it, the evolution of the frequencies xi = Ni/ni is
given by the (easy to interpret) equations
x˙1 = T1(s)(1− x1)− px1, x˙2 = T2(s)(1− x2)− px2. (1.25)
For system (1.24) - (1.25) the rest points can be found explicitly. More general situations
(with several tasks and several types of workers) were analyzed numerically giving rea-
sonable agreement with the concrete observations of the ants and then were used to build
algorithms for robots.
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A well known analytic model of collective behaviour of a swarm of interacting Brownian
oscillators was proposed by Y. Kuramoto, see [1] for its review and extensions. As was
shown in [233], the corresponding dynamics can be also obtained as the solution to a
certain mean-field game.
The theory developed in this book offers the precise relations between the processes
with a finite number of agents and their LLN limits like (1.24) - (1.25). Moreover, it
suggests to choose the parameters available to the major player (say, the designer of the
swarm) strategically via forward looking perspectives with finite or infinite horizon (in
the spirit of Chapter 3).
1.15 Replicator dynamics with mean-field dependent
payoffs: controlled hawk and dove evolution
As a final example let us touch upon the applications to the well established theory of
evolutionary games and evolutionary dynamics reducing the discussion to the variations
on most popular concrete model.
Recall the celebrated Hawk-and-Dove game, which is a symmetric two-player game
with the matrix of payoffs (the letters in the table denote the payoffs to the row player)
hawk dove
hawk H V
dove 0 D
The game can be interpreted as being played by individuals sharing common resource.
If a hawk and a dove meet, the dove abandons the site without fight leaving the whole
resource, V , to the hawk. If two doves meet, they share resource yielding D each (that
could be more or less than V depending on the level of collaboration). If two hawks meet,
they fight inflicting strong damages to each other so that the average payoff can become
even negative.
The replicator dynamics, which is one of the most basic dynamics for the theory of
evolutionary games (see [144] or [115] for general background) is given by the equation
x˙ = x(1− x)[x(H +D − V )− (D − V )],
which is of course a particular case of dynamics (1.3), (1.10). This evolution may have
only one internal rest point (point of internal equilibria),
x∗ =
V −D
V −D −H .
If V > D, as is usually assumed, then x∗ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if H < 0. In this case, this
point is known (and easily checked) to be a stable equilibrium of the replicator dynamics.
Remark 4. This equilibrium is also known to be ESS (evolutionary stable equilibrium) of
the Hawk-and-Dove game (see e.g. [144] or [115] for the general background on ESS).
The replicator dynamics can be obtained as the dynamic LLN (law of large number)
for a Markov model of N interacting species, which can use one of two strategies, h or d
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(hawk or dove), with each pair meeting randomly and playing the game described by the
Table above. The payoff for each player in this game of N players, the fraction x (resp.
1− x) of which playing h (resp. d), is Hx+ V (1− x) for being a hawk and D(1− x) for
being a dove.
The point we like to stress here is the following. If there are only a few hawks and
plenty of dove to rob, the hawks get less impetus to fight between themselves meaning
that H may increase with the decay of x, the fraction of species playing h. Similarly, if
there are too many doves on the restricted resource area, they may start behaving more
aggressively meaning that D may decrease with the decay of x. Choosing linear functions
to express this dependence in the simplest form, the modified table of this nonlinear
Hawk-and-Dove game becomes
hawk dove
hawk H + ax V
dove 0 D − bx
with some constants a, b > 0.
In this setting the game of two players stops being defined independently, but the
game of N players choosing one of the strategies h or d remains perfectly well defined
(with the theory mentioned in Section 1.6 and developed in Chapters 2, 3 fully applied)
with the payoffs of hawks and doves becoming
Πh(x) = (H + ax)x+ V (1− x), Πd(x) = (D − bx)(1 − x).
The replicator dynamics generalizes to the equation
x˙ = x(1− x)[x(H + ax+D − bx− V )− (D − bx− V )], (1.26)
which remains to be a particular case of dynamics (1.3), (1.10). The internal fixed points
of this dynamics are the solutions of the quadratic equation
(a− b)x2 − (V −D −H − b)x+ (V −D) = 0. (1.27)
It is seen that, say for a = b, the internal equilibrium becomes
x∗ =
V −D
V −D −H − b ,
which moves to the left with the increase of b. When the denominator in this expression
becomes negative, the internal equilibrium gets lost and the pure strategy d becomes the
stable equilibrium. On the other hand, if b = 0, then the roots of the quadratic equation
(1.27) have asymptotic expressions
x1 =
V −D
V −D −H
(
1 + a
V −D
(V −D −H)2 +O(a
2)
)
, x2 =
1
a
(V −D −H) +O(1)
for small a. Therefore, for small a, the internal rest point starts moving go the right
remaining the only internal rest point. When a increases various bifurcations can occur.
For instance, if −H < a < (V −D −H)/2, the internal rest points disappear. If
V −D −H
2
< a <
(V −D −H)2
4(V −D) ,
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two internal fixed points appear (both solutions of (1.27) belong to (0, 1)), the left being
stable, and the right unstable, so that in total we get two stable equilibria, one mixed and
one pure hawk.
Similar shifts of equilibria and bifurcations occur when mean-field dependence is in-
troduced in other popular two-player games. It is interesting to see whether this kind of
bifurcations could be observed in real field experiments.
The model can be used to describe the transformations of behavioral patterns and
social norms in society, how doves (social behavior) develop themselves into hawks (ag-
gressive behavior, violence) and vice versa. Moreover, making the parameter a, b de-
pending on the some control parameter u of a major player allows one to introduce the
model of controlled hawk and dove evolution, with the principal having a tool to drive
the equilibria in the direction desired. Results of Chapter 3 provide the general technique
for the analysis of such controlled processes.
1.16 Fluctuations
An important direction that we are not pursuing here is the analysis of fluctuations of
the random Markov processes of N agents and the deterministic LLN provided by the
kinetic equations. This problem can be approached in two slightly different ways. Firstly
one can start with the generator of the N agent process and look for the next order of
its approximation (as compared with the first order approximation used for obtaining
the kinetic equations). Expanding the increments of functions to the second order yields
directly the second order operator, and hence the diffusion process. Such diffusion process
may capture much better the long time behavior of the N agent process, for instance
implying the dying out of certain strategies, which was demonstrated both theoretically
and experimentally on many concrete biological systems with the evolution described
by the models of evolutionary games, see [74] and references therein. For models with
countable state space this analysis was performed in [129]. An alternative approach is to
write down explicitly the parameters (e.g. the generator) of the process of fluctuations
and look for its limit under appropriate scaling. Such limit can be often found to be
described by a certain Gaussian process thus leading to the dynamic central-limit-type
theorems. Such results were obtained for various models, see references in Chapter 5.
Both approaches can be looked at as providing a stochastic law of large numbers for
process involving N agents. Unlike deterministic LLN, these random LLN are less robust
and much more sensitive to the methods of approximations and scaling, with a variety of
limits that can be obtained depending on the choice of the latter.
1.17 Brief guide to the content of the book
As was already mentioned, the first part of the book deals with the models of a large
number N of minor players interacting with major players, the strategies of small players
propagating by direct imitation (myopic behavior) of more successful strategies of the sur-
rounding players. The purpose of the analysis is to turn the ’curse of dimensionality’ into
the ’blessing of dimensionality’ by obtaining better manageable deterministic limits, that
is, kinetic equations, as N →∞, and providing effective rates of convergence. Numerous
examples of the concrete models were presented above.
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The first part is mostly based on papers [138], [140], with a gap from [138] corrected
(see Remark 17) and with the results of [140] improved and strengthened in many ways,
specifically for countable state-spaces.
In Chapter 2 we shall work with the case of a finite number d of strategies of small
players and major players acting with the instantaneous best response. Together with
convergence rates to the deterministic limit we present the game -theoretic interpretation
of the fixed points of the limiting dynamics providing the link between the large time
behavior of the limiting, N → ∞, and approximating, finite N , dynamics. The results
of the last Sections 2.11 - 2.14 are essentially new, though the last section can be looked
at as a performance of the general results from [133] or [177] in the specific setting of
interacting particles.
In Chapter 3 the behavior of major players is modified by a more realistic requirement
that they choose their control parameters strategically aiming at some optimal payoff
during either a fixed finite period or over infinite horizon. The dynamics is considered
in the multi-step version, where major players choose their controls at discrete times kτ ,
k ∈ N, with a fixed τ , and in the continuous-time limit, obtained from the former by
letting τ → 0. The deterministic continuous-time problem is obtained when τ → 0 and
N → ∞ simultaneously subject to some bounds on the dependence of τ and N . Long
time behavior is analyzed both for the discounted payoff and for the average payoff, the
latter often leading to the so-called turnpike behavior of the trajectories, well known in
classical mathematical economics.
Chapter 4 extends the results of Chapters 2 and 3 to the case of countable state-space
of small players. This extension is carried out in order to include important models of
evolutionary coalition building and strategically enhanced preferential attachment. The
mathematics of this chapter is more demanding, as it heavily exploits the theory of infinite-
dimensional ODEs. The results of Section 4.6 are new.
In the second part we model small players as rational optimizers bringing the analysis
into the realm of the so-called mean-field games (MFG), widely discussed in modern
research literature. We start in Chapter ?? with some general introduction to the MFGs
on finite state spaces including the theorem on the approximations of finite-number-of-
player games by the limiting MFG evolutions following mostly the papers [29], [30], but
with significant improvements and simplifications.
The rest of the second part is based essentially on papers [145], [146], [143] and [126].
As the complexity of MFGs increases with the increase of the state-space of small players
we start with the detailed description of toy models of three-state and four-state games in
Chapters ?? and ?? respectively. These games represent remarkable and rare examples,
where all stationary solutions to the MFG consistency problem can be found explicitly.
The analysis of these toy models reveals and provides explicit description of the nontrivial
properties of MFGs, like phase transitions, and of the key parameters that control these
transitions. It also signifies a reasonably large class of models, where the state-space of
small players is two-dimensional, one direction being controlled by the individual player
(say, the level of tax evasion or the costs spent on a defence system) and another by the
principal or binary interactions (say, the position of agent on the bureaucratic staircase
or the state of computer being infected or not).
In Chapter ?? a more general theory is developed revealing the turnpike property in
the MFG context. Roughly speaking the turnpike property means that time-dependent
control evolutions with large horizon spend most of the time around some fixed stationary
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solution (a turnpike), which leads to the crucial simplification of the analysis, because
stationary solutions are usually much easier to identify and calculate.
A very detailed analytic description of models is not achievable for models with larger
state-spaces. For such models numeric calculations can be effectively exploited for getting
the detailed picture of the dynamics, its phase portrait and bifurcations. We are not
touching numerics in this book. Instead of numerics we employ the asymptotic analysis
to describe the dynamics under reasonable asymptotic regimes. This approach is akin to
physics, where the search for a relevant small parameter is the key tool for getting insights
into a complicated phenomenon. We identify and exploit three natural small parameters
in our MFGs leading to the three asymptotic regimes: fast execution of personal decisions
(why should one wait long to execute one’s own decisions?), small discounts (means in
practical terms that the planning horizon is not very small) and small coupling constants
of binary interaction, the last one being of course the most standard in physics.
Finally we present some literature review indicating main trends both in our main
methodology (dynamic law of large numbers) and in the concrete areas of applications
(inspection, corruption, etc), most closely related to our methods and objectives. The
literature is quite abundant and keeps growing rapidly.
Chapter 2
Best response principals
In this chapter our basic tool, the dynamic law of large numbers (LLN, whose descriptive
explanation was given in Chapter 1), is set on the firm mathematical ground. We prove
several versions of this LLN, with different regularity assumptions on the coefficients,
with and without major players, and finally with a distinguished (or tagged) player, the
latter version being used later in Part II. The convergence is proved with rather precise
estimates of the error terms, which is of course crucial for any practical applications. For
instance, we show that in the case of smooth coefficients, the convergence rates, measuring
the difference between the various bulk characteristics of the dynamics of N players and
the limiting evolution (corresponding to the infinite number of players), are of order 1/N .
For example, for N = 10 players this difference is about 10%, showing that the number
N does not have to be ’very large’ for the approximation (1.3) of ’infinitely many players’
to give reasonable predictions.
In the presence of a major player, the theory is built here for the model of what can be
called the best response principal, where the major player chooses the strategy at any time
as the instantaneous best response (in case of several major players as an instantaneous
Nash equilibrium) for the current distribution of small players. More realistic forward
looking major player will be analysed in the next chapter.
Further in this chapter we develop the theory of approximate Nash equilibria for our
mean-field interacting systems of a large number of agents showing that these equilibria
can be approximated by the rest points of the system of the limiting kinetic equations.
This result yields a remarkable static game-theoretic interpretation of the rest points of
kinetic equations, which is independent of the myopic hypothesis and migration models
used in the derivation of the latter. When these rest points are dynamically stable, we
show further that the Markov evolution of the systems of many agents spends large periods
of time in a neighborhood of these rest points. Moreover, in some cases, the connection
becomes even deeper: the supports of the invariant measures of the Markov evolutions of
N agents turn out to be concentrated around these fixed points. This result makes the
crucial extension of the LLN limit from finite to infinite times.
Next we extend our modelling to the case of discontinuous coefficients linking unique-
ness and non-uniqueness of the solutions to the kinetic equations with the problem of the
existence of the invariant measures for the prelimiting game of a finite number of agents.
Discontinuous coefficients arise naturally, when small payers are considered as rational op-
timizers (that is, in the setting of MFG) with a finite-valued control parameter, switching
between these values creating discontinuities, separating regular regimes.
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Finally we extend the modelling to the so-called semi Markov chains allowing for the
waiting times between the jumps to be non-exponential, but to have heavy power tails.
In this case the limiting dynamics turns to the fractional PDE, with the solution process
obtained by certain random time change of the solutions of the initial kinetic equations.
In particular, the dynamic LLN limit becomes a random process, unlike all other sit-
uations discussed in this book. This brings the theory to the realm of the fractional
calculus, which becomes one of the major trends in the modern application of analysis to
physics and economics. In fact, many observations of naturally occurring processes give
strong evidence of the presence of heavy tails in the distribution of time between various
transitions (see e. g. [222] or [229]).
2.1 Preliminaries: Markov chains
Two basic notions that are crucial for our analysis are Markov chains and the charac-
teristics of the first order linear partial differential equations (PDE). We briefly recall
now these notions (with more analytic detail than in Section 1.1) referring for systematic
exposition to numerous textbooks, see e.g. [185] or [113] for Markov chains and [192],
[193], [142] for ODEs and PDEs.
Let us first recall the basic setting of continuous time Markov chains with a finite state
space {1, ..., d}, which can be interpreted as the types of agents or particles (say, possible
opinions of individuals on a certain subject, or the levels of fitness in a military unit, or
the types of robots in a robot swarm). A Markov chain on {1, ..., d} is specified by the
choice of a Q-matrix or a Kolmogorov’s matrix Q, which is a d×d square matrix such that
its non-diagonal elements are non-negative and the elements of each row sum up to zero
(and thus the diagonal elements are non-positive). As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the
Markov chain with the Q-matrix Q is the process evolving by the following rule. Starting
from any time t and a current state i one waits a |Qii|-exponential random waiting time
τ and then the position jumps to a state j according to the distribution Qij/|Qii|. Then
at time t + τ the procedure starts again from position j, etc.
To work with the Markov chain we need more detail of its analytic description. Let
Xi(t) denote the position of the chain at time t ≥ 0, if it started at i at the initial time
t = 0, and let Pij(t) denote the probability of the transfer from i to j in time t, so that
P(Xj(t) = j) = Pij(t).
Then one can show that these transition probabilities P (t) = {Pij(t)} satisfies the following
Kolmogorov’s forward equations
d
dt
Pij(t) =
d∑
l=1
QljPil(t), t ≥ 0,
or in matrix form
d
dt
P (t) = P (t)Q.
On the other hand, the evolution of averages,
T tf(i) = Ef(Xi(t)) =
d∑
j=1
Pij(t)f(j)
CHAPTER 2. BEST RESPONSE PRINCIPALS 24
for any function f on the state space {1, ..., d}, i.e. for any vector f ∈ Rd, satisfies the
Kolmogorov’s backward equations
d
dt
T tf(i) =
d∑
j=1
QijT
tf(j), t ≥ 0,
or in the vector form
d
dt
T tf = QT tf.
Consequently T t can be calculated as the matrix exponent:
T tf = etQf.
Remark 5. The values of the function f above will be denoted both by fn and f(n)
reflecting two interpretations of f as a vector in Rd and a function on the state space.
The matrix Q considered as the linear operator in Rd is called the generator of the
Markov chain Xi(t) and the operators T
t in Rd are called the transition operators. These
operators form a semigroup, that is, they satisfy the equation T tT s = T t+s for any s, t > 0,
which is directly seen from the exponential representation T t = etQ.
These definitions have natural extensions for the case of time dependent matrices Q.
Namely, let {Q(t)} = {(Qij)(t)} be a family of d × d square Q-matrices or Kolmogorov
matrices depending piecewise continuously on time t ≥ 0. The family {Q(t)} specifies a
(time non-homogeneous) Markov chain Xs,j(t) on the state space {1, ..., d}, which is the
following process. Starting from any time t and a current state i one waits a |Qii|(t)-
exponential random waiting time. After such time τ the position jumps to a state j
according to the distribution (Qij/|Qii|)(t). Then at time t+ τ the procedure starts again
from position j, etc.
Let us denote Xs,j(t) the position of this process at time t if it was initiated at time
s in the state i. The transition probabilities P (s, t) = (Pij(s, t))
d
i,j=1, s ≤ t, defining the
probabilities to migrate from i to j during the time segment [s, t], are said to form the
transition matrix and the corresponding operators
Us,tf(i) = Ef(Xs,i(t)) =
d∑
j=1
Pij(s, t)f(j)
are called the transition operators of the Markov chain. The matrices Q(t) define the
time-dependent generator of the chain acting in Rd as
(Q(t)f)n =
∑
m6=n
Qnm(t)(fm − fn), f = (f1, · · · , fd).
The transition matrices satisfy the Kolmogorov’s forward equation
d
dt
Pij(s, t) =
d∑
l=1
Qlj(t)Pil(s, t), s ≤ t,
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and the transition operators of this chain satisfy the chain rule, also called the Chapman-
Kolmogorov equation, Us,rU r,t = Us,t for s ≤ r ≤ t, and the Kolmogorov backward equa-
tions
d
ds
(Us,tf)(i) = −
d∑
j=1
Qij(U
s,tf)(j), s ≤ t.
A two-parameter family of operators, Us,t, s ≤ t, satisfying the chain rule, is said to from
a (backward) propagator.
Concerning discrete time Markov chains Xi(t) specified by the transition matrix P =
{Pij} (briefly mentioned in Section 1.1) let us recall the evident fact that the probabilities
P nij of transitions i→ j in time n (i.e. the probabilities of being in j at time t conditioned
on the initial state i at time 0) form the matrix P n = {P nij}, which is the power of the
transition matrix P : P n = (P )n, n = 0, 1, · · · . The corresponding transition operators
describing the dynamics of the averages act as the multiplication by P n, and hence will
be also denoted by P n:
P nf(i) = Ef(Xi(n)) = (P
nf)(i) =
∑
j
P nijf(j).
A trivial but important modification to be mentioned is the similar setting but with
time between jumps being any fixed time τ . This modification allows one to establish
close link between discrete and continuous time modeling. Namely, for a continuous time
Markov chain with the transition operators T t specified by the Q-matrix Q, let
τ < (max
i
|Qii|)−1.
Then one can define the discrete-time Markov chain on the same state space with the
transition matrix P τ = {P τij}, where
P τii = 1− τ |Qii|, P τij = τQij , j 6= i. (2.1)
In matrix form this rewrites as
P τ = 1+ τQ,
where 1 denotes the unit matrix. Hence
(P τ )n = (1+ τQ)n.
Consequently, if τ → 0 and n→∞ in such a way that nτ → t,
lim(P τ )n = etQ = T t, (2.2)
yielding the important link between the semigroup T t and its discrete-time approximations
P τ .
Extension of these results to time-dependent chains (with P depending explicitly on t)
is more or less straightforward. The transition probabilities just become time dependent:
P τ,tii = 1− τ
∑
i
|Qii(t)|, P τ,tij = τQij(t), i 6= j, (2.3)
or P τ,t = 1+ τQ(t).
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2.2 Preliminaries: ODEs and first order PDEs
Let us turn to the auxiliary results on ODEs and linear PDEs that we shall need. The
results are mostly standard (see e.g. [192], [193] and [142]) and we will not prove them,
but collect them in the form convenient for direct referencing.
Let x˙ = g(x) be a (vector-valued) ordinary differential equation (ODE) in Rd. If g is
a Lipschitz function, its solution Xx(t) with the initial condition x is known to be well
defined for all t ∈ R. Hence one can define the lifting of this evolution on functions:
T tf(x) = f(Xx(t)).
These transition operators act as continuous contraction operators on the space C(Rd)
and in its subspace C∞(R
d), and they form a group, i.e. T tT s = T s+t for any s, t. The
operator
Lf(x) = g(x) · ∂f
∂x
is called the generator of this group, because for any f ∈ C∞(Rd) ∩ C1(Rd)
d
dt
|t=0T tf = Lf.
If g ∈ C1(Rd), then
d
dt
T tf = LT tf = T tLf (2.4)
for any t, so that the function S(t, x) = T tf(x) = f(Xx(t)) satisfies the linear first order
partial differential equation (PDE)
∂S
∂t
− g(x) · ∂S
∂x
= 0, (2.5)
with the initial condition S(0, x) = f(x) for any f ∈ C∞(Rd) ∩ C1(Rd). Solutions Xx(t)
to the ODE x˙ = g(x) are referred to as the characteristics of PDE (2.5), because the
solutions to (2.5) are expressed in terms of Xx(t).
Let us recall the basic result on the smooth dependence of the solutions Xx(t) on the
initial point x and the implied regularity of the solutions to (2.5) (key steps of the proof
are provided in Section 4.1 in a more general case).
Proposition 2.2.1. (i) Let g ∈ CbLip(Rd). Then Xx(t) ∈ CbLip(Rd) as a function of x
and
‖Xx(t)‖Lip ≤ exp{t‖g‖Lip}. (2.6)
(ii) Let g ∈ C1(Rd). Then Xx(t) ∈ C1(Rd) as a function of x and (recall that
‖g‖Lip = ‖g(1)‖)∥∥∥∥∂Xx(t)∂x
∥∥∥∥ = sup
j,x
∥∥∥∥∂Xx(t)∂xj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ exp{t‖g(1)‖} = exp{t sup
k,x
∥∥∥∥∂g(x)∂xk
∥∥∥∥}. (2.7)
Moreover, if f ∈ C1(Rd), then T tf ∈ C1(Rd) and
‖(T tf)(1)‖ = sup
j,x
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂xj f(Xx(t))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖f (1)‖
∥∥∥∥∂Xx(t)∂x
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ‖f (1)‖ exp{t‖g(1)‖}. (2.8)
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(iii) Let g ∈ C2(Rd). Then Xx(t) ∈ C2(Rd) as a function of x and∥∥∥∥∂2Xx(t)∂x2
∥∥∥∥ = sup
j,i,x
∥∥∥∥∂2Xx(t)∂xi∂xj
∥∥∥∥ ≤ t‖g(2)‖ exp{3t‖g(1)‖}. (2.9)
Moreover, if f ∈ C2(Rd), then T tf ∈ C2(Rd) and
‖(T tf)(2)‖ = sup
j,i,x
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂xj∂xi f(Xx(t))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖f (2)‖ exp{2t‖g(1)‖}+ t‖f (1)‖ ‖g(2)‖ exp{3t‖g(1)‖}.
(2.10)
Let us also quote the result on the continuous dependence of the solutions on the r.h.s.
and initial data.
Proposition 2.2.2. Let gi ∈ CbLip(Rd), i = 1, 2 and let X ix(t) denote the solutions of the
equations x˙ = gi(x). Let ‖g1 − g2‖ ≤ δ. Then
|X1x(t)−X2y (t)| ≤ (tδ + |x− y|) exp{t‖gi‖Lip}, i = 1, 2. (2.11)
As follows from (2.4),
T tf − f
t
→ Lf, t→ 0,
for any f ∈ C∞(Rd) ∩ C1(Rd). As a corollary to previous results let us obtain the rates
of this convergence.
Proposition 2.2.3. Let g ∈ C1(Rd) and f ∈ C∞(Rd) ∩ C2(Rd). Then
‖T tf − f‖ ≤ t‖g‖ ‖f‖bLip, (2.12)
‖T
tf − f
t
− Lf‖ ≤ t‖g‖(‖g‖ ‖f (2)‖+ ‖g‖Lip‖f‖Lip) ≤ t‖g‖ ‖g‖bLip‖f‖C2. (2.13)
Proof. By (2.4),
‖T tf − f‖ = ‖
∫ t
0
T sLf ds‖ ≤ t‖Lf‖,
implying (2.12). Next, by (2.4),
T tf − f
t
− Lf = 1
t
∫ t
0
T sLf ds− Lf = 1
t
∫ t
0
(T sLf − Lf) ds.
Applying (2.12) to the function Lf yields the first inequality in (2.13), the second in-
equality being a direct consequence.
A more general setting of non-autonomous equations x˙ = g(t, x) is required, where g
is Lipschitz in x and piecewise continuous in t. Here the solutions Xs,x(t) with the initial
point x at time s are well defined and the transition operators form a two-parameter
family:
Us,tf(x) = f(Xs,x(t)). (2.14)
These operators satisfy the chain rule Us,rU r,t = Us,t and the function S(s, x) = Us,tf(x)
satisfies the PDE
∂S
∂s
+ g(s, x) · ∂S
∂x
= 0, (2.15)
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with the initial (or terminal) condition S(t, x) = f(x). As mentioned above, the operators
Us,t satisfying the chain rule are said to form a propagator. Moreover, these operators
form a Feller propagator meaning that they also act in the space C∞(R
d) and depend
strongly continuous on s and t. That is, if f ∈ C∞(Rd), then Us,tf(x) is a continuous
function t 7→ Us,t ∈ C∞(Rd) for any s and a continuous function s 7→ Us,t ∈ C∞(Rd) for
any t.
The solutions Xs,x(t) to the ODE x˙ = g(t, x) are called the characteristics of PDE
(2.15). The results of Propositions 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 (and their proofs) hold for the equation
x˙ = g(t, x), if all norms of functions of t, x are understood as supt of their norms as
functions of x, say
‖g‖Lip = sup
t
‖g(t, .)‖Lip, ‖g(2)‖ = sup
t
‖g(2)(t, .)‖. (2.16)
With this agreement the following estimates hold:
‖Xs,x(t)‖Lip ≤ exp{(t− s)‖g‖Lip}, (2.17)
‖(Us,tf)(1)‖ = sup
j,x
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂xj f(Xs,x(t))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖f (1)‖ exp{(t− s)‖g(1)‖}, (2.18)∥∥∥∥∂2Xs,x(t)∂x2
∥∥∥∥ ≤ (t− s)‖g(2)‖ exp{3(t− s)‖g(1)‖}, (2.19)
‖(Us,tf)(2)‖ ≤ ‖f (2)‖ exp{2(t− s)‖g(1)‖}+(t− s)‖f (1)‖ ‖g(2)‖ exp{3(t− s)‖g(1)‖}, (2.20)
with the derivatives on l.h.s. existing whenever the derivatives on the r.h.s. exist.
As is easily seen, for propagators estimate (2.12) still holds, that is,
‖Us,tf − f‖ ≤ (t− s)‖g‖ ‖f‖bLip,
and in estimate (2.13) an additional term appears on the r.h.s. depending on the conti-
nuity of g with respect to t. For instance, if g is Lipschitz in t with the constant
κ = sup
x
‖g(., x)‖Lip,
the analog of estimate (2.13) writes down as
‖U
s,tf − f
t− s − Lsf‖ ≤ (t− s)‖g‖ ‖g‖bLip‖f‖C2 + (t− s)κ‖f‖bLip. (2.21)
Remark 6. Evolution (s, x) → Xs,x(t) can be looked at as the deterministic Markov
process with the transition operators Us,t.
Finally let us remind the result on the sensitivity of linear evolutions with respect to
a parameter. Let us consider the following linear ODE in Rd:
y˙ = A(t, x)y, y ∈ Rd, t ∈ [0, T ], (2.22)
with the matrix A depending smoothly on a parameter x = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Rn. Here
we shall work with y using their sup-norms. All function norms of A will be meant as
supt∈[0,T ] of the corresponding norms as functions of x. For instance,
‖A‖ = sup
t∈[0,T ],x
sup
i
∑
j
|Aij(t, x)|.
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For the solution y(t) = y(t, x) to (2.22) with some initial data y0(x) that may itself depend
on x we have the evident estimate
‖y(t)‖sup ≤ exp{t‖A‖}‖y0‖sup.
Proposition 2.2.4. Let A(t, .) ∈ C2(Rn). Then y(t) is also twice differentiable with
respect to x and
∥∥∥∥ ∂y∂xi
∥∥∥∥
sup
≤ exp{2t‖A‖}
(∥∥∥∥∂y0∂xi
∥∥∥∥
sup
+ t
∥∥∥∥∂A∂xi
∥∥∥∥ ‖y0‖sup
)
, (2.23)
∥∥∥∥ ∂2y∂xi∂xj
∥∥∥∥
sup
≤ exp{3t‖A‖}
(∥∥∥∥ ∂2y0∂xi∂xj
∥∥∥∥
sup
+ t
∥∥∥∥ ∂2A∂xi∂xj
∥∥∥∥ ‖y0‖sup
+2t sup
k
∥∥∥∥ ∂y0∂xk
∥∥∥∥
sup
sup
k
∥∥∥∥ ∂A∂xk
∥∥∥∥
sup
+ 2t2 sup
k
∥∥∥∥ ∂A∂xk
∥∥∥∥
2
‖y0‖sup
)
. (2.24)
Proof. All these bounds arise from the solutions of the linear equations satisfied by the
derivatives in question:
d
dt
∂y
∂xi
= A(t, x)
∂y
∂xi
+
∂A
∂xi
y,
d
dt
∂2y
∂xi∂xj
= A(t, x)
∂2y
∂xi∂xj
+
∂A
∂xj
∂y
∂xi
+
∂A
∂xi
∂y
∂xj
+
∂2A
∂xi∂xj
y.
For the justification (existence of the derivatives) we again refer to the textbooks in ODEs
mentioned above.
2.3 Mean-field interacting particle systems
Let us turn to the basic setting of mean-field interacting particle systems with a finite
number of types.
Let {Q(t, x)} = {(Qij)(t, x)} be a family of d × d square Q-matrices or Kolmogorov
matrices depending Lipschitz continuously on a vector x from the closed simplex
Σd = {x = (x1, ..., xd) ∈ Rd+ :
d∑
j=1
xj = 1},
and piecewise continuously on time t ≥ 0, so that ‖Q‖bLip = ‖Q‖ + ‖Q‖Lip, where we
define (in accordance with our basic conventions, see (2) - (4) in Preface)
‖Q‖ = sup
i,t,x
∑
j
|Qij(t, x)| <∞, ‖Q‖Lip = sup
x 6=y
sup
i,t
∑
j |Qij(t, x)−Qij(t, y)|
|x− y| . (2.25)
In view of the properties of Q-matrices this implies
‖Q‖ = 2 sup
i,t,x
|Qii(t, x)| <∞, ‖Q‖Lip ≤ 2 sup
x 6=y
sup
i,t
∑
j 6=i |Qij(t, x)−Qij(t, y)|
|x− y| . (2.26)
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The norms on the derivatives of the families of Kolmogorov matrices Q with respect
to x can be, of course, introduced, in various equivalent ways. For definiteness, we will
use the following quantities, most convenient for our purposes:
‖Q‖C1 = ‖Q‖+ sup
i
∑
j
∣∣∣∣sup
k,t,x
∂Qij
∂xk
∣∣∣∣ , ‖Q‖C2 = ‖Q‖C1 + sup
i
∑
j
∣∣∣∣ sup
k,l,t,x
∂2Qij
∂xk∂xl
∣∣∣∣ . (2.27)
As above this implies the estimates in terms of the transitions Qij with j 6= i:
‖Q‖C1 ≤ ‖Q‖+2 sup
i
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣sup
k,t,x
∂Qij
∂xk
∣∣∣∣ , ‖Q‖C2 ≤ ‖Q‖C1+2 sup
i
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣ sup
k,l,t,x
∂2Qij
∂xk∂xl
∣∣∣∣ . (2.28)
In what follows the matrices Q will depend on the additional parameter controlled by
the principal, but for the moment this dependence is not relevant and will be ignored.
Suppose we have a large number of particles distributed arbitrary among the types
{1, ..., d}. More precisely our state space is Zd+, the set of sequences of d non-negative
integers n = (n1, ..., nd), where each ni specifies the number of particles in the state i. Let
N denote the total number of particles in state n: N = n1 + ... + nd. For i 6= j and a
state n with ni > 0 denote by n
ij the state obtained from n by removing one particle of
type i and adding a particle of type j, that is ni and nj are changed to ni − 1 and nj + 1
respectively. The mean-field interacting particle system (in continuous time) specified by
the family {Q} is defined as the Markov chain on S with the generator
LNt f(n) =
d∑
i,j=1
niQij(t, n/N)[f(n
ij)− f(n)]. (2.29)
Probabilistic description of this process is as follows. Starting from any time and
current state n one attaches to each particle a |Qii|(t, n/N)-exponential random waiting
time (where i is the type of this particle). If the shortest of the waiting times τ turns out
to be attached to a particle of type i, this particle jumps to a state j according to the
distribution (Qij/|Qii|)(t, n/N). Briefly, with this distribution and at rate |Qii|(t, n/N),
any particle of type i can turn (migrate) to a type j. After any such transition the
process starts again from the new state nij . Notice that since the number of particles N
is preserved by any jump, this process is in fact a Markov chain with a finite state space.
Normalizing the states to x = n/N ∈ Σd∩Zd+/N , leads to the generator (also denoted
by LNt , with some abuse of notation)
LNt f(n/N) =
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
niQij(t, n/N)[f(n
ij/N)− f(n/N)], (2.30)
or equivalently
LNt f(x) =
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
xiQij(t, x)N [f(x− ei/N + ej/N)− f(x)], x ∈ Zd+/N, (2.31)
where e1, ..., ed denotes the standard basis in R
d. Let us denote by XN(t) = XNs,x(t) the
corresponding Markov chain and by E = Es,x the expectation with respect to this chain,
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where x ∈ Σd ∩ Zd+/N denotes the initial state at time s < t. The transition operators of
this chain will be denoted by Us,tN :
Us,tN f(x) = Ef(X
N
s,x(t)) = Es,xf(X
N(t)), s ≤ t. (2.32)
Two versions of the notations in this formula (with (s, x) attached either to E or toXN(t))
are both standard in the theory. As any transition operators of a Markov chain, these
operators satisfy the chain rule (or Chapman-Kolmogorov equation)
Us,rN U
r,t
N = U
s,t
N , s ≤ r ≤ t.
and are said to form a propagator.
In the pressure and resistance setting of (1.10) generator (2.31) reduces to
LNt f(x) =
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
κxixj(Rj(t, x)−Ri(t, x))+N [f(x− ei/N + ej/N)− f(x)]. (2.33)
Recall that the dual operator (LNt )
∗ to the operator LNt is defined from the relation∑
x=n/N∈Σd
[(LNt f)(x)g(x)− f(x)((LNt )∗g)(x)] = 0.
By the shift of the summation index it is straightforward to see that the dual is given by
the formula
(LNt )
∗g(y) =
d∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
[(yi+1/N)Qij(t, y+ei/N−ej/N)g(y+ei/N−ej/N)−yiQij(t, y)g(y)],
(2.34)
where, for convenience, it is set that Qij(t, x) = 0 for x /∈ Σd. As is known from the theory
of Markov chains, stable distributions g (also referred to as equilibrium probabilities) for
the chains, defined by the generator LNt = L
N in the time-homogeneous case, solve the
equation (LN )∗g = 0, and for large times t these Markov chains converge to some of these
equilibria.
In accordance with (2.1), mean-field interacting systems in discrete time related to the
above discussed mean-field interacting particle system in continuous time specified by the
family {Q} is defined as the Markov chain evolving in discrete time t = kτ , k ∈ N, with
τ ≤ (N‖Q‖)−1 (2.35)
with the transition probabilities
P τ,tnnij = P
τ,t
nnij ,N = τniQij(t, x), i 6= j, (2.36)
the probability of remaining in a given state n being 1 − τ∑i ni|Qii(t, x)|. As it follows
from (2.36),
P τ,tN f − f
τ
= LNt f (2.37)
for all N , t and τ . If Q does not depend explicitly on t, the dependence on t disappears
in (2.36), (2.37).
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As one can expect and as will be shown, the theories of discrete and continuous time
mean-field interacting systems are very similar. However, the discrete-time version is a
bit more restrictive for the choice of parameters, as they are linked by (2.35).
Two asymptotic regimes for mean-field interacting particle system (given by operators
LNt ) are studied in the first part of this book: N →∞ and t→∞. In full detail the limit
limt→∞ limN→∞ will be studied. An important question is whether the order of applying
these limits can be interchanged. In other words, what can be said about t→∞ limit of
the chain with a finite number of particles N (which is described essentially by the highly
multidimensional equation (LN )∗g = 0) if we know the large-time-behavior of the simpler
limiting dynamics N →∞ (given by (2.40) below).
2.4 Dynamic LLN: smooth coefficients
As above, the functional norms of functions of two variables (t, x) with and x ∈ Σd will
mean the supt of their respective norms as functions of x.
Our main interest concerns the asymptotic behavior of these chains as N → ∞. To
this end, let us observe that, for f ∈ C1(Σd),
lim
N→∞, n/N→x
N [f(nij/N)− f(n/N)] = ∂f
∂xj
(x)− ∂f
∂xi
(x),
so that
lim
N→∞, n/N→x
LNt f(n/N) = Λtf(x),
where
Λtf(x) =
d∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
xiQij(t, x)[
∂f
∂xj
− ∂f
∂xi
](x) =
d∑
k=1
∑
i 6=k
[xiQik(t, x)− xkQki(t, x)] ∂f
∂xk
(x).
(2.38)
More precisely, if f ∈ C2(Σd), then, by the Taylor formula,
LNt f(x)− Λtf(x) =
1
2N
d∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
xiQij(t, x)[
∂2f
∂x2i
+
∂2f
∂x2j
− ∂
2f
∂xi∂xj
](θ),
for x = n/N , with some θ ∈ Σd, and thus
‖LNt f − Λtf‖ ≤
1
N
‖f (2)‖ ‖Q‖. (2.39)
The limiting operator Λtf is a first-order PDO with characteristics solving the equa-
tions
x˙k =
∑
i 6=k
[xiQik(t, x)− xkQki(t, x)] =
d∑
i=1
xiQik(t, x), k = 1, ..., d, (2.40)
called the kinetic equations for the process of interaction described above. In vector form
this system rewrites as
x˙ = QT (t, x)x = xQ(t, x), (2.41)
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where QT is the transpose matrix to Q. (In the second notation xQ(t, x) the vector x is
understood as a row vector allowing for the multiplication by Q from the right.)
The corresponding transition operators act on C(Σd) as
Us,tf(x) = f(Xs,x(t)), s ≤ t. (2.42)
For the case of operator (2.33) the limiting operator takes the form
Λtf(x) =
d∑
i,j=1
κxixj [Rj(t, x)−Ri(t, x)]+
[
∂f
∂xj
− ∂f
∂xj
]
=
d∑
i,j=1
κxixj [Rj(t, x)− Ri(t, x)] ∂f
∂xj
, (2.43)
and the characteristics (or the kinetic equations) become
x˙j =
d∑
i=1
κxixj [Rj(t, x)− Ri(t, x)]. (2.44)
For the sake of clarity we often derive results first for time independent Q and then
comment on (usually straightforward) modification required for the general case (time
dependent versions are important only for the second part of the book).
Thus we shall denote byXx(t) the characteristics and byX
N
x (t) the Markov chain start-
ing at x at time t = 0. The generators of these processes also become time-homogeneous:
LNt = L
N , Λt = Λ. The corresponding transition operators U
s,t depend only on the differ-
ence t− s and the operators U t = U0,t, defined as U tf(x) = f(Xx(t)), form a semigroup.
The transition operators for the Markov chain XNx (t) are
U tNf(x) = Ef(X
N
x (t)) = Exf(X
N(t)).
Let us write down explicitly the straightforward estimates of the norms of the r.h.s.
g(t, x) = xQ(t, x) of (2.41), as a function of x, in terms of the norms of Q introduced in
(2.26) and (2.28):
‖g‖ ≤ ‖Q‖, ‖g‖Lip ≤ ‖Q‖bLip, ‖g‖bLip ≤ 2‖Q‖bLip, ‖g(2)‖ ≤ 2‖Q‖C2, (2.45)
because
∂gk
∂xl
= Qlk +
∑
j
xj
∂Qjk
∂xl
,
∂2gk
∂xl∂xm
=
∂Qlk
∂xm
+
∂Qmk
∂xl
+
∑
j
xj
∂2Qjk
∂xl∂xm
.
Under (2.26) system (2.41) is easily seen to be well-posed in Σd (see Remark below for
additional comments and the proof in more general infinite-dimensional setting in Section
4.1), that is, for any x ∈ Σd the solution Xx(t) to (2.41) with Q not depending on t and
with the initial condition x at time t = 0 is well defined and belongs to Σd for all times
t > 0 (not necessarily for t < 0).
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Remark 7. (i) Unlike general setting (2.14), where the condition t > 0 was not essential,
here it is essential, because the preservation of the simplex Σd holds only in forward time.
It holds, because x˙k ≥ 0 whenever xk = 0 and x ∈ Σd, which does not allow a trajectory to
cross the boundary of Σd. Hence the operators Φ
t are defined as operators in C(Σd) only
for t > 0. (ii) It is seen from the structure of (2.41) that if xk 6= 0, then (Xx(t))k 6= 0 for
any t ≥ 0. Hence the boundary of Σd is not attainable for this semigroup, but, depending
on Q, it can be gluing or not. For instance, if all elements of Q never vanish, then the
points Xx(t) never belong to the boundary of Σd for t > 0, even if the initial point x does
so. In fact, in this case x˙k > 0 whenever xk = 0 and x ∈ Σd.
Our first objective now is to show that the Markov chains XNx (t) do in fact converge to
the deterministic evolution Xx(t) in the sense that the corresponding transition operators
converge (the so-called weak convergence of Markov processes), the previous arguments
showing only that their generators converge on sufficiently smooth functions. We are also
interested in precise rates of convergence.
The next elementary result concerns the (unrealistic) situation with optimal regularity
of all objects concerned.
Theorem 2.4.1. Let all the elements Qij(x) belong to C
2(Σd) and f ∈ C2(Σd). Then
sup
x∈Zd
+
/N
|U tNf(x)− U tf(x)| ≤
t‖Q‖
N
(‖f (2)‖+ 2t‖f‖bLip‖Q‖C2) exp{3t‖Q‖bLip}, (2.46)
and, for any x and n/N ,
|U tNf(n/N)− U tf(x)|
≤
[
t‖Q‖
N
(‖f (2)‖+ 2t‖f‖bLip‖Q‖C2) + ‖f‖bLip‖x− n/N‖
]
exp{3t‖Q‖bLip}. (2.47)
Finally, if the initial states n/N converge to a point x ∈ Σd, as N →∞, then
sup
0≤t≤T
|U tNf(n/N)− U tf(x)| → 0, N →∞, (2.48)
for any T and any f ∈ C(Σd).
Proof. To compare the semigroups, we shall use the following standard trick. We write
(U t − U tN )f = U t−sN Us|ts=0f =
∫ t
0
d
ds
U t−sN U
sf ds =
∫ t
0
U t−sN (Λ− LN )Usf ds. (2.49)
Let us apply this equation to an f ∈ C2(Σd). By (2.10) and the second estimate of (2.45),
‖(U tf)(2)‖ ≤ (‖f (2)‖+ 2t‖f‖bLip‖Q‖C2) exp{3t‖Q‖bLip}.
Hence by (2.39),
‖(LN − Λ)Usf‖ ≤ ‖Q‖
N
(‖f (2)‖+ 2t‖f‖bLip‖Q‖C2) exp{3t‖Q‖bLip}.
Consequently (2.46) follows from (2.49) and the contraction property of U tN .
Equation (2.47) follows, because, by (2.8) and (2.45),
|U tf(x)− U tf(y)| ≤ ‖U tf‖Lip ‖x− y‖ ≤ exp{t‖Q‖bLip}‖f‖Lip ‖x− y‖.
The last statement is obtained because of the possibility to approximate any function
f ∈ C(Σd) by smooth functions.
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By the definition of the propagators U t, U tN , equations (2.46)-(2.48) can be written in
terms of the averages of the Markov chains XNx . For instance, (2.48) takes the form
sup
0≤t≤T
|Ef(XNn/N(t))− f(Xx(t))| → 0, N →∞. (2.50)
For time-dependent Q everything remains the same:
Theorem 2.4.2. Let all the elements Qij(t, x) belong to C
2(Σd) as functions of x and
are piecewise continuous as functions of t. Let f ∈ C2(Σd). Then
sup
x∈Zd
+
/N
|Us,tN f(x)−Us,tf(x)| ≤
(t− s)‖Q‖
N
(‖f (2)‖+2(t−s)‖f‖bLip‖Q‖C2) exp{3(t−s)‖Q‖bLip},
(2.51)
and the corresponding analog of (2.47) holds.
The proof is also the same, though instead of (2.49) one uses its version for propagators:
(Us,t − Us,tN )f = −Us,rN U r,t|tr=sf =
∫ t
s
Us,rN (Λr − LNr )U r,tf dr. (2.52)
The LLN for discrete-time setting is also analogous. Namely, the following result
holds, where we returned to the time-homogeneous setting.
Theorem 2.4.3. Let all the elements Qij(x) belong to C
2(Σd) and f ∈ C2(Σd). Let the
discrete-time Markov chain be defined by (2.35)-(2.37) Then
sup
n∈Zd
+
|(P τN)kf(n/N)− U tf(n/N)| ≤
2t‖Q‖
N
(‖f (2)‖+ 2t‖f‖bLip‖Q‖C2) exp{3t‖Q‖bLip},
(2.53)
for t = kτ , and, for any x and n/N ,
|(P τN)kf(n/N)− U tf(x)|
≤
[
2t‖Q‖
N
(‖f (2)‖+ 2t‖f‖bLip‖Q‖C2) + ‖f‖bLip‖x− n/N‖
]
exp{3t‖Q‖bLip}. (2.54)
And of course, the analog of convergence (2.48) also holds.
Proof. We have
((P τN)
k−U τk)f = (P τN)(k−1)(P τN −U τ ) + (P τN)(k−2)(P τN −U τ )U τ + · · ·+ (P τN −U τ )U τ(k−1).
By (2.39), (2.37) and (2.13),
‖(P τN − U τ )f‖ = τ
∥∥∥∥P τNf − fτ − U
τf − f
τ
∥∥∥∥
≤ τ
(‖Q‖
N
‖f (2)‖+ τ‖Q‖2‖f (2)‖+ τ‖Q‖ ‖Q‖bLip‖f‖bLip
)
≤ τ
N
(2‖Q‖ ‖f (2)‖+ ‖Q‖bLip‖f‖bLip),
where (2.35) was taken into account. Consequently, taking into account (2.10),
‖(P τN)kf − U τkf‖ ≤ exp{3t‖Q‖bLip}
×
(
2τn
N
‖Q‖ ‖f (2)‖+ τ
N
n−1∑
k=0
(‖Q‖bLip‖f‖bLip + 2kτ‖Q‖C2‖f‖bLip)
)
,
yielding (2.53). Estimate (2.54) follows like in Theorem 2.4.1.
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2.5 Dynamic LLN: Lipschitz coefficients
Let us move now to a more realistic situation where Q is only assumed to be Lipschitz,
that is, (2.26) holds.
Theorem 2.5.1. Let the functions Q(t, x) be piecewise continuous in t and belong to CbLip
as functions of x with ‖Q‖bLip = supt ‖Q(t, .)‖ ≤ ω with some ω. Suppose the initial data
x(N) = n/N of the Markov chains XNs,x(N)(t) converge to a certain x in R
d, as N →∞.
Then these Markov chains converge to the deterministic evolution Xs,x(t), in the weak
sense:
|Ef(XNs,x(N)(t))− f(Xs,x(t))| → 0, as N →∞, (2.55)
or in terms of the transition operators
|Us,tN f(x)− Us,tf(x)| → 0, as N →∞, (2.56)
for any f ∈ C(Σd), the convergence being uniform in x whenever the convergence x(N)→
x is uniform.
For smooth or Lipschitz f , the following rates of convergence are valid:
|Ef(XNs,x(N)(t))− f(Xs,x(N)(t))|
≤ C(t− s) exp{3(t− s)‖Q‖bLip}
(
(t− s)1/2
N1/2
‖Q‖bLip(d+ ‖Q‖)‖f‖bLip + ‖Q‖
N
‖f (2)‖
)
,
(2.57)
|Ef(XNs,x(N)(t))−f(Xs,x(N)(t))| ≤ C exp{3(t−s)‖Q‖bLip}(d+‖Q‖)‖Q‖bLip
(t− s)1/2
N1/2
‖f‖bLip,
(2.58)
|f(Xs,x(N)(t))− f(Xs,x(t))| ≤ exp{(t− s)‖Q‖bLip}‖f‖bLip‖x(N)− x‖ (2.59)
with a constant C.
Remark 8. The dependence on t and d is not essential here, but the latter becomes crucial
for dealing with infinite state-spaces, while the former for dealing with a forward looking
principal.
Remark 9. Assuming intermediate regularity of Q, that is, assuming Q ∈ C1(Σd) with
all first order derivatives being Ho¨lder continuous with a fixed index α ∈ (0, 1) will yield
intermediate rates of convergence between 1/N and 1/
√
N above.
Proof. To shorten the formulas let us write down a proof for time independent Q.
The Lipshitz continuity (2.59) of the solutions is a consequence of Proposition 2.2.1.
Next, since any function f ∈ C(Rd) can be approximated by functions from C2(Rd), the
convergence (2.55) follows from (2.57) and (2.59). Thus it remains to show (2.57) and
(2.58).
The main idea is to approximate all Lipschitz continuous functions involved by the
smooth ones. Namely, choosing an arbitrary mollifier χ (non-negative infinitely smooth
even function on R with a compact support and
∫
χ(w) dw = 1) and the corresponding
mollifier φ(y) =
∏
χ(yj) on R
d−1, let us define, for any function V on Σd, its approxima-
tion
Φδ[V ](x) =
∫
Rd−1
1
δd−1
φ
(y
δ
)
V (x− y) dy =
∫
Rd−1
1
δd−1
φ
(
x− y
δ
)
V (y) dy.
CHAPTER 2. BEST RESPONSE PRINCIPALS 37
Notice that Σd is (d− 1)-dimensional object, so that any V on it can be considered as a
function of first (d− 1) coordinates of a vector x ∈ Σd (continued to Rd−1 in an arbitrary
continuous way). It follows that
‖Φδ[V ]‖C1 = |Φδ[V ]‖bLip ≤ ‖V ‖bLip (2.60)
for any δ and
|Φδ[V ](x)− V (x)| ≤
∫
1
δd−1
φ
(y
δ
)
|V (x− y)− V (x)| dy
≤ ‖V ‖Lip
∫
Rd−1
1
δd−1
φ
(y
δ
)
|y|1 dy ≤ δ(d− 1)‖V ‖Lip
∫
R
|w|χ(w) dw. (2.61)
Remark 10. We care about dimension d in the estimates only for future use (here it is
irrelevant). By a different choice of mollifier φ one can get rid of d in (2.61), but then it
would pop up in (2.62), which is avoided with our φ.
Next, the norm ‖Φδ[V ]‖C2 does not exceed the sum of the norm ‖Φδ[V ]‖C1 and the
supremum of the Lipschitz constants of the functions
∂
∂xj
Φδ[V ](x) =
∫
1
δd
(
∂
∂xj
φ
)(y
δ
)
V (x− y) dy.
Hence
‖Φδ[V ](2)‖ ≤ ‖V ‖bLip1
δ
∫
|χ′(w)| dw, ‖Φδ[V ]‖C2 ≤ ‖V ‖bLip
(
1 +
1
δ
∫
|χ′(w)| dw
)
.
(2.62)
Let U tN,δ and U
t
δ denote the same transition operators as above but built with respect
to the matrices
Φδ[Q](x) =
∫
1
δd
φ
(y
δ
)
Q(x− y) dy
rather than Q. Notice that Φδ[Q](x) are also Q-matrices for any δ.
Similarly we denote by LN,δ and Λδ the corresponding generators and by Xδx(t) the
characteristics with Φδ[Q] used instead of Q.
By (2.61) and (2.11),
‖Xt(x)−Xδt (x)‖ ≤ Cδtd‖Q‖bLip exp{t‖Q‖bLip}
and hence
|U tf(x)− U tδf(x)| = |f(Xt(x)− f(Xδt (x))| ≤ C‖Q‖bLip‖f‖bLipδtd exp{t‖Q‖bLip}. (2.63)
Moreover, since
‖(LN,δ − LN )f‖ ≤ δ(d− 1)‖f‖bLip‖Q‖bLip
∫
R
|w|χ(w) dw,
it follows by (2.49) applied to propagators UN and UN,δ that the same estimate (2.63)
holds for the difference U tN,δ − U tN :
‖U tN,δf − U tNf‖ ≤ C‖Q‖bLip‖f‖bLipδtd exp{t‖Q‖bLip}. (2.64)
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By (2.46) and (2.62),
‖U tN,δf − U tδf‖ ≤
t‖Q‖
N
(‖f (2)‖+ Ct
δ
‖Q‖bLip‖f‖bLip). (2.65)
Therefore,
‖U tNf − U tf‖ ≤ ‖U tNf − U tN,δf‖+ ‖U tN,δf − U tδf‖+ ‖U tδf − U tf‖
≤ Ct
(
δd‖Q‖bLip‖f‖bLip + ‖Q‖
N
‖f (2)‖+ t
Nδ
‖Q‖bLip‖Q‖‖f‖bLip
)
exp{3t‖Q‖bLip}
Thus choosing δ =
√
t/N , makes the decay rate of δ and t/(Nδ) equal yielding (2.57).
Finally, if f is only Lipschitz, we approximate it by f˜ = Φδ˜[f ], so that the second
derivative of Φδ˜[f ] is bounded by ‖f‖bLip/δ˜. By the contraction property of U tN and U t,
‖U tN (f − f˜)‖ ≤ ‖f − f˜‖ ≤ Cdδ˜‖f‖bLip, ‖U t(f − f˜)‖ ≤ ‖f − f˜‖ ≤ Cdδ˜‖f‖bLip.
Thus the rates of convergence for f become of order
[dδ˜ + tδd‖Q‖bLip + t
2
Nδ
‖Q‖bLip‖Q‖+ t
Nδ˜
]‖f‖bLip exp{3t‖Q‖bLip}.
Choosing δ = δ˜ =
√
t/N yields (2.58).
The corresponding result for the discrete-time setting is again fully analogous.
Theorem 2.5.2. Let the functions Q(x) belong to CbLip. Let the discrete-time Markov
chains XN,τx (t) be defined by (2.35)-(2.37). Suppose the initial data x(N) = n/N of these
Markov chains converge to a certain x in Rd, as N → ∞ (and thus τ → 0 by (2.35)).
Then these Markov chains converge to the deterministic evolution Xx(t), in the weak
sense:
|Ef(XN,τx(N))(t))− f(Xx(t))| → 0, as N →∞, (2.66)
for any f ∈ C(Σd), the convergence being uniform in x whenever the convergence x(N)→
x is uniform.
For smooth or Lipschitz f , the following rates of convergence are valid:
|Ef(XN,τx(N)(t))− f(Xx(N)(t))|
≤ Ct exp{3t‖Q‖bLip}
(
t1/2
N1/2
(d+ ‖Q‖2bLip)‖f‖bLip +
‖Q‖
N
‖f (2)‖
)
, (2.67)
|Ef(XN,τx(N)(t))− f(Xx(N)(t))| ≤ C exp{3t‖Q‖bLip}(d+ ‖Q‖2bLip)
t1/2
N1/2
‖f‖bLip, (2.68)
with a constants C.
Proof. The only modification as compared with the proof of Theorem 2.5.2 is the necessity
to estimate (P τN,δ)
k−(P τN )k instead of U tN,δ−U tN . This is done like in the proof of Theorem
2.4.3 using the identity
((P τN)
k − (P τN,δ)k)f = (P τN)(n−1)(P τN − P τN,δ)
+(P τN)
(n−2)(P τN − P τN,δ)P τN,δ + · · ·+ (P τN − P τN,δ)(P τN,δ)k−1.
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2.6 Dynamic LLN with major players
As discussed in Section 1.4, we are mostly interested in the presence of a principal that may
exert pressure on small players on the level described by the parameter b from a bounded
convex subset of a Euclidean space. Mean-field interacting particle system controlled by
the principal will be generated by (2.29) with the coefficients depending on the control
parameter b of the principal (and not depending on time, for simplicity):
LN,bf(n) =
d∑
i,j=1
niQij(n/N, b)[f(n
ij)− f(n)]. (2.69)
In the simplest setting, which we refer to as ’best response principal’, one can imagine
the principal choosing the value of b∗ maximizing some current profit B(x, b, N) for given
x,N , that is via (1.5):
b∗(x,N) = argmaxB(x, ., N). (2.70)
If there exists a limit b∗(x) = lim b∗(x,N), the limiting evolution (1.3) turns to evolution
(1.6):
x˙k =
d∑
i=1
xiQik(x, b
∗(x)), k = 1, ..., d, (2.71)
or, in particular in pressure and resistance framework, to evolution (1.11):
x˙j =
∑
i
κxixj [Rj(x, b
∗(x))− Ri(x, b∗(x))], j = 1, ..., d. (2.72)
Remark 11. A more strategic thinking principal will be discussed in Chapter 3.
The corresponding modification of Theorem 2.5.1 is straightforward yielding the fol-
lowing result (using time-homogeneous Q for simplicity).
Theorem 2.6.1. Assume
|b∗(x,N)− b∗(x)| ≤ ǫ(N), (2.73)
with some ǫ(N) → 0, as N → ∞ and some function b∗(x), and let the functions Q(x, b)
(or, in particular, Rj(x, b) in the pressure and resistance framework), b
∗(x,N), b∗(x)
belong to CbLip as a function of their variables with norms uniformly bounded by some ω.
Suppose the initial data x(N) = n/N of the Markov chains XNx(N)(t) converge to a certain
x in Rd, as N → ∞. Then these Markov chains converge to the deterministic evolution
Xx(t) solving (2.71) (or (2.72) respectively):
|Ef(XNx(N))(t)− f(Xx(t))| → 0, as N →∞, (2.74)
for any f ∈ C(Σd), the convergence being uniform in x whenever the convergence x(N)→
x is uniform. For Lipschitz f , estimate (2.59) holds and (2.58) generalizes to
|Ef(XNx(N)(t)− f(Xx(N)(t))| ≤ C(ω, t)
(
dt1/2
N1/2
+ tǫ(N)
)
‖f‖bLip. (2.75)
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Similarly, there can be several, say K, major players or principals that may exert
pressure on small players. Assume their control parameters are bj (each chosen from
some bounded closed domain in a Euclidean space) and their profits are given by some
Lipschitz continuous functions Bj(x, b1, · · · , bK , N) depending on the distribution x of
small players. Recall that a Nash equilibrium in the game of K players given by these
payoffs (for any fixed x,N) is a profile of ’no regret’ strategies (b∗1(x,N), · · · , b∗K(x,N)),
that is, such strategies that unilateral deviation cannot be profitable:
Bj(x, b
∗
1(x,N), · · · , b∗K(x,N), N)
= max
bj
Bj(x, b
∗
1(x,N), · · · , b∗j−1(x,N), bj , b∗j+1(x,N), · · · , b∗K(x,N), N) (2.76)
for all j.
Assume that for x ∈ Σd there exists a branch of such Nash equilibria (b∗1(x,N), · · · , b∗K(x,N))
depending continuously on x such that there exists a limit
(b∗1(x), · · · , b∗K(x)) = lim
N→∞
(b∗1(x,N), · · · , b∗K(x,N)). (2.77)
The dynamics (2.71) or (2.72) and Theorem 2.6.1 extend automatically to the case of
major players adhering to these local (x dependent) Nash equilibria. For instance, (2.72)
takes the form
x˙j =
∑
i
κxixj [Rj(x, b
∗
1(x), · · · , b∗K(x))− Ri(x, b∗1(x), · · · , b∗K(x))], j = 1, ..., d. (2.78)
2.7 Dynamic LLN with distinguished (tagged) player
Looking for a behavior of some particular distinguished or tagged particle inside the pool
of a large number of indistinguishable ones, is a well known useful tool in statistical
mechanics and experimental biology. Let us extend here the results of Sections 2.4 and
2.5 to the case of a tagged agent following different transition rules than the crowd. This
analysis will be used in Section ??.
Under the setting of Theorem 2.5.1 let us assume that one distinguished agent in the
group of N players deviates from the general rules moving according to the transition Q-
matrix Qdev(t, x). Then the natural state-space for such Markov chain will be {1, · · · , d}×
Σd, the first coordinate j denoting the position of the tagged player. Instead of (2.31),
the generator of this Markov chain becomes
LN,devt f(j, x) =
∑
k
Qdevjk (t, x)(f(k, x)− f(j, x))
+
∑
i
(xi − δji /N)
∑
k 6=i
Qik(t, x) [f(j, x− ei/N + ek/N)− f(j, x)] . (2.79)
Let Us,tN denote the transition operators of this Markov chains.
For smooth f and as N →∞ operators (2.79) converge to the operator
Λdevt f(j, x) =
∑
k
Qdevjk (t, x)(f(k, x)− f(j, x))
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+
∑
i
xi
∑
k 6=i
Qik(t, x)
[
∂f
∂xk
− ∂f
∂xi
]
(j, x), (2.80)
with the rates of convergence
‖LN,devt f − Λdevt f‖ = sup
j,x
|(LN,devt − Λdevt )f(j, x)| ≤
‖Q‖
N
(‖f (2)‖+ 2‖f‖), (2.81)
where
‖f (2)‖ = sup
j,i,k,x
∣∣∣∣ ∂f∂xi∂xk (j, x)
∣∣∣∣ .
Operator (2.80) generates quite specific Markov process on {1, · · · , d}×Σd (generally
speaking, not a chain any more, as it has a continuous state-space). Its second coordinate
x evolves according to the deterministic kinetic equations x˙ = QT (t, x)x, independently
on the random first coordinate, which, given j, x at time s, evolves according to the
time-nonhomogeneous Markov chain Jxs,j(t) ∈ {1, · · · , d} with the Q-matrix
Qdevij (t) = Qij(t, Xs,x(t), u
dev
i (t)).
Therefore the transition operators Us,t of this process can be written as
Us,tf(j, x) = Ef(Jxs,j(t), Xs,x(t)). (2.82)
For a function f that does not explicitly depends on x this simplifies to
Us,tf(j, x) = Ef(Jxs,j(t)). (2.83)
Theorem 2.7.1. Under setting of Theorem 2.5.1 let us assume that one distinguished
agent in the group of N players deviates from the general rules moving according to the
transition Q-matrix Qdev(t, x), t ∈ [0, T ], satisfying the same regularity assumptions as
Q. Let f(j, x) = f(j) does not explicitly depend on x. Then
‖(Us,t − Us,tN )f‖sup ≤
(t− s)3/2
N1/2
C(d, T, ‖Q‖bLip, ‖Qdev‖bLip)‖f‖sup, 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T,
(2.84)
with a constant C depending on d, T, ‖Q‖bLip, ‖Qdev‖bLip. For smooth Q and Qdev,
‖(Us,t − Us,tN )f‖sup ≤
(t− s)2
N
C(T, ‖Q‖C2 , ‖Qdev‖C2)‖f‖sup, (2.85)
with a constant C depending on T, ‖Q‖C2 , ‖Qdev‖C2.
Proof. Let us start with the case of smooth Q and Qdev. Using (2.81) and the comparison
of propagators formula (2.52) we derive that
‖(Us,t − Us,tN )f‖sup = supj,x|(Us,t − Us,tN )f(j, x)|
≤ (t−s) sup
r∈[s,t]
‖(LN,devt −Λdevt )U r,tf‖sup ≤
t− s
N
‖Q‖
(
sup
r∈[s,t]
‖(U r,tf)(2)‖+ 2‖f‖
)
. (2.86)
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Thus we need to estimate
‖(U r,tf)(2)‖ = sup
k,l,j,x
∣∣∣∣∂2U r,tf(j, x)∂xk∂xl
∣∣∣∣ ,
with Us,t given by (2.83) (and with f(j, x) = f(j) not depending on x).
To deal with Us,t it is convenient to fix s < T and x and to consider the auxiliary
propagator U r,t[s,x], s ≤ r ≤ t ≤ T , of the Markov chain Yr,j(t) in {1, · · · , d} with the
Q-matrix Qdev(t, Xs,x(t)), so that
U r,t[s,x]f(j) = Ef(Yr,j(t)), (2.87)
and
Us,tf(j) = Us,t[s,x]f(j). (2.88)
Unlike Us,t acting on functions on {1, · · · , d}×Σd, the propagator U[s, x]r,t is a prop-
agator of a usual Markov chain and hence its action satisfies the ODE
d
dr
U r,t[s,x]f(j) = [Q
dev(t, Xs,x(t))U
r,t
[s,x]f ](j) =
∑
k
Qdevjk (t, Xs,x(t))(U
r,t
[s,x]f)(k).
To find the derivatives with respect to x we can use the standard ODE sensitivity results,
Proposition 2.2.4 (used in backward time and with the initial condition not depending
explicitly on the parameter), yielding
sup
i,k,x
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂xiU r,t[s,x]f(k)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (t− r) sup
k
|f(k)| sup
x,i
∥∥∥∥∂Qdev(t, Xs,x(t))∂xi
∥∥∥∥ exp{2(t− r)‖Qdev‖},
and
sup
i,j,k
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂xi∂xjU r,t[s,x]f(k)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ exp{3(t− r)‖Qdev‖} sup
k
|f(k)|
×
(
(t− r) sup
i,j
∥∥∥∥∂2Qdev(t, Xs,x(t))∂xi∂xj
∥∥∥∥+ (t− r)2 sup
i
∥∥∥∥∂Qdev(t, Xs,x(t))∂xi
∥∥∥∥
2
)
.
Since
∂Qdev(t, Xs,x(t))
∂xi
=
∂Qdev(t, y)
∂y
|y=Xs,x(t)
∂Xs,x(t))
∂xi
and similarly for the second derivative, we can use Proposition 2.2.1 to estimate the deriva-
tives ofXs,x(t) and thus to obtain ‖(U r,tf)(2)‖ ≤ C with C depending on T, ‖Q‖C2 , ‖Qdev‖C2
and hence (2.85) follows by (2.86).
When Q and Qdev are only Lipschitz we use the same approximations Φδ[Q] and
Φδ[Q
dev] as in Section 2.5. And as in Section 2.5 we get the rate of convergence of order
tdδ + t2/(δN) yielding (2.84) by choosing δ =
√
t/N .
Let us extend the result to functions f(j, x) depending on x explicitly.
Theorem 2.7.2. Under setting of Theorem 2.5.1 let us assume that one distinguished
agent in the group of N players deviates from the general rules moving according to the
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transition Q-matrix Qdev(t, x), t ∈ [0, T ], satisfying the same regularity assumptions as
Q. Then
‖(Us,t − Us,tN )f‖sup ≤
(t− s)1/2
N1/2
C(d, T, ‖Q‖bLip, ‖Qdev‖bLip)‖f‖bLip, 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T,
(2.89)
with a constant C depending on d, T, ‖Q‖bLip, ‖Qdev‖bLip. For smooth Q and Qdev and f ,
‖(Us,t − Us,tN )f‖sup ≤
(t− s)
N
C(T, ‖Q‖C2 , ‖Qdev‖C2)‖f‖C2, (2.90)
with a constant C depending on T, ‖Q‖C2 , ‖Qdev‖C2.
Proof. The only difference with the previous case is the necessity to use Proposition 2.2.4
in full, that is, with the initial condition also depending on the parameter and, in case f
is not smooth, approximate it in a usual way by smooth functions.
2.8 Rest points of limiting dynamics and Nash equi-
libria
Theorem 2.6.1 suggests that eventually the controlled Markov evolution will settle down
near some stable equilibrium points of dynamic systems (2.71) or (2.72).
Let us deal now specifically with system (2.72). For a subset I ⊂ {1, · · · , d}, let
ΩI = {x ∈ Σd : xk = 0, k ∈ I, andRj(x, b∗(x)) = Ri(x, b∗(x)) for i, j /∈ I}.
Theorem 2.8.1. A vector x with non-negative coordinates is a rest point of (2.72), that
is, it satisfies the system of equations∑
i
κxixj [Rj(x, b
∗(x))−Ri(x, b∗(x))] = 0, j = 1, ..., d, (2.91)
if and only if x ∈ ΩI for some I ⊂ {1, · · · , d}.
Proof. For any I such that xk = 0 for k ∈ I, system (2.91) reduces to the same system
but with coordinates k /∈ I. Hence it is sufficient to show the result for the empty I. In
this situation, system (2.91) reduces to∑
i
xi[Rj(x, b
∗(x))− Ri(x, b∗(x))] = 0, j = 1, ..., d. (2.92)
Subtracting jth and kth equations of this system yields
(x1 + · · ·+ xd)[Rj(x, b∗(x))−Rk(x, b∗(x))] = 0,
and thus
Rj(x, b
∗(x)) = Rk(x, b
∗(x)),
as required.
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So far we have deduced the dynamics arising from a certain Markov model of inter-
action. As it is known, the internal (not lying on the boundary of the simplex) singular
points of the standard replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory correspond to
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of the initial game with a fixed number of players (in
most examples just two-player game). Therefore, it is natural to ask whether a similar
interpretation can be given to fixed points of Theorem 2.8.1. Because of the additional
nonlinear mean-field dependence of R on x the interpretation of x as mixed strategies is
not at all clear. However, consider explicitly the following game ΓN of N+1 players (that
was tacitly borne in mind when discussing dynamics). When the major player chooses the
strategy b and each of N small players chooses the state i, the major player receives the
payoff B(x, b, N) and each player in the state i receives Ri(x, b), i = 1, · · · , d (as above,
with x = n/N and n = (n1, · · · , nd) the realized occupation numbers of all the states).
Thus a strategy profile of small players in this game can be specified either by a sequence
of N numbers (expressing the choice of the state by each agent), or more succinctly, by
the resulting collection of frequencies x = n/N .
As usual (see any text in game theory, e.g. [175] or [194]) one defines a Nash equilib-
rium in ΓN as a profile of strategies (xN , b
∗
N) such that for any player changing its choice
unilaterally would not be beneficial, that is
b∗N = b
∗(xN , N) = argmaxB(xN , b, N)
and for any i, j ∈ {1, · · · , d}
Rj(x− ei/N + ej/N, b∗N) ≤ Ri(x, b∗N). (2.93)
A profile is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if these inequalities hold up to an additive correction
term not exceeding ǫ. It turns out that the singular points of (2.72) describe all approxi-
mate Nash equilibria for ΓN in the following precise sense:
Theorem 2.8.2. Let R(x, b) be Lipschitz continuous in x uniformly in b. Let
Rˆ = sup
i,b
‖Ri(., b)‖Lip,
and, for I ⊂ {1, · · · , d}, let
ΩˆI = {x ∈ ΩI : Rk(x, b∗(x)) ≤ Ri(x, b∗(x)) for k ∈ I, i /∈ I}.
Then the following assertions hold.
(i) The limit points of any sequence xN such that (xN , b
∗(xN , N)) is a Nash equilibrium
for ΓN belong to ΩˆI for some I. In particular, if all xN are internal points of Σd, then
any limiting point belongs to Ω∅.
(ii) For any I and x ∈ ΩˆI there exists an 2Rˆd/N-Nash equilibrium (xN , b∗(xN , N))
to ΓN such that the difference of any coordinates of xN and x does not exceed 1/N in
magnitude.
Proof. (i) Let us consider a sequence of Nash equilibria (xN , b
∗(xN , N)) such that the
coordinates of all xN in I vanish. By (2.93) and the definition of Rˆ,
|Rj(xN , b∗(xN , N))−Ri(xN , b∗(xN , N))| ≤ 2
N
Rˆ (2.94)
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for any i, j /∈ I and
Rk(xN , b
∗(xN , N)) ≤ Ri(xN , b∗(xN , N)) + 2
N
Rˆ, k ∈ I, i /∈ I. (2.95)
Hence x ∈ ΩˆI for any limiting point (x, b).
(ii) If x ∈ ΩˆI one can construct its 1/N -rational approximation, namely a sequence
xN ∈ Σd ∩Zd+/N such that the difference of any coordinates of xN and x does not exceed
1/N in magnitude. For any such xN , the profile (xN , b
∗(xN , N)) is an 2Rˆd/N -Nash
equilibrium for ΓN .
Theorem 2.8.2 provides a game-theoretic interpretation of the fixed points of dynamics
(2.72), which is independent of any myopic hypothesis used to justify this dynamics. To
better illustrate this independence we can easily extend this theorem to the situations,
when the solutions to the kinetic equations are not well defined, namely to the case of only
continuous Rj(x) (neither Lipschitz not even Ho¨lder). The result can be best expressed
in terms of the modulus of continuity of the function Rj that we define in the following
way: wj(h; b) = sup{|Rj(x, b) − Rj(y, b)|}, where sup is over the pairs of x, y that differ
only in one coordinate and by amount not exceeding h. Straightforward extension of the
proof of Theorem 2.8.2 yields the following result.
Theorem 2.8.3. Let R(x, b) be continuous in x uniformly in b, so that Rˆ(h) → 0 as
h→ 0, where
Rˆ(h) = sup
i,b
wi(h; b).
Then (i) the limit points of any sequence xN such that (xN , b
∗
N(xN , N)) is a Nash equi-
librium for ΓN belong to ΩˆI for some I; and (ii) for any I and x ∈ ΩˆI there exists an
2dRˆ(1/N)-Nash equilibrium (xN , b
∗
N (xN , N)) to ΓN such that the difference of any coor-
dinates of xN and x does not exceed 1/N in magnitude.
Theorem 2.8.2 extends also automatically to the case of several major players and
dynamics (2.78). For example, let us discuss the case of Lipschitz continuous payoffs.
Namely, let us consider the game ΓN,K of N +K players, where the major players choose
the strategies b1, · · · , bK and each ofN small players chooses the state i. The payoffs of the
major players are B(x, b, N) and each player in the state i receives Ri(x, b), i = 1, · · · , d.
Assume the existence of a continuous branch of Nash equilibria (b∗1(x,N), · · · , b∗K(x,N))
having limit (2.77).
Theorem 2.8.4. Let R(x, b1, · · · , bK) be Lipschitz continuous in x uniformly in b1, · · · , bK
and
Rˆ = sup
i,b1,··· ,bK
‖Ri(., b1, · · · , bK)‖Lip.
For I ⊂ {1, · · · , d}, let us define ΩI and ΩˆI as above but with (b∗1(x), · · · , b∗K(x)) instead
of just b∗(x). Then
(i) The limit points of any sequence xN such that (xN , b
∗
1(xN , N), · · · , b∗K(xN , N)) is a
Nash equilibrium for ΓN,K belong to ΩˆI for some I.
(ii) For any I and x ∈ ΩˆI there exists an 2Rˆd/N-Nash equilibrium
(xN , b
∗
1(x,N), · · · , b∗K(x,N)) for ΓN,K such that the difference of any coordinates of xN
and x does not exceed 1/N in magnitude.
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Of course, the set of ’almost equilibria’ Ω may be empty or contain many points.
Thus one can naturally pose here the analog of the question, which is well discussed in
the literature on the standard evolutionary dynamics (see [46] and references therein),
namely which equilibria can be chosen in the long run (the analogs of stochastically
stable equilibria in the sense of [87]) if small mutations are included in the evolution of
the Markov approximation.
A distinguished class of rest points of dynamics (2.72) (and the related Nash equilibria)
represent stable rest points (or stable sets of rest points), characterized by the property
that all points starting motion in a neighborhood of such point (or set of points) remain in
this neighborhood forever. The analysis of stable rest points in the key class of examples
will be preformed in Section 2.11. It will be shown there that such stability implies certain
’long term stability’, usually for times t of order N , for the approximating dynamics of
N players, see Theorem 2.11.2. This theorem is formulated for a class of examples,
but is very general in its nature. In many cases one gets much better results showing
that the equilibrium probabilities for the chains of N players have supports in the 1/N -
neighborhood of the set of stable rest points of dynamics (2.72).
2.9 Main class of examples: inspection, corruption,
security
All models of inspection, corruption, counterterrorist measures and cyber-security of
Chapter 1 fall in the general class of pressure and resistance games, where payoffs to
small players have the following structure:
Rj(x, b) = wj − p(b)fj , (2.96)
where wj > 0 are profits (or winnings) resulting in applying jth strategy and fj > 0
are fines that have to be paid with some probabilities p(b) depending on, and increasing
with, the efforts of the principal measured by the budget parameter b. By ordering the
strategies of small players one can assume that
w1 < w2 < · · · < wd, f1 < f2 < · · · < fd, (2.97)
the latter inequalities expressing the natural assumption that fines (risks) increase when
one attempts to get higher profits. With the principal having essentially opposite interests
to the interest of the pool of small players, the payoff of the principal can be often expressed
as the weighted average loss of small players with the budget used subtracted:
B(x, b) = −b+ κ
∑
j
xj(p(b)fj − wj) = −b + κ(p(b)f¯ − w¯), (2.98)
where κ is a constant and bars denote the averaging with respect to the distribution x.
Remark 12. Of course, one can think of more general situations with Rj = wj−pj(b)fj,
with probabilities depending on j or with Rj = wj−p(bj)fj with different budgets used for
dealing with different strategies.
CHAPTER 2. BEST RESPONSE PRINCIPALS 47
Since p is increasing, p′(b) > 0. Moreover, interpreting p as the probability of finding
certain hidden behavior of small players, it is natural to assume that search can never be
perfect, that is p(b) 6= 1, and thus p : [0,∞) → [0, 1). Assuming that p is fast increasing
for small b and this growth decreases with the increase of b (the analog assumption to
the law of diminishing return in economics) leads to the conditions that p′(0) = ∞ and
p(b) is a concave function. Summarising, the property of p : (0,∞) → (0, 1) that can be
naturally assumed for a rough qualitative analysis are as follows: p is a smooth monotone
bijection such
p′′(b) < 0 for all b, p′(0) = +∞, p′(∞) = 0. (2.99)
Under these assumptions the function B(x, b) from (2.98) is concave as a function of b, its
derivatives monotonically decreases from ∞ to −1 and hence there exists a unique point
of maximum b∗ = b∗(x) such that −1 + κf¯ p′(b∗) = 0, so that
b∗(x) = (p′)−1(1/κf¯(x)), (2.100)
where (p′)−1 : (0,∞) → (0,∞) is the (monotonically decreasing) inverse function to p′.
Moreover, b∗(x) depends on x only via the average f¯ =
∑
j xjfj , so that
b∗(x) = bˆ(f¯(x)), bˆ(f¯) = (p′)−1(1/κf¯(x)). (2.101)
Clearly the range of possible b∗(x) = bˆ(f¯) is the interval
b∗ ∈ [(p′)−1(1/κf1), (p′)−1(1/κfd)]. (2.102)
Thus the controlled dynamics (2.72) takes the form
x˙j = xj [wj − p(b∗(x))fj − (w¯ − p(b∗(x))f¯)], j = 1, ..., d. (2.103)
The rest point of this dynamics can be explicitly calculated and their stability analysed
for general classes of the dependence of fines fj on the profits wj . The simplest possibility
is the proportional fines fj = λwj with a constant λ > 0.
Remark 13. Such fines are used in the Russian legislation for punishment arising from
tax evasion, that is, in the context of inspection games.
The next result classifying the rest points for proportional fines is straightforward.
Proposition 2.9.1. For the case of proportional fines dynamics (2.103) turns to the
dynamics
x˙j = xj(wj − w¯)(1− p(b∗(x))λ), j = 1, ..., d. (2.104)
The rest points of this dynamics are the vertices of the simplex Σd and, if
1
λ
∈ p[(p′)−1(1/κf1), (p′)−1(1/κfd)], (2.105)
then all points of the hyperplane defined uniquely by the equation f¯(x) = f ∗ with
p(bˆ(f ∗)) = 1/λ, (2.106)
also represent rest points.
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2.10 Optimal allocation
So far our small players were indistinguishable. However, in many cases the small players
can belong to different types. These can be inspectees with various income brackets,
the levels of danger or overflow of particular traffic path, or the classes of computers
susceptible to infection. In this situation the problem for the principal becomes a policy
problem, that is, how to allocate efficiently her limited resources. Our theory extends to
a setting with various types more-or-less straightforwardly. We shall touch it briefly.
The models of investment policies of Section 1.12 also belong to this class of problems.
Let our players, apart from being distinguished by states i ∈ {1, · · · , d}, can be also
classified by their types or classes α ∈ {1, · · · ,A}. The state space of the group becomes
Zd+×ZA+, the set of matrices n = (niα), where niα is the number of players of type α in the
state i (for simplicity of notation we identify the state spaces of each type, which is not
at all necessary). One can imagine several scenarios of communications between classes,
two extreme cases being as follows:
(C1) No-communication: the players of different classes can neither communicate nor
observe the distribution of states in other classes, so that the interaction between types
arises exclusively through the principal;
(C2) Full communication: the players can change both their types and states via
pairwise exchange of information, and can observe the total distribution of types and
states.
There are lots of intermediate cases, say, when types form a graph (or a network) with
edges specifying the possible channels of information. Let us deal here only with cases
(C1) and (C2). Starting with (C1), let Nα denote the number of players in class α and
nα the vector {niα}, i = 1, · · · , d. Let xα = nα/Nα,
x = (xiα) = (niα/Nα) ∈ (Σd)A,
and b = (b1, · · · , bA) be the vector of the allocation of resources of the principal, which
may depend on x. Assuming that the principal uses the optimal policy
b∗(x) = argmaxB(x, b) (2.107)
arising from some concave (in the second variable) payoff function B on (Σd)
A×RA, the
generator of the controlled Markov process becomes
Lb∗,Nf(x) =
A∑
α=1
Nακα
∑
i,j
xiαxjα
× [Rαj (xα, b∗(x))− Rαi (xα, b∗(x))]+[f(x− eαi /Nα + eαj /Nα)− f(x)], (2.108)
where eαi is now the standard basis in R
d ×RA. Passing to the limit as N → ∞ under
the assumption that
lim
N→∞
Nα/N = ωα
with some constants ωα we obtain a generalization of (2.72) in the form
x˙jα = καωα
∑
i
xiαxjα[R
α
j (xα, b
∗(x))− Rαi (xα, b∗(x))], (2.109)
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for j = 1, ..., d and α = 1, · · · ,A, coupled with (2.107).
In case (C2), x = (xiα) ∈ Σdα, the generator becomes
Lb∗,Nf(x) =
A∑
α,β=1
Nκ
∑
i,j
xiβxjα
× [Rαj (x, b∗(x))− Rβi (x, b∗(x))]+[f(x− eβi /Nα + eαj /Nα)− f(x)], (2.110)
and the limiting system of differential equations
x˙jα = κ
∑
i,β
xiβxjα[R
α
j (x, b
∗(x))− Rβi (x, b∗(x))]. (2.111)
2.11 Stability of rest points and its consequences
As was noted above, an important class of rest points represent stable points.
Let us show that the hyperplane of fixed points (2.106) is stable under dynamics
(2.104), that is, if the dynamics starts in a sufficiently small neighborhood of this hyper-
plane, then it would remain there forever. We shall do it by the method of Lyapunov
functions showing that the function
V (x) = (1− λp(b∗(x)))2
is a Lyapunov function for dynamics (2.104) meaning that V (x) = 0 only on plane (2.106)
and V˙ (x) ≤ 0 everywhere whenever x evolves according to (2.104).
Proposition 2.11.1. If x evolves according to (2.104), then V˙ (x) < 0 for all x that are
not vertices of Σd and do not belong to plane (2.106) implying that the neighborhoods
{x : V (x) < v} are invariant under (2.104) for any v.
Proof. We have
d
dt
V (x) =
∂V
∂x
x˙ = −2λ(1− λp(b∗(x)))2p′(bˆ(f¯))bˆ′(f¯)
∑
j
xjfj(wj − w¯)
= −2λ2(1− λp(b∗(x)))2p′(bˆ(f¯))bˆ′(f¯)(
∑
j
xjw
2
j − w¯2)
= −2λ2V (x)p′(bˆ(f¯))bˆ′(f¯)(
∑
j
xjw
2
j − w¯2) < 0,
since
∑
j xjw
2
j − w¯2 is the variance of the random variable w taking values wj with prob-
abilities xj , which is always non-negative.
The statement of this proposition can be essentially improved yielding full portrait of
dynamics (2.104).
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Theorem 2.11.1. (i) If the plane of rest points (2.106) exists, that is condition (2.105)
holds, then this plane is the global attractor for dynamics (2.104) outside vertices of Σd: for
any x, which is not a vertex of Σd, Xx(t) approaches this plane as t→∞. Moreover, the
simplex Σd is decomposed in two invariant sets with 1−p(b∗(x))λ > 0 and 1−p(b∗(x))λ <
0.
(ii) If
1/λ ≥ p[(p′)−1(1/κfd)],
then the pure strategy of maximal activity j = d is the global attractor: for any x, which
is not a vertex of Σd, Xx(t) approaches the point (0, · · · , 0, 1), as t→∞.
(iii) If
1/λ ≤ p[(p′)−1(1/κf1)],
then the pure strategy of minimal activity j = 1 is the global attractor: for any x, which
is not a vertex of Σd, Xx(t) approaches the point (1, 0, · · · , 0), as t→∞.
Proof. (i) Since for any x, which is not a vertex of Σd, Xx(t) can also never become
a vertex, (d/dt)V (Xx(t)) < 0 on the whole trajectory. Hence there exists a limit of
V (Xx(t)), as t→∞. A straightforward argument by contradiction shows that this limit
should be zero.
(ii) In this case 1− p(b∗(x))λ > 0 in the whole Σd and the point of minimum of V in
Σd is (0, · · · , 0, 1).
(iii) In this case 1− p(b∗(x))λ < 0 in the whole Σd and the point of minimum of V in
Σd is (1, 0, · · · , 0).
Let us describe a consequence of stability of hyperplane (2.106) to the behavior of the
dynamics U tN of a finite number of players.
Theorem 2.11.2. If V (x) ≤ v, with high probability the points XNx (t) stay in the neigh-
borhood {V (y) ≤ rv} for large r and times t much less than N . Namely,
P(V (XNx (t)) > rv) ≤
1
r
(
1 +
ǫ
v
‖V (2)‖ ‖Q‖
)
(2.112)
for t ≤ ǫN .
Proof. By (2.39),
‖LNt V − ΛtV ‖ ≤
1
N
‖V (2)‖ ‖Q‖.
Hence, by Proposition 2.11.1,
LNt V (x) ≤
1
N
‖V (2)‖ ‖Q‖
for all x. Consequently,
d
dt
U tNV (x) = L
t
NV (x) ≤
1
N
‖V (2)‖ ‖Q‖
for all x and therefore
U tNV (x) ≤ V (x) +
t
N
‖V (2)‖ ‖Q‖.
Consequently, if t ≤ ǫN for some small ǫ and V (x) ≤ v, then
EV (XNx (t)) ≤ v + ǫ‖V (2)‖ ‖Q‖,
implying (2.112) by Markov’s inequality.
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This theorem is very rough and has almost straightforward extension to general sta-
ble rest points of dynamics (2.71). For the particular case of dynamics (2.104) the full
description of large time behavior of the Markov chains XNx (t) is available.
Theorem 2.11.3. (i) Under condition of Theorem 2.11.1 (ii) or (iii) the points (0, · · · , 0, 1)
or (1, 0, · · · , 0), respectively, are the absorbing points for Markov chains XNx (t) for any
N : starting from any profile of strategies, the trajectory almost surely reaches this point
in finite time and remains there forever. (ii) Under condition of Theorem 2.11.1 (i),
the 2/N-neighborhood of plane (2.106) is absorbing for the Markov chains XNx (t) for any
N : starting from any profile of strategies, the trajectory almost surely enters this neigh-
borhood in a finite time and remains there forever. It follows, in particular, that these
Markov chains have stationary distributions supported on the states belonging to the 2/N-
neighborhoods of plane (2.106).
Proof. The generator (2.31) of the Markov chain XNx (t) for transitions (1.10), (2.96) is
LNt f(x) = N
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
xixj [wj−wi−p(b∗(x))(fj−fi)]+[f(x−ei/N+ej/N)−f(x)], x ∈ Zd+/N,
(2.113)
which, for the case of proportional fines, takes the form
LNt f(x) = N
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
xixj [(wj−wi)(1−p(b∗(x))λ)]+[f(x− ei/N + ej/N)− f(x)]. (2.114)
Therefore, when 1− p(b∗(x))λ < 0, only transitions decreasing activity, i→ j < i are
allowed. Vice versa, when 1−p(b∗(x))λ > 0, only transitions increasing activity, i→ j > i
are allowed. This implies statement (i), as in this case the sign of 1−p(b∗(x))λ is constant
on the whole Σd.
In case (ii) the transitions from points on the ’upper set’ and ’lower set’,
Σ+d = {x : 1− p(b∗(x))λ < 0}, Σ−d = {x : 1− p(b∗(x))λ > 0},
decrease or increase the activity, respectively. As long as these points are outside 2/N -
neighborhood of plane (2.106) any single transition cannot jump from the upper to the
lower set or vise versa, but it decreases the distance of the states to plane (2.106). Thus
the points continue to move until they enter this neighborhood.
The analysis of system (2.103) for non-proportional fines is given in [125]. In cases
of convex and concave dependence of fines on the profits, all fixed points turn out to be
isolated and supported by only two pure strategies.
These results lead to clear practical conclusions showing how the manipulations with
the structure of fines (often imposed by the principal) can yield the desired distribution
of the rest points of the related dynamics and hence the equilibria of the corresponding
games. The choice of the fine structure can be looked at as a kind of mechanism design
of the principal. For instance, in the case of proportional fines considered above, an
appropriate choice of the coefficient of proportionality can lead to the whole pool of small
players to act on the maximal or on the minimal level of activity.
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2.12 Stability for two-state models
Of course, one expects the simplest evolutions to occur for two-state models. In fact,
under reasonable assumptions the behavior of both limiting and approximating dynamics
can be fully sorted out in this case.
Assume the state space of small players consists of only two strategies. Then the
rates are specified just by two numbers Q12 and Q21, describing transitions from the first
state to the second and vice versa, and the overall distribution by one number, x = n/N ,
the fraction of players using the first strategy. When dealing with time independent
transitions, the limiting dynamics (2.40) reduces to the following single equation:
x˙ = (1− x)Q21(x)− xQ12(x). (2.115)
Assume now that the interval [0, 1] is decomposed into a finite number of regions with
the directions of preferred transitions alternating between them. Namely, let
0 = a0 < a1 < · · · < ak−1 < ak = 1, Ik = (ak−1, ak),
and let Q21 > 0, Q12 = 0 in Ik with even k, and Q21 = 0, Q12 > 0 in Ik with odd k.
Assume also that Q12(x) and Q21(x) are Lipschitz continuous and vanish on the boundary
points x = 0 and x = 1.
The minority game of Section 1.10 fits to these assumptions with just two intervals:
I0 = (0, 1/2), I1 = (1/2, 1).
The fixed points of the dynamics are the points of ’changing interests’: x = aj ,
j = 0, · · · , k. It is clear that the points ak with even (respectively odd) k are stable
(respectively unstable) fixed points of dynamics (2.115). Therefore, if dynamics starts at
x ∈ Ik with even (resp. odd) k, the solution Xx(t) of (2.115) will tend to the left point
ak (resp. right point ak+1) of Ik, as t→∞.
What is interesting is that in this case the same behavior can be seen to hold for
the approximating systems of N agents evolving according to the corresponding Markov
XNx (t) chain with the generator
LNt f(x) = xQ12(x)N [f(x− 1/N)− f(x)] + (1− x)Q21(x)N [f(x+ 1/N)− f(x)]. (2.116)
Proposition 2.12.1. Under the above assumptions and for any sufficiently large N , the
Markov chain XNx (t) starting at a point x = n/N ∈ (ak, ak+1) moves to the left (resp.
right) if k is even (resp. odd), reaches an 1/N- neighborhood of ak (resp. ak+1) in finite
time and remains in this neighborhood for ever after.
Proof. This is straightforward.
2.13 Discontinuous transition rates
An interesting topic to mention is the study of nonlinear Markov chains with discontinuous
rates Qij(x). Specifically important is the case when the whole simplex Σd is decomposed
into a finite union of closed domains, Σd = ∪kj=1X¯j such that the interiors Xj of X¯j do not
intersect and Qij(x) are Lipcshitz continuous in each Xj with the continuous extension to
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X¯j. Such system would naturally arise in MFG forward-backward systems (see Chapter
??) with a finite set of controls.
We shall not develop here the full theory of discontinuous rates, but we shall set the
ground for it by looking at the specific case of two-state models of the previous section.
Namely, using the notations of that section, let us assume now that Q21 and Q12 are not
continuous through the switching points ak. As the simplest assumption let us choose
these rates to be constant:
Q21(x) =
{
1, x ∈ Ik, k even
0, x ∈ Ik, k odd,
Q12(x) =
{
1, x ∈ Ik, k odd
0, x ∈ Ik, k even.
(2.117)
The kinetic equations (2.115) have to be understood now in the sense of Filippov, see
[84], [85], which means in this case that instead of the equation we look at the kinetic
differential inclusion
x˙ ∈ F (x), F (x) =
{
(1− x)Q21(x)− xQ12(x), x /∈ {a0, · · · , ak}
[−aj , 1− aj ], x = aj,
(2.118)
so that away from points aj the inclusion coincides with the equation (2.115). The solution
of this inclusion is not unique only if started from the points ak with odd k (i.e. from
the unstable equilibria). Discarding these initial points we see that starting from x0 = ak
with even k the unique solution to (2.118) remains in ak. Starting from x0 ∈ Ik with even
k, the unique solution to (2.118) moves according to x˙ = 1− x until it reaches ak, where
it remains for ever, that is,
x(t) =
{
e−t(x0 − 1) + 1, t ≤ t0 = ln(1− x0)− ln(1− ak),
ak, t ≥ t0.
Similarly, starting from x0 ∈ Ik with odd k, the unique solution to (2.118) moves according
to x˙ = −x until it reaches ak−1, where it remains for ever.
Comparing this behavior of the kinetic inclusion with the behavior of the approximat-
ing Markov chain XNx (t) (it was described in Section 2.12 and remains the same for the
present discontinuous case), we obtain the following.
Proposition 2.13.1. Under the above assumptions, the Markov chain XNx (t) starting at
a point x = k/N , which does not equal any ak with odd k converges weakly to the unique
solution of the differential inclusion (2.118) starting from the same point. Moreover, this
converges is even uniform in all times.
2.14 Nonexponential waiting times and fractional LLN
The key point in the probabilistic description of both Markov and nonlinear Markov chains
was the assumption that the waiting time between transitions is an exponential random
variable. Here we shall touch upon another extension of the results of Sections 2.4 and 2.5,
when more general waiting times are allowed. The characteristic feature of the exponential
waiting times is its memoryless property: the distribution of the remaining time does not
CHAPTER 2. BEST RESPONSE PRINCIPALS 54
depend on the time one has waited so far. Thus refuting exponential assumptions leads
necessarily to some effects of memory and to non-Markovian evolutions. Such evolutions
are usually described by fractional in time differential equations, which have drawn lots of
attention in modern scientific literature. Let us obtain the dynamic LLN for interacting
multi-agent systems for the case of non-exponential waiting times with the power tail
distributions. As one can expect this LLN will not be deterministic anymore, and our
exposition in this section will be more demanding mathematically than in other parts of
the book.
Let us say that a positive random variable τ has the probability law P on [0,∞) with
a power tail of index α if
P(τ > t) ∼ 1
tα
for large t, that is the ration of the l.h.s. and the r.h.s tends to 1, as t → ∞. For
any α ∈ (0, 1) such random variable has infinite expectation. Nevertheless, the index α
characterized in some sense the length of the waiting time (and thus the rate at which the
sequence of independent identically distributed random variables of this kind evolves),
since the waiting time increases with the decrease of α.
As the exponential tails, the power tails are well suited for taking minima. Namely,
if τj , j = 1, · · · , d, are independent variables with a power tail of indices αi, then τ =
min(τ1, · · · , τd) is clearly a variable with a power tail of index α = α1 + · · ·+ αd.
Assume for simplicity that the family {Q(x)} does not depend on time. Then in full
analogy with the case of exponential times of Sections 1.2 or 2.3 let us assume that the
waiting time of the agents of type i to change the strategy has the power tail with the
index αi(x) = αxi|Qii| with some fixed α > 0. Consequently, the minimal waiting time of
all agents will have the probability law Px(dy) with a tail of the index
αA(x) =
∑
αi(x) = α
∑
i
xi|Qii(x)|.
Our process with power tail waiting times can thus be described probabilistically as
follows. Starting from any time and current state n, or x = n/N , we wait a random
waiting time τ , which has a power tail with the index A(x). After this time the choice of
the pair (i, j) such that the transition of one agent from state i to state j occurs is carried
out with probability (1.2):
P(i→ j) = niQij(n/N)∑
k nk|Qkk(n/N)|
=
xiQij(x)
A(x)
. (2.119)
After such jump the process continues from the new state x − ei/N + ej/N in the same
way as previously from x.
The easiest way to see, what kind of LLN one can expect under this setting and
appropriate scaling, is to lift the non-Markovian evolution on the space of sequences
x = (x1, · · · , xd) ∈ Σd ∩Zd+/N to the discrete time Markov chain by considering the total
waiting time s as an additional space variable. Namely, let us consider the Markov chain
(XN,τx,s , S
N,τ
x,s )(kτ) on (Σd∩Zd+/N)×R+ with the jumps occurring at discrete times kτ , k ∈
N, such that the process at a state (x, s) at time τk jumps to (x−ei/N+ej/N, s+τ 1/αA(x)y)
with the probability distribution
Px(dy)P(i→ j) = Px(dy)τxiQij(x)
A(x)
. (2.120)
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The key to the reasonable scaling is to choose τ = 1/N . We shall denote the corre-
sponding Markov chain (Xτx,s, S
τ
x,s)(kτ). Its transition operator is
U τf(x, s) =
∫
Px(dy)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
xiQij(x)
A(x)
f
(
x− ei
N
+
ej
N
, s+ τ 1/αA(x)y
)
. (2.121)
What we are interested in is not exactly this chain, but the value of its first coordinate
Xτx,s at the time kτ , when the total waiting time S
τ
x,s(kτ) (which is our real time, unlike
the artificial time s) reaches t, that is, at the time
kτ = T τx,s(t) = inf{mτ : Sτx,s(mτ) ≥ t},
so that T τx,s is the inverse process to S
τ
x,s. Thus the scaled mean-field interacting system
of agents with a power tail waiting time between jumps is the (non-Markovian) process
X˜τx,s(t) = X
τ
x,s(T
τ
x,s(t)). (2.122)
Let us see what happens in the limit τ → 0, or equivalently N = 1/τ → ∞. Since
the transitions in Σd ∩ Zd+/N do not depend on the waiting times, the first coordinate
of the chain (Xτx,s, S
τ
x,s)(kτ) is itself a discrete time Markov chain, which converges (by
Theorems 2.4.3 and 2.5.2) to the deterministic process described by the solutions XAx,s(t)
to the kinetic equations x˙ = xQ(x)/A(x) with the initial condition x at time s. Thus we
can expect that the limit of the process (2.122), which is the LLN we are looking for, is
the process obtained from the characteristics XAx,0(t) evaluated at some random time t.
Let us see more precisely what happens with the whole chain (Xτx,s, S
τ
x,s)(kτ). It is
well known (see e.g. Theorem 8.1.1 of [137]) that if the operator
ΛAf = lim
τ→0
1
τ
(U τf − f) (2.123)
is well defined and generates a Feller process, then this Feller process represents the weak
limit of the scaled chain with the transitions [U τ ][t/τ ], where [t/τ ] denotes the integer part
of the number t/τ . Thus we need to calculate (2.123). We have
1
τ
(U τf − f) = 1
τ
∫
Px(dy)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
xiQij(x)
A(x)
[
f
(
x− ei
N
+
ej
N
, s+ τ 1/αA(x)y
)
− f(x, s)
]
=
1
τ
∫
Px(dy)
[
f(x, s+ τ 1/αA(x)y)− f(x, s)]
+
1
τ
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
xiQij(x)
A(x)
[
f
(
x− ei
N
+
ej
N
, s
)
− f(x, s)
]
+R, (2.124)
where the error term equals
R =
1
τ
∫
Px(dy)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
xiQij(x)
A(x)
×
[(
f
(
x− ei
N
+
ej
N
, s+ τ 1/αA(x)y
)
− f (x, s+ τ 1/αA(x)y))− (f (x− ei
N
+
ej
N
, s
)
− f(x, s)
)]
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=
1
τ
∫
Px(dy)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
xiQij(x)
A(x)
[
g(x, s+ τ 1/αA(x)y)− g(x, s)] ,
with
g(x, s) = f
(
x− ei
N
+
ej
N
, s
)
− f(x, s).
From the calculations of Section 2.4 we know that the second term in (2.124) converges
to Λf(x, s)/A(x), with
Λf(x, s) =
d∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
xiQij(x)[
∂f
∂xj
− ∂f
∂xi
](x, s) =
d∑
k=1
∑
i 6=k
[xiQik(x)− xkQki(x)] ∂f
∂xk
(x, s),
whenever f is continuously differentiable in x.
By Theorem 8.3.1 of [137] (see also [133]), the first term in (2.124) converges to
αA(x)
∫ ∞
0
f(x, s+ y)− f(x, s)
y1+αA(x)
dy,
whenever f is continuously differentiable in s.
To estimate the term R we note that if f ∈ C1(Σd × R+), then g(x) is uniformly
bounded by 1/N and |∂g/∂s| is uniformly bounded. Hence applying again Theorem 8.3.1
of [137] to R we obtain that R/τ → 0 as τ → 0. Hence it follows that, for f ∈ C1(Σd×R+),
ΛAf(x, s) = lim
τ→0
1
τ
(U τf − f)(x, s) = αA(x)
∫ ∞
0
f(x, s+ y)− f(x, s)
y1+αA(x)
dy + Λf(x, s)/A(x).
(2.125)
Thus we see again that the first coordinate of the chain (Xτx,s, S
τ
x,s)(kτ) converges to
the deterministic process described by the solutions XAx,s(t) (starting in x at time s) to
the kinetic equations x˙ = xQ(x)/A(x). The second coordinate of (Xτx,s, S
τ
x,s)(kτ) depends
on the first coordinate. For s = 0 it converges to the stable like process with the time
dependent family of generators
ΛASg(t) = αA(X
A
x,0(t))
∫ ∞
0
g(t+ y)− g(t)
y1+αA(X
A
x,0(t))
dy. (2.126)
Deriving the convergence of the processes from the convergence of the generators as
in Section 2.4 and using (2.122) we arrive at the following result.
Theorem 2.14.1. If Q(x) is a Lipschitz continuous function, then the process of the
mean-field interacting system of agents X˜τx,s(t) given by (2.122) converges in distribution
to the process
X˜x,s(t) = X
A
x,s(T
t
x), (2.127)
where T tx is the random time when the stable-like process generated by (2.126) and started
at s reaches the time t. Moreover, from the probabilistic interpretation of the generalized
Caputo-type derivative of mixed orders A(x) (see [139]) it follows that the evolution of
averages f(x, s) = Ef(X˜x,s(t)) satisfies the following generalized fractional differential
equation
D
A(x)
t−∗ f(x, s) =
1
A(x)
d∑
k=1
∑
i 6=k
[xiQik(x)− xkQki(x)] ∂f
∂xk
(x, s), s ∈ [0, t], (2.128)
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with the terminal condition f(x, t) = f(x), where the left fractional derivative acting on
the variable s ≤ t of f(x, s) is defined as
D
A(x)
t−∗ g(s) = αA(x)
∫ t−s
0
g(s+ y)− g(s)
y1+αA(x)
dy+αA(x)(g(t)−g(s))
∫ ∞
t−s
dy
y1+αA(x)
dy. (2.129)
As usual with the nondeterministic LLN, the limiting process depends essentially on
the scaling and the choice of approximations. Instead of modeling the total waiting time
by a random variable with the tail of order t−αA(x), we can equally well model this time
by a random variable with the tail of order A−1(x)t−α, which would yield similar results
with the mixed fractional derivative of a simpler form
D˜
A(x)
t−∗ g(s) =
α
A(x)
∫ t−s
0
g(s+ y)− g(s)
y1+α
dy +
α(g(t)− g(s))
A(x)
∫ ∞
t−s
dy
y1+α
dy
=
α
A(x)
∫ t−s
0
g(s+ y)− g(s)
y1+α
dy +
g(t)− g(s)
A(x)(t− s)α . (2.130)
However, any scaling of the jump times would lead to the process obtained from the
characteristics (solutions of x˙ = xQ(x)) via certain random time change.
The situation changes drastically if the family Q(t, x) is time dependent. Then the
partial decoupling (possibility to consider the first coordinate (Xτx,s independent of the
second one) does not occur, and formula (2.127) does not hold. Nevertheless, the fractional
equation (2.128) extends directly to this case turning to the equation
D
A(x)
t−∗ f(x, s) =
1
A(x)
d∑
k=1
∑
i 6=k
[xiQik(s, x)− xkQki(s, x)] ∂f
∂xk
(x, s), s ∈ [0, t]. (2.131)
Unlike (2.127), its solution can be represented probabilistically either via the technique of
Dynkin’s martingale (see [139]) or via chronological Feynmann-Kac formula (see [141]).
Chapter 3
Dynamic control of major players
Here we start exploiting another setting for the major player behavior. We shall assume
that the major player has some planning horizon with both running and (in case of a finite
horizon) terminal costs. For instance, running costs can reflect real spending and terminal
cost some global objective, like reducing the overall crime level by a specified amount.
This setting will lead us to the class of problem that can be called Markov decision (or
control) processes (for the principal) on the evolutionary background (of permanently
varying profiles of small players). We shall obtain the corresponding LLN limit, both for
discrete and continuous time. For discrete time the LLN limit turns to the deterministic
multi-step control problem in case of one major player and to the deterministic multi-step
game between major players in case of several such players. In continuous time modeling
the LLN limit turns to the deterministic continuous time dynamic control problem in case
of one major player and to the deterministic differential game in case of several major
players. We analyze the problem both with finite and infinite horizons. The latter case
is developed both for the payoffs with discounting and without it. The last version leads
naturally to the so-called turnpike behavior of both limiting and prelimiting (finite N)
evolutions. The theory of this chapter also has an extension arising from non-exponential
waiting time and leading to the control fractional dynamics in the spirit of Section 2.14,
but we do not touch this extension here (see however [151]).
3.1 Multi-step decision making of the principal
As above, we shall work with the case of a finite-state-space of small players, so that the
state space of the group is given by vectors x = (n1, · · · , nd)/N from the lattice Zd+/N .
Starting with a discrete time case, we denote byXN(t, x, b) the Markov chain generated
by (2.69) with a fixed b taken from certain convex compact subset of a Euclidean space,
that is by the operator
Lb,Nf(x) = N
∑
i
xiQij(x, b)
[
f
(
x− ei
N
+
ej
N
)
− f(x)
]
, (3.1)
and starting in x ∈ Zd+/N at the initial time t = 0.
Let us assume that the principal is updating her strategy in discrete times {kτ},
k = 0, 1, · · · ..., n − 1, with some fixed τ > 0, n ∈ N, aiming at finding a strategy
π = {b0, b1, · · · , bn−1} maximizing the reward
V π,Nn (x(N)) = EN,x(N) [τB(x0, b0) + · · ·+ τB(xn−1, bn−1) + V (xn)] , (3.2)
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where B and V are given functions (the running and the terminal payoff), x(N) ∈ Zd+/N
also given,
xk = XN(τ, xk−1, bk−1), k = 1, 2, · · · ,
and bk = bk(xk) are measurable functions of the current state x = xk (EN,x(N) denotes
the expectation specified by such process).
By the basic dynamic programming (see e.g. [112] or [144]) the maximal rewards
V Nn (x(N)) = supπ V
π,N
n (x(N)) at different times k are linked by the optimality equation
V Nk = S[N ]V
N
k−1, where the Shapley operator S[N ] (sometimes referred to as the Bellman
operator) is defined by the equation
S[N ]V (x) = sup
b
[τB(x, b) + EV (XN(τ, x, b))] , (3.3)
so that Vn can be obtained by the nth iteration of the Shapley operator:
V Nn = S[N ]V
N
n−1 = S
n[N ]V. (3.4)
We are again interested in the law of large numbers limit N → ∞, where we expect
the limiting problem for the principal to be the maximization of the reward
V πn (x0) = τB(x0, b0) + · · ·+ τB(xn−1, bn−1) + V0(xn), (3.5)
where
x0 = lim
N→∞
x(N) (3.6)
(which is supposed to exist) and
xk = X(τ, xk−1, bk−1), k = 1, 2, · · · , (3.7)
with X(t, x, b) denoting the solution to the characteristic system (or kinetic equations)
x˙k =
d∑
i=1
xiQik(x, b(x)), k = 1, ..., d, (3.8)
with the initial condition x at time t = 0, or in the pressure and resistance framework,
x˙j =
∑
i
κxixj[Rj(x, b)− Ri(x, b)], j = 1, ..., d. (3.9)
Again by dynamic programming, the maximal reward in this problem Vn(x) = supπ V
π
n (x),
π = {bk}, is obtained by the iterations of the corresponding Shapley operator, Vn = SnV0,
with
SV (x) = sup
b
[τB(x, b) + V (X(τ, x, b))] . (3.10)
Especially for the application to the continuous time models it is important to have
estimates of convergence uniform in n = t/τ for bounded total time t = nτ .
As a preliminary step let us prove a rather standard fact about the propagation of
continuity by the operator S.
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Proposition 3.1.1. Let V , B, Q be bounded continuous functions, which are Lipschitz
continuous in x, with
κV = ‖V ‖Lip, κB = sup
b
‖B(., b)‖Lip <∞, ω = sup
b
‖Q(., b)‖bLip <∞. (3.11)
Then SnV ∈ CbLip for all n and
‖SnV ‖ ≤ t‖B‖ + ‖V ‖, ‖SnV ‖Lip ≤ (tκB + κV )etω (3.12)
for t = nτ .
Proof. First equation in (3.12) follows from the definition of SV . Next, by (2.45) and
(2.11),
|X(τ, x, b)−X(τ, y, b)| ≤ |x− y|etω,
and therefore |SV (x)− SV (y)| does not exceed
sup
b
[τB(x, b) + V (X(τ, x, b))− τB(y, b)− V (X(τ, y, b))] ≤ |x− y|(τκB + κV etω).
Similarly,
|S2V (x)− S2V (y)| ≤ sup
b
[τB(x, b) + SV (X(τ, x, b))− τB(y, b)− SV (X(τ, y, b))]
≤ |x− y|(τκB + ‖SV ‖Lipetω) ≤ |x− y|(τκB + (τκB + κV etω)etω).
By induction we obtain that
‖SnV ‖Lip ≤ τκB(1 + eτω + · · ·+ eτω(n−1)) + κV eτωn ≤ nτκBeτωn + κV eτωn,
implying the second estimate in (3.12).
Theorem 3.1.1. (i) Assume (3.11) and (3.6) hold. Then, for any τ ∈ (0, 1], n ∈ N and
t = τn,
‖Sn[N ]V − SnV ‖ ≤ C(d, ω)(tκB + κV )etω(t
√
1/(τN) + |x(N)− x|) (3.13)
with a constant C(d, ω) depending on d and ω. In particular, for τ = N−ǫ with ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
this turns to
‖Sn[N ]V − SnV ‖ ≤ C(d, ω)(tκB + κV )etω(tN−(1−ǫ)/2 + |x(N)− x|). (3.14)
(ii) If there exists a Lipshitz continuous optimal policy π = {bk}, k = 1, · · · , n, for the
limiting optimization problem, then π is approximately optimal for the N-agent problem,
in the sense that for any ǫ > 0 there exists N0 such that, for all N > N0,
|V Nn (x(N))− V N,πn (x(N))| ≤ ǫ.
Proof. (i) Let L = supk≤n ‖SnV ‖Lip. By (3.12) it is bounded by (tκB+κV )etω. By (2.58),
|S[N ]V (x)− SV (x)| ≤ supb|EV (XNx (τ))− V (Xx(τ))| ≤ C(d, ω)L
√
τ/N,
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where we used the condition τ ≤ 1 to estimate e3τω ≤ C(ω). Next,
|S2[N ]V (x)− S2V (x)| ≤ supb|ES[N ]V (XNx (τ))− SV (Xx(τ))|
≤ supbE|S[N ]V (XNx (τ))− SV (XNx (τ))|+ supb|ESV (XNx (τ))− SV (Xx(τ))|
≤ C(d, ω)L
√
τ/N + C(d, ω)L
√
τ/N ≤ 2C(d, ω)L
√
τ/N.
It follows by induction that
‖Sn[N ]V − SnV ‖ ≤ C(d, ω)nL
√
τ/N = C(d, ω)tL
√
1/(τN), (3.15)
yielding (3.13).
(ii) One shows as above that for any Lipschitz continuous policy π, the corresponding
value functions V π,N converge. Combined with (i), this yields Statement (ii).
3.2 Infinite horizon: discounted payoff
The standard optimization problem of infinite horizon planning related to the finite hori-
zon problem of optimising (3.2) is the problem of maximizing the discounted sum
Ππ,N(x(N)) = EN,x(N)
∞∑
k=0
τβkB(xk, bk), (3.16)
with a β ∈ (0, 1), where, as above,
xk = XN(τ, xk−1, bk−1), k = 1, 2, · · · ,
π = {bk} and bk = bk(xk) are measurable functions depending on the current state x = xk.
In the law of large numbers limit, N → ∞, we expect the limiting problem for the
principal to be the maximization of the reward
Ππ(x) =
∞∑
k=0
βkτB(xk, bk) (3.17)
with xk = X(τ, xk−1, bk−1).
Notice firstly that the solution to the finite-time discounting problem of the maximiza-
tion of the payoff
V π,Nn (x(N)) = EN,x(N)
[
τB(x0, b0) + · · ·+ βn−1τB(xn−1, bn−1) + βnV (xn)
]
, (3.18)
is given by the iterations
V Nn = Sβ [N ]V
N
n−1 = S
n
β [N ]V (3.19)
of the corresponding discounted Shapley operator
Sβ[N ]V (x) = sup
b
[τB(x, b) + βEV (XN(τ, x, b))] . (3.20)
Similarly the solution to the corresponding limiting discounted problem
Vn(x) = max
π
[
τB(x0, b0) + · · ·+ βn−1τB(xn−1, bn−1) + βnV (xn)
]
, (3.21)
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is given by the iterations
Vn = SβV
N
n−1 = S
n
βV (3.22)
of the corresponding discounted Shapley operator
SβV (x) = sup
b
[τB(x, b) + βV (X(τ, x, b))] . (3.23)
As a preliminary step let us recall a standard fact about the finite-step approximations
to the optimal Ππ.
Proposition 3.2.1. Assume
ω = sup
b
‖Q(., b)‖bLip <∞.
Let B and V be bounded continuous functions. Then the sequence SnβV (x) converges, as
n→∞, to the discounted infinite horizon optimal reward
Π(x) = sup
π
Ππ(x),
and the sequence Snβ [N ]V (x(N)) converges, as n→∞, to the discounted infinite horizon
optimal reward
ΠN (x(N)) = sup
π
Ππ,N(x(N)).
Proof. Since
‖SnβV − Snβ V˜ ‖ ≤ βn‖V − V˜ ‖,
‖Snβ [N ]V − Snβ [N ]V˜ ‖ ≤ βn‖V − V˜ ‖,
it follows that, if the sequences SnβV or S
n
β [N ]V converge for some V , then these iterations
converge to the same limit for any bounded V . But for V = 0 we see directly that
‖SnβV − Π‖ ≤ βn‖B‖
2
1− β ,
‖Snβ [N ]V − ΠN‖ ≤ βn‖B‖
2
1− β .
Theorem 3.2.1. Assume (3.11) and (3.6) hold and let
βeτω ≤ β0 < 1.
Then the discounted optimal rewards
ΠN(x(N)) = sup
π
Ππ,N(x(N))
converge, as N →∞ and x(N)→ x, to the discounted best reward
Π(x) = sup
π
Ππ(x).
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Proof. Following the arguments of Proposition 3.1.1, we obtain
‖SnβV ‖ ≤ τ‖B‖
1
1− β0 + β
n
0 ‖V ‖,
‖SnβV ‖Lip ≤ τκB(1 + βeτω + · · ·+ βn−1eτω(n−1)) + βnκV eτωn ≤ τκB
1
1− β0 + β
n
0κV ,
that is, unlike optimization without discounting, these norms are bound uniformly in the
number of steps used.
Estimating the differences ‖Snβ [N ]V − SnβV ‖ as in the proof of Theorem 3.1.1 yields
‖Snβ [N ]V − SnβV ‖ ≤ C
√
τ√
N
(β‖SnβV ‖bLip + · · ·+ βn‖SβV ‖bLip)
≤ C
√
τ√
N
(
τ‖B‖bLip 1
(1− β0)2 + β
n+1
0 ‖V ‖bLip
)
.
Since SnβV (x(N)) converges to Π(x), as n → ∞, it follows that Snβ [N ]V (x) converges to
Π(x), as n→∞ and N →∞.
Remark 14. The optimal payoffs Π(x) and ΠN(x) are the fixed points of the Shapley
operator: SβΠ = Π, Sβ [N ]Π
N = Π. This fact can be used as a basis for another proof of
Theorem 3.2.1.
3.3 Continuous time modeling
Here we initiate the analysis of the optimization problem for a forward-looking principal.
Namely, let the state space of the group being again given by vectors x = (n1, · · · , nd)/N
from the lattice Zd+/N , but the efforts (budget) b of the major player are chosen contin-
uously in time aiming at optimizing the payoff∫ T
t
B(x(s), b(s)) ds+ ST (x(T ))
where B, ST are some continuous functions uniformly Lipschitz in all their variables. The
optimal payoff of the major player is thus
SN(t, x(N)) = sup
b(.)
ENx(N)
{∫ T
t
B(x(s), b(s)) ds+ ST (x(T ))
}
, (3.24)
where ENx is the expectation of the corresponding Markov process starting at the position
(x) at time t, and U˜ is some class of controls (say, piecewise constant). We are now in
the standard Markov decision setting of a controlled Markov process generated by the
operator Lb,N from (3.1)
As was shown above, the operators Lb,N tend to a simple first order PDO, so that the
limiting optimization problem of the major player turns out to be the problem of finding
S(t, x) = sup
b(.)
{∫ T
t
B(x(s), b(s))ds+ ST (x(T ))
}
, (3.25)
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where x(s) solve the system of equations
x˙j =
∑
i
xiQij(x, b), j = 1, ..., d. (3.26)
The well-posedness of this system is a straightforward extension of the well-posedness of
equations (2.41).
It is well known (see e.g. [147] or any textbook on deterministic optimal control) that
the optimal payoff S(t, x) of (3.25) represents the unique generalized solution (so-called
viscosity solution) to the HJB equation
∂S
∂t
+ sup
b
[
B(x, b) +
(
∂S
∂x
, xQ(x, b)
)]
= 0, (3.27)
with the initial (or terminal) condition S(T, x) = ST (x).
Instead of proving the convergence SN (t, x(N)) → S(t, x), we shall concentrate on a
more practical issue comparing the corresponding discrete time approximations, as these
approximations are usually exploited for practical calculations of SN or S.
The discrete-time approximation to the limiting problem of finding (3.25) is the prob-
lem of finding
Vt,n(x) = sup
π
V πt,n(x) = sup
π
[τB(x0, b0) + · · ·+ τB(xn−1, bn−1) + V (xn)] , (3.28)
where τ = (T − t)/n, x0 = x, V (x) = ST (x) and
xk = X(τ, xk−1, bk−1), k = 1, 2, · · · , (3.29)
with X(t, x, b) solving equation (3.8) with the initial condition x at time t = 0. It is
known (see e. g. Theorem 3.4 of [147]) that the discrete approximations Vn(x) approach
the optimal solution S(T − t, x) given by (3.25) and solving the Cauchy problem for the
HJB (3.27).
The discrete-time approximation to the initial optimization problem is the problem of
finding
V Nt,n(x0) = sup
π
V π,Nt,n (x0)
= sup
π
EN,x(N) [τB(x0, b0) + · · ·+ τB(xn−1, bn−1) + V0(xn)] , (3.30)
where xk = XN(τ, xk−1, bk−1) with XN(t, x, b) denoting the Markov process with generator
(3.1) and with the strategies π = {bk} as in Section 3.1.
Remark 15. It is also known, see e. g. Theorem 4.1 of [86], that V Nn (x) with V0 = ST
approach the optimal solutions SN(T − t, x) given by (3.24) and solving certain HJB
equation.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let B, ST be uniformly Lipschitz in all their variables. Then, for any
x, t ∈ [0, T ] and τ = N−ǫ with ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
|V Nt,n(x)− Vt,n(x)| ≤ C(d, ω, T )(κB + κV )(N−(1−ǫ)/2 + |x(N)− x|). (3.31)
And consequently V Nt,n(x) converge, as N → ∞ (and n = (T − t)/τ , τ = N−ǫ), to the
optimal solution S(T − t, x) given by (3.25) and solving the Cauchy problem for the HJB
(3.27).
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Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1.1 (i).
One can also imagine the situation that changing the budget bears some costs, so that
instantaneous adjustments of policies become unfeasible, in which case the efforts (budget)
b of the major player can evolves depending on some more flexible control parameter
u ∈ U ∈ Rr, for instance, according to the equation b˙ = u. In this case the payoff of the
major player can be given, as usual, by the function∫ T
t
J(x(s), b(s), u(s)) ds+ ST (x(T ), b(T ))
where J, ST are some Lipschitz continuous functions. The optimal payoff of the major
player is then
SN(t, x(N), b) = sup
u(.)
ENx(N),b
{∫ T
t
J(x(s), b(s), u(s)) ds+ ST (x(T ), (b(T ))
}
, (3.32)
where ENx,b is the expectation of the corresponding Markov process starting at the position
(x, b) at time t, and the corresponding limiting optimal payoff is
S(t, x, b) = sup
u(.)
{∫ T
t
J(x(s), b(s), u(s))ds+ ST (x(T ), (b(T ))
}
, (3.33)
where (x(s), (b(s)) (depending on u(.)) solve the system of equations
b˙ = u, x˙j =
∑
i
xiQij(x, b), j = 1, ..., d.
The well-posedness of this system is a straightforward extension of the well-posedness
of equations (2.41). Everything extends directly to this case, where the limiting HJB
equation becomes
∂S
∂t
+ sup
u
[
J(x, b, u) +
(
∂S
∂x
, xQ(x, b)
)
+ u
∂S
∂b
]
= 0, (3.34)
with the initial (or terminal) condition S(T, x, b) = ST (x, b).
Similar analysis can be performed for the continuous-time discounted payoff setting,
the limiting payoff being then given by a solution to the corresponding stationary HJB
equation.
Remark 16. Performing the same analysis for the case of non-exponential jumps of
Section 2.14 would lead to the limit that would not be controlled by the HJB equation
(3.27), but its fractional counterpart, the fractional HJB, derived in general setting setting
in [150] and [151], which in the present case gets the form
D
A(x)
T−∗S(x, s) = sup
b
[
B(x, b) +
(
∂S
∂x
, xQ(x, b)
)]
, s ∈ [0, T ]. (3.35)
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3.4 Several major players
Let us extend the above result to the case of several players competing on the background
of the pool of small players.
As was pointed out in Chapter 1, in the games with several principals one can naturally
distinguished two cases: the pool of small players is common for the major agents (think
about advertising models, or several states fighting together a terrorist group) or is specific
to each major agent (think about generals controlling armies, big banks controlling their
subsidaries, etc). Of course mathematically, the second case can be embedded in the
first case (with an appropriate increase of dimension). However, the second case is quite
special, because in the deterministic limit (we are mostly concern with) it turns to the
differential games with the so-called separated dynamics, where each player controls her
own position independently of other players (like in the classical games of pursuit and
evasion). And this case is much better developed in the theory of games.
Let us start with the case of two major players, I and II, playing a zero-sum game.
We shall first discuss the general case of a common pool of small players and then point
out the specific features of ’separated dynamics’.
Let b1 and b2 denote the control parameters of players I and II respectively, each taken
from a compact subset of a Euclidean space. Let player I tries to maximise the reward
B(x, b1, b2, N) and player II tries to minimise it.
The corresponding modification of Section 3.1 leads to the study of the Marokv chains
XN(t, x, b
1, b2), which are the chains generated by operators (3.1) with b substituted by
the pair (b1, b2).
Starting again with the discrete setting we assume that players I and II update their
strategies in discrete times {kτ}, k = 0, 1, · · · ..., n− 1. The rules of the game are distin-
guished by the order of the moves of players I or II.
In the case of the upper game we assume that player I always makes the first move,
which directly becomes known to player II. This leads to the problem of finding
V Nn,up(x(N)) = inf
π1
sup
π2
EN,x(N)
[
τB(x0, b
1
0, b
2
0) + · · ·+ τB(xn−1, b1n−1, b2n−1) + V (xn)
]
,
(3.36)
with x0 = x(N) ∈ Zd+/N . Here strategies π1 are rules that assign the controls b1k of player
I on the basis of the history of the chain up to steps k, that is, on the basis of known
x0, · · · , xk, b10, · · · , b1k−1, b10, · · · , b1k−1, strategies π2 are rules that assign the controls b2k of
player II on the basis of the history of the chain up to steps k plus the choice b1k, that is,
on the basis of known x0, · · · , xk, b10, · · · , b1k−1, bk, b10, · · · , b1k−1, and
xk = XN(τ, xk−1, b
1
k−1, b
2
k−1), k = 1, 2, · · · .
Similarly, in the case of the lower game we assume that player II always makes the first
move, which directly becomes known to player I. This leads to the problem of finding
V Nn,low(x(N)) = sup
π2
inf
π1
EN,x(N)
[
τB(x0, b
1
0, b
2
0) + · · ·+ τB(xn−1, b1n−1, b2n−1) + V (xn)
]
.
(3.37)
Here π2 are strategies assigning controls b2k of player II on the basis of the history of the
chain up to steps k and π1 are strategies that assign controls b1k of player I on the basis
of the history of the chain up to steps k plus the choice b2k.
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The values V Nn,up and V
N
n,low are called the upper and low values of the multistage
stochastic game with payoff B(x, b1, b2, N) and Markov dynamics XN(τ, x, b
1, b2).
It is a standard fact (see e.g. [194] or [144]) that Vn,up ≥ Vn,low and each of these values
can be calculated as the iterations of certain Shapley operators:
V Nn,low = Slow[N ]V
N
n−1,low = S
n
low[N ]V, V
N
n,up = Sup[N ]V
N
n−1,up = S
n
up[N ]V, (3.38)
where
Slow[N ]V (x) = sup
b2
inf
b1
[τB(x, b1, b2, N) + EV (XN(τ, x, b1, b2))] , (3.39)
Sup[N ]V (x) = inf
b1
sup
b2
[τB(x, b1, b2, N) + EV (XN(τ, x, b1, b2))] , (3.40)
We are again interested in the law of large numbers limit, N → ∞, where we expect
the limiting values Vn,up and Vn,low to be given by the corresponding problems with the
limiting deterministic dynamics:
Vn,up(x) = inf
π1
sup
π2
[
τB(x0, b
1
0, b
2
0) + · · ·+ τB(xn−1, b1n−1, b2n−1) + V (xn)
]
, (3.41)
Vn,low(x) = sup
π2
inf
π1
[
τB(x0, b
1
0, b
2
0) + · · ·+ τB(xn−1, b1n−1, b2n−1) + V (xn)
]
, (3.42)
with x0 = x, the same rules for strategies as above, but with the dynamics
xk = X(τ, xk−1, b
1
k−1, b
2
k−1), k = 1, 2, · · · ,
where X(t, x, b1, b2) denotes the solution of the kinetic equation
x˙k =
d∑
i=1
xiQik(x, b
1, b2), k = 1, ..., d, (3.43)
with the initial data x at time zero.
As in the case of finite N games, the values Vn,up and Vn,low are given by the iterations
of the corresponding Shapley operators:
Vn,low = SlowVn−1,low = S
n
lowV, Vn,up = SupVn−1,up = S
n
upV, (3.44)
where
SlowV (x) = sup
b2
inf
b1
[τB(x, b1, b2) + V (X(τ, x, b1, b2))] , (3.45)
SlowV (x) = inf
b1
sup
b2
[τB(x, b1, b2) + V (X(τ, x, b1, b2))] , (3.46)
The next analog of Theorem 3.1.1 is straightforward.
Theorem 3.4.1. (i) Assume
κV = ‖V ‖Lip, κB = sup
b1,b2
‖B(., b1, b2)‖Lip <∞, ω = sup
b1,b2
‖Q(., b1, b2)‖bLip <∞. (3.47)
and (3.6). Then, for any τ ∈ (0, 1], n ∈ N and t = τn,
max(‖Snlow[N ]V − SnlowV ‖, ‖Snup[N ]V − SnupV ‖)
CHAPTER 3. DYNAMIC CONTROL OF MAJOR PLAYERS 68
≤ C(d, ω)(tκB + κV )etω(t
√
1/(τN) + |x(N)− x|) (3.48)
with a constant C(d, ω) depending on d and ω. In particular, for τ = N−ǫ with ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
this turns to
max(‖Snlow[N ]V − SnlowV ‖, ‖Snup[N ]V − SnupV ‖)
≤ C(d, ω)(tκB + κV )etω(tN−(1−ǫ)/2 + |x(N)− x|). (3.49)
(ii) If there exists Lipshitz continuous optimal policies π1, π2 for the low or upper game
(the policies giving minmax in (3.41) or maxmin in (3.42) respectively, then π1, π2 are
approximately optimal for the N-agent problem.
In continuous-time-setting the efforts b1, b2 of the major players are chosen continu-
ously, with player I aiming at maximizing and player II at minimizing the payoff∫ T
t
B(x(s), b1(s), b2(s)) ds+ ST (x(T )) (3.50)
where J, ST are some continuous functions uniformly Lipschitz in all their variables.
The discrete-time approximation to this game is the problem of finding the upper and
lower values (3.36), (3.37) with the limiting values (3.41), (3.42).
It is known (see e.g. [86], [194]) that under the assumptions of Lipschitz continuity of
all functions involved, the limit of values (3.41) and (3.42) as n → ∞, τ = t/n, are the
generalized (so-called viscosity) solutions to the upper and lower HJB-Isaacs equations,
respectively:
∂S
∂t
+ inf
b1
sup
b2
[
B(x, b1, b2) +
(
∂S
∂x
, xQ(x, b1, b2)
)]
= 0, (3.51)
∂S
∂t
+ sup
b2
inf
b1
[
B(x, b1, b2) +
(
∂S
∂x
, xQ(x, b1, b2)
)]
= 0, (3.52)
with the terminal condition ST .
In many cases (see e.g. [86], [194]) one can show that solutions to (3.51) and (3.52)
coincide, the common value V (t, x) being known as the value of the zero-sum differential
game with the dynamics
x˙k =
d∑
i=1
xiQik(x, b
1, b2), k = 1, ..., d, (3.53)
and payoff function (3.50). Such differential games are said to have a value.
The following result is a straightforward extension of Theorem 3.3.1.
Theorem 3.4.2. Assume that the game with dynamics (3.53) and payoff (3.50) has a
value V (t, x) and that all functions involved as parameters are Lipschitz continuous Then,
for any x, t ∈ [0, T ] and τ = N−ǫ with ǫ ∈ (0, 1), both the upper and lower values (3.36),
(3.37) converge to V (t, x), as N →∞.
Let us describe in more detail the setting of two players controlling different pools of
minor players. Suppose we are given two families of Q-matrices {Q(t, u, x) = (Qij)(u, x)}
and {P (t, v, x) = (Pij)(v, x)}, i, j = 1, · · · d, depending on x ∈ Σd and parameters u and
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v from two subsets U and V of Euclidean spaces. Any given bounded measurable curves
u(t), v(t), t ∈ [0, T ], defines a Markov chain on
(Σd ∩ Zd+/N)× (Σd ∩ Zd+/M),
specified by the generator
LN,Mt,u(t),v(t)f(x, y) = N
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
xiQij(t, u(t), x)[f(x− ei/N + ej/N, y)− f(x, y)]
+M
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
yiPij(t, v(t), y)[f(x, y − ei/M + ej/M)− f(x, y)]. (3.54)
For f ∈ C1(Σd × Σd),
lim
N,M→∞
LN,Mt,u(t),v(t)f(x, y) = Λt,u(t),v(t)f(x, y),
where
Λt,u(t),v(t)f(x, y) =
d∑
k=1
∑
i 6=k
[xiQik(t, u(t), x)− xkQki(t, u(t), x)] ∂f
∂xk
(x, y)
+
d∑
k=1
∑
i 6=k
[yiPik(t, v(t), y)− ykPki(t, v(t), y)] ∂f
∂yk
(x, y). (3.55)
The corresponding controlled characteristics are governed by the equations
x˙k =
∑
i 6=k
[xiQik(t, u(t), x)− xkQki(t, u(t), x)] =
d∑
i=1
xiQik(t, u(t), x), k = 1, ..., d, (3.56)
y˙k =
∑
i 6=k
[yiPik(t, v(t), y)− ykPki(t, v(t), y)] =
d∑
i=1
yiPik(t, v(t), y), k = 1, ..., d. (3.57)
For a given T > 0, let us denote by Γ(T, τ)N the discrete-time stochastic game with the
dynamics specified by the generator (3.54), with the objective of the player I (controlling
Q via u) to maximize the payoff EVT (x(T ), y(T )) for a given function VT (terminal payoff),
and with the objective of player II (controlling P via v) to minimize this payoff (zero-sum
game), while the decision for choosing u and v are taken at time τk, k ∈ N. As previously
we want to approximate it by the deterministic zero-sum differential game Γ(T ), defined
by dynamics (3.56), (3.57) and the payoff of player I given by VT (Xt,x(T ), Yt,y(T ).
For this game with the separated dynamics it is known that the value V (t, x, y) exists
(see e.g. [86] or [169]). Hence Theorem 3.4.2 applies, so that the corresponding upper and
lower discrete-timer values converge to V (t, x) as as N →∞, where V is the generalized
(viscosity or minimax) solution (see [86] or [218]) of the HJB-Isaacs equation
∂S
∂t
+ sup
u
(
∂S
∂x
, xQ(x, u)
)
+ inf
v
(
∂S
∂y
, yP (y, v)
)
= 0. (3.58)
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One can similarly explore the corresponding competitive version of setting (3.32),
(3.33) that takes into account the costs of changing the budgets of the major players.
The situation with many major players is quite similar. Though the results on the
Nash equilibria in several-player differential games are less developed (see however [169],
[194]) the general conclusion from the above discussion is as follows: whenever the discrete
approximations to certain differential game have a common limit, the same common limit
have the discrete approximations to the corresponding stochastic game of the major players
and N minor players, as N →∞, τ = N−ǫ, ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 17. Original paper [138] dealing with Markov chains generated by (3.54) as a
gap in the argument showing directly the convergence of the limiting τ → 0 dynamics of
fixed number of players to the limiting differential game. This gap is corrected by showing
the convergence of the discrete approximations τ → 0 with τ ∼ N−ǫ ∼M−ǫ.
3.5 Turnpike theory for nonlinear Markov games
In Section 3.2 we discussed the infinite horizon problems with discounting payoff. Here
we shall touch upon the analysis of long time optimization problems without discounting,
working in the framework of Section 3.3. This analyses also allows one to link the best
response principal modeling of Chapter 2 with the present setting of a forward looking
principal.
For simplicity, let us assume, as in Section 2.6, that for any x there exists the unique
point of maximum b∗(x) of the function B(x, b).
Our analysis will be based on the following assumption (A) on the existence of an
optimal steady state for the kinetic dynamics:
(A) There exists a unique x∗ such that
0 = B(x∗, b∗(x∗)) = max
x
B(x, b∗(x)) = max
x,b
B(x, b). (3.59)
Moreover, (x∗, b∗(x∗)) is an asymptotically stable rest point of the kinetic equations,
that is x∗Q(x∗, b∗(x∗)) = 0 and there exists a neighborhood U of x∗ such that for all
x ∈ U the solution Xx(t) of the best response dynamics (2.71), that is, of the equation
x˙ = xQ(x, b∗(x)) starting at x, converges to x∗ exponentially:
‖Xx(t)− x∗‖ ≤ e−λt‖x− x∗‖. (3.60)
Let us also assume a power type nondegeneracy of the maximum point x∗, that is, the
following condition:
(B) For x in U , J behaves like a power function:
J(x, b∗(x)) ∼ −J˜ |x− x∗|α (3.61)
for some constants J˜ , α > 0.
Under these assumptions the rest point solutionX(t) = x∗ of the best response dynam-
ics (2.71) represents a turnpike for the optimization problem (3.25)-(3.26) in the following
sense.
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Theorem 3.5.1. Under assumptions (A) and (B) let x ∈ U , ST be bounded, and X˜x(s)
be the optimal trajectory for the optimization problem (3.25)-(3.26). Then, for any suffi-
ciently small ǫ and any time horizon T − t, the time τ this trajectory spends away from
the ǫ-neighborhood of x∗ satisfies the following bound:
τ ≤ 1
ǫα
[
|x− x∗|αλ−1 + (supST − S(x∗))J˜−1
]
. (3.62)
Thus for large T − t, an optimal trajectory spends most of the time near x∗. Moreover,
the payoff Vt for the optimization problem (3.25)-(3.26) has the following bounds
C|x− x∗|α + S(x∗) ≤ Vt ≤ supST (3.63)
with a constant C.
Proof. The cost on the trajectory Xx(s) of the best response dynamics (2.71) starting in
x at time t is of order
ST (x
∗)−
∫ T
t
e−λ(s−t)J˜ |x− x∗|α ds = ST (x∗)− J˜
λ
|x− x∗|α(1− e−(T−t)). (3.64)
If a trajectory spends time τ away from the ǫ-neighborhood of x∗, then the cost on this
trajectory does not exceed
−τ J˜ǫα + supST .
If it is an optimal trajectory it should perform better than Xx(s). Comparing with (3.64)
yields (3.62). The lower bound in (3.63) is again obtained from the trajectory Xx(s).
Combining Theorems 3.5.1 and 3.3.1 we obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.5.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.5.1 the optimal cost V Nt,n for the
approximate Markov chain (from Theorem 3.3.1) are approximated by the cost on the
limiting best response dynamics Xx(s).
For a general introduction to the turnpike theory, related background and bibliography
we can refer to paper [152], see also monograph [235] for the case of deterministic control.
Chapter 4
Models of growth under pressure
The results of this chapter extend the results of Chapters 2 and 3 to the case of a countable
state-space of small players, and moreover, to the case of processes that allow for the
change of the number of particles (thus going beyond the simple migrations that we
played with so far), where physical particles correspond in this setting to the coalitions
(stable groups) of agents. This extension is carried out in order to include important
models of evolutionary coalition building, merging and splitting (banks, subsidiaries, etc),
strategically enhanced preferential attachment and many other. The mathematics of this
chapter is more demanding than in the rest of our presentation, and its results are not
used in other parts of the book. It is based on some elements of infinite -dimensional
analysis, the analysis of functions on the Banach space of sequences l1 and of the ODEs
in this space. We start with brief description of the tools used.
4.1 Preliminaries: ODEs in l1
We recall some elementary results on the positivity preserving ODEs in l+1 starting with
reminding some basic notations. As usual, we denote by R∞ = {(x1, x2, · · · )} the space
of sequences of real numbers and by l1 the Banach space of sumable sequences
l1 = {(x1, x2, · · · ) : ‖x‖ =
∑
j
|xj | <∞}.
By R∞+ and l
+
1 we denote the subsets of theses space with non-negative coordinates xj .
All notations for basic classes of regular functions extend automatically to this infinite-
dimensional setting. For instance, for a convex closed subset Z of l1, C(Z) denotes the
space of bounded continuous functions equipped with the sup-norm: ‖f‖ = supx |f(x)|.
For these functions the Lipschitz constant is
‖f‖Lip = sup
x 6=y
|f(x)− f(y)|
‖x− y‖ = supj sup
|f(x)− f(y)|
|xj − yj| , (4.1)
where the last sup is the supremum over the pairs x, y that differ only in its jth coordinate.
By CbLip(Z) we denote the space of bounded Lipschitz functions with the norm ‖f‖bLip =
‖f‖+‖f‖Lip. By Ck(Z) we denote the space of functions on Z with continuous uniformly
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bounded partial derivatives equipped with the norm
‖f‖Ck(Z) = ‖f‖+
k∑
j=1
‖f (j)(Z)‖,
where ‖f (j)(Z)‖ is the supremum of the magnitudes of all partial derivatives of f of order
j. As in case of functions on Rd, ‖f‖C1 = ‖f‖bLip. The space C(Z, l1) of bounded
continuous l1-valued functions f = (fi) : Z → l1, will be also usually denoted C(Z), their
norm being ‖f‖ = supx∈Z ‖f(x)‖.
We shall denote by (g, f) the inner product (g, f) =
∑∞
k=1 gkfk for the elements
g, f ∈ R∞ such that ∑∞k=1 |gk| |fk| <∞.
As subsets Z of l1 we shall mostly use the sets
M(L) = {y ∈ R∞ :
∑
j
Lj |yj| <∞}, M≤λ(L) = {y ∈M(L) :
∑
j
Lj |yj| ≤ λ},
M+(L) =M(L) ∩R∞+ , M+≤λ(L) =M≤λ(L) ∩R∞+ .
for a non-decreasing sequence L ∈ R∞+ and λ > 0. For our purposes we will need only
two examples L: L(j) = 1, for which M(L) = l1, and L(j) = j. If Lj → ∞, as j → ∞,
the sets M+≤λ(L) are easily seen to be compact in l1.
The function g :M+(L)→M(L) for some L ∈ R∞+ is called conditionally positive if
gj(x) ≥ 0 whenever xj = 0. We will work with the l1-valued ODEs
x˙ = g(x)⇐⇒ {x˙j = gj(x) for all j = 1, · · · }, (4.2)
with such r.h.s. g. Since g may be defined only on M+(L), we are thus reduced to
the analysis of solutions that belong to M+(L) for all times. The vector L (or the
corresponding function on N) is said to be a Lyapunov vector (or a Lyapunov function)
for equation (4.2) (or for its r.h.s. function g), if the Lyapunov condition
(L, g(x)) ≤ a(L, x) + b, x ∈M+(L), (4.3)
holds with some constants a, b.
The Lyapunov function L is called subcritical (resp. critical) for g, or g is said to be
L- subcritical (resp. L- critical), if (L, g(x)) ≤ 0 (resp. (L, g(x)) = 0) for all x ∈M+(L).
In the last case L is also referred to as the conservation law.
Theorem 4.1.1. Let g :M+(L)→M(L) be conditionally positive and Lipschitz continu-
ous on any setM+≤λ(L) with some Lipschitz constant κ(λ), and L be the Lyapunov vector
for g. Then for any x ∈ M+(L) there exists a unique global solution X(t, x) ∈ M+(L)
(defined for all t ≥ 0) of equation (4.2) in l1 with the initial condition x. Moreover, if
x ∈M+≤λ(L) and a 6= 0, then
X(t, x) ∈M+≤λ(t)(L), λ(t) = eat
(
λ+
b
a
)
− b
a
= eatλ+ (eat − 1) b
a
. (4.4)
If a = 0, then the same holds with λ(t) = λ+ bt, and if f is L-critical, then with λ(t) = λ.
Finally, X(t, x) is Lipschitz as the function of x:
‖X(t, x)−X(t, y)‖ ≤ eκ(λ(t))‖x− y‖. (4.5)
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Remark 18. Intuitively, this result is clear. In fact, by conditional positivity, the vector
field g(x) on any boundary point of R∞+ is directed inside or tangent to the boundary, thus
not allowing a solution to leave it. On the other hand, by the Lyapunov condition,
(L,X(t, x)) ≤ (L, x) + a
∫ t
0
(L,X(s, x)) ds+ bt
implying (4.4) by Gronwall’s lemma. However, a rigorous proof is not fully straightfor-
ward, because already the existence of a solution is not clear: an attempt to construct it
via a usual fixed-point argument reducing it to the integral equation x(t) =
∫ t
0
g(x(s)) ds,
or by the standard Euler or Peano approximations encounters a problem, since all these
approximations may not preserve positivity (and thus may jump out of the domain where
g is defined).
Proof. Assuming a 6= 0 for definiteness, let
Mxa,b(t) =
{
y ∈ R∞+ : (L, y) ≤ eat
(
(L, x) +
b
a
)
− b
a
}
.
Fixing T , let us define the space Ca,b(T ) of continuous functions y : [0, T ] 7→ R∞+ such
that y([0, t]) ∈Mxa,b(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Let gL = gL(x) be the maximum of the Lipschitz constants of all gj onM
x
a,b(T ). Let us
pick up a constant K = K(x) ≥ gL. By conditional positivity, gj(y) ≥ −Kyj in Mxa,b(T ),
because
‖gj(y)− gj(y1, · · · , yj−1, 0, yj+1, · · · )‖ ≤ Kyj and gj(y1, · · · , yj−1, 0, yj+1, · · · ) ≥ 0.
Hence, by rewriting equation (4.2) equivalently as
y˙ = (g(y) +Ky)−Ky ⇐⇒ {y˙j = (gj(y) +Kyj)−Kyj, j = 1, · · · , n}, (4.6)
we ensure that the ’nonlinear part’ gj(y) +Kyj of the r.h.s. is always non-negative.
We modify the usual approximation scheme (see remark above) for ODEs by defining
the map Φx from Ca,b(T ) to itself in the following way: for a y ∈ C([0, T ],R+n ) let Φx(y)
be the solution of the equation
d
dt
[Φx(y)](t) = g(y(t)) +Ky(t)−K[Φx(y.)](t),
with the initial data [Φx(y)](0) = x. It is a linear equation with the unique explicit
solution, which can be taken as an alternative definition of Φx:
[Φx(y)](t) = e
−Ktx+
∫ t
0
e−K(t−s)[g(y(s)) +Ky(s)] ds.
Clearly, Φx preserves positivity and fixed points of Φ are positive solutions to (4.6) with
the initial data x.
Let us check that Φ takes Ca,b(T ) to itself. If y ∈ Ca,b(T ),
(L, [Φx(y](t))) = e
−Kt(L, x) +
∫ t
0
e−K(t−s)[(a+K)(L, y(s)) + b] ds
CHAPTER 4. MODELS OF GROWTH UNDER PRESSURE 75
≤ e−Kt(L, x) +
∫ t
0
e−K(t−s)[(a+K)
(
eas
(
(L, x) +
b
a
)
− b
a
)
+ b] ds
= (L, x)e−Kt + e−Kt(e(K+a)t − 1)((L, x) + b/a)− (b/a)e−Kt(eKt − 1)
= (L, x)eat +
b
a
(eat − 1).
Notice that, due to this bound, the iterations of Φ remain in Ca,b(T ) and hence it is
justified to use the Lipshitz constant K for g.
Next, the map Φ(t) is a contraction for small t, because
‖[Φx1(y1. )](t)− [Φx2(y2. )](t)‖ ≤ (K + gL)
∫ t
0
‖y1s − y2s‖ ds+ ‖x1 − x2‖
and the proof of the existence and uniqueness of a fixed point is completed by the usual
application of the Banach fixed point principle.
Finally,
‖X(t, x)−X(t, y)‖ ≤
∫ t
0
κ(λ(t))‖X(s, x)−X(s, y)‖ ds+ ‖x− y‖,
and (4.5) follows by usual Gronwall’s lemma.
Once the solution X(t, x) are constructed the linear operators T t,
T tf(x) = f(X(t, x)), t ≥ 0, (4.7)
become well defined contractions in C(M+(L)) forming a semigroup. In case a = b = 0,
the operators U t form a semigroup of contractions also in C(M+≤λ(L)) for any λ.
Theorem 4.1.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1.1 assume additionally that g is
twice continuously differentiable on M+(L) so that for any λ
‖g(2)(M+≤λ(L))‖ ≤ D2(λ) (4.8)
with some continuous function D2. Then the solutions to X(t, x) from Theorem 4.1.1 are
twice continuously differentiable with respect to initial data and
‖X(t, .)(1)(M+≤λ(L))‖ ≤ etκ(λ(t)), (4.9)
‖X(t, .)(2)(M+≤λ(L))‖ = sup
j,i
sup
x∈M+
≤λ
(L)
‖∂
2X(t, x)
∂xi∂xj
‖ ≤ tD2(λ(t))e3tκ(λ(t)). (4.10)
Moreover,
‖(T tf)(1)(M+≤λ(L))‖ = sup
j
sup
x∈M+
≤λ
(L)
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂xj f(X(t, x))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖f (1)(M+≤λ(L))‖etκ(λ(t)), (4.11)
‖(T tf)(2)(M+≤λ(L))‖ = sup
j,i
sup
x∈M+
≤λ
(L)
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂xj∂xi f(X(t, x))
∣∣∣∣
≤ ‖f (2)(M+≤λ(t)(L))‖e2tκ(λ(t)) + t‖f (1)(M+≤λ(t)(L))‖D2(λ(t))e3tκ(λ(t)) (4.12)
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Proof. Differentiating the equation x˙ = g(x) with respect to initial conditions yields
d
dt
∂X(t, x)
∂xj
=
∑
k
∂g
∂xk
(X(t, x))
∂Xk(t, x)
∂xj
, (4.13)
implying (4.9). Differentiating the equation x˙ = f(x) twice yields
d
dt
∂2X(t, x)
∂xj∂xi
=
∑
k
∂g
∂xk
(X(t, x))
∂2Xk(t, x)
∂xj∂xi
+
∑
k,l
∂2g
∂xk∂xl
(X(t, x))
∂Xk(t, x)
∂xj
∂Xl(t, x)
∂xi
.
(4.14)
Solving this linear equation with the initial condition ∂2X(0, x)/∂xj∂xi = 0 yields (4.10).
Differentiating (4.7) yields
∂
∂xj
(T tf)(x) =
∑
k
∂f
∂xk
(X(t, x))
∂Xk(t, x)
∂xj
, (4.15)
implying (4.11). Differentiating second time yields
∂2
∂xj∂xi
(T tf)(x) =
∑
k
∂f
∂xk
(X(t, x))
∂2Xk(t, x)
∂xj∂xi
+
∑
k,l
∂2f
∂xk∂xl
(X(t, x))
∂Xk(t, x)
∂xj
∂Xl(t, x)
∂xj
,
(4.16)
implying (4.12).
Remark 19. The proof above is not complete. All estimates are proved based on the
assumption that the required derivatives exist. However, the corresponding justification
argument are standard in the theory of ODEs and thus are not reproduced here, see e.g.
[142].
4.2 Mean-field interacting systems in l1
In this chapter we extend the main results of Chapters 2 and 3 in two directions, namely,
by working with a countable (rather than finite or compact) state-space and unbounded
rates, and with more general interactions allowing in particular for a change in the number
of particles.
Therefore we take the set of natural numbers {1, 2, · · · } as the state space of each
small player, the set of finite Borel measures on it being the Banach space l1 of sumable
real sequences x = (x1, x2, · · · ).
Thus the state space of the total multitude of small players will be formed by the set
Zfin+ of sequences of integers n = (n1, n2, · · · ) with only finite number of non-vanishing
ones, with nk denoting the number of players in the state k, the total number of small
players being N =
∑
k nk. As we are going to extend the analysis to processes not
preserving the number of particles, we shall work now with a more general scaling of the
states, namely with the sequences
x = (x1, x2, · · · ...) = hn = h(n1, n2, · · · ...) ∈ hZfin+
with the parameter h = 1/N0, the inverse number to the total number of players
∑
k nk at
the initial moment of observation. The necessity to distinguish initial moment is crucial
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here, as this number changes over time. Working with the scaling related to the current
number of particles N may lead, of course, to different evolutions.
The general processes of birth, death, mutations and binary interactions that can occur
under the effort b of the principal are Markov chains on hZfin+ specified by the generators
of the following type
Lb,hF (x) =
1
h
∑
j
βj(x, b)[F (x+ hej)− F (x)] + 1
h
∑
j
αj(x, b)[F (x− hej)− F (x)]
+
1
h
∑
i,j
α1ij(x, b)[F (x−hei+hej)−F (x)]+
1
h
∑
i,(j1,j2)
α1i(j1j2)(x, b)[F (x−hei+hej1+hej2)−F (x)]
+
1
h
∑
(i1,i2),j
α2(i1i2)j(x, b)[F (x− hei1 − hei2 + hej)− F (x)]
+
1
h
∑
(i1,i2)
∑
(j1,j2)
α2(i1i2)(j1j2)(x, b)[F (x− hei1 − hei2 + hej1 + hej2)− F (x)], (4.17)
where brackets (i, j) denote the pairs of states. Here the terms with βj and αj describe
the spontaneous injection (birth) and death of agents, the terms with α1ij describe the
mutation or migration of single agents, the terms with α1i(lj) describe the fragmentation
or splitting, the terms with α2 describe the binary interactions, which can result in either
merging of two agents producing an agent with another strategy or their simultaneous mi-
gration to any other pair of strategies. All terms include possible mean-field interactions.
Say, our model (2.31) was an example of migration.
Let L be a strictly positive non-decreasing function on N. We shall refer to such
functions as Lyapunov functions. We say that the generator Lb,h with βj = 0 and the
corresponding process do not increase L if for any allowed transition the total value of L
cannot increase, that is if α1ij 6= 0, then L(j) ≤ L(i), if α1i(j1,j2) 6= 0, then L(j1) + L(j2) ≤
L(i), if α2(i1i2)j 6= 0, then L(j) ≤ L(i1) + L(i2), if α2(i1i2)(j1j2) 6= 0, then L(j1) + L(j2) ≤
L(i1) + L(i2). If this is the case, the chains generated by Lb,h always remain in M+≤λ(L),
if they were started there. Hence, if Lj → ∞, as j → ∞, the sets hZfin+ ∩M+≤λ(L) are
finite for any h and λ, and Lb,h generates well-defined Markov chains Xb,h(t, x) in any of
these sets.
A generator Lb,h is called L-subcritical if Lb,h(L) ≤ 0. Of course, if Lb,h does not
increase L, then it is L-subcritical. Though the condition to not increase L seems to be
restrictive, many concrete models satisfy it, for instance, the celebrated merging-splitting
(Smoluchovskii) process considered below. On the other hand, models with spontaneous
injections may increase L, so that one is confined to work with the weaker property of
sub-criticality. We shall first analyse the case of chains that do not increase L, and then
will consider subcritical evolutions and evolutions allowing for a mild growth of L.
By Taylor-expanding F in (4.17) one sees that if F is sufficiently smooth, the sequence
Lb,hF converges to
ΛbF (x) =
∑
j
(βj(x, b)− αj(x, b))∂F
∂xi
+
∑
i,j
α1ij(x, b)[
∂F
∂xj
− ∂F
∂xi
]
CHAPTER 4. MODELS OF GROWTH UNDER PRESSURE 78
+
∑
i,(j1,j2)
α1i(j1j2)(x, b)[
∂F
∂xj1
+
∂F
∂xj2
− ∂F
∂xi
] +
∑
(i1,i2)
∑
j
α2(i1i2)j(x, b)[
∂F
∂xj
− ∂F
∂xi1
− ∂F
∂xi2
]
+
∑
(i1,i2)
∑
(j1,j2)
α2(i1i2)(j1j2)(x, b)[
∂F
∂xj1
+
∂F
∂xj2
− ∂F
∂xi1
− ∂F
∂xi2
]. (4.18)
Moreover,
‖(Lb,h − Λb)F‖C(M+
≤λ
(L)) ≤ 8hκ(λ)‖F‖C2(M+
≤λ
(L)), (4.19)
with κ(L, λ) being the supb of the norms∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i
(αi + βi) +
∑
i,j
α1ij +
∑
i,(j1,j2)
α1i(j1j2) +
∑
(i1,i2),j
α2(i1i2)j +
∑
(i1,i2),(j1,j2)
α2(i1i2)(j1j2)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
C(M+
≤λ
(L))
.
(4.20)
By regrouping the terms of Λb, it can be rewritten in the form of the general first order
operator
ΛbF (x) =
∑
j
gj(x, b)
∂F
∂xj
, (4.21)
where g = (gi) with
gi = βi − αi +
∑
k
(α1ki − α1ik) +
∑
k
[α1k(ii) +
∑
j 6=i
(α1k(ij) + α
1
k(ji)]−
∑
(j1,j2)
α1i(j1j2)
+
∑
(j1,j2)
α2(j1j2)i −
∑
k
[α2(ii)k +
∑
j 6=i
(α2(ij)k + α
2
(ji)k)]
+
∑
(j1,j2)
[α2(j1j2)(ii) +
∑
j 6=i
(α2(j1j2)(ji) + α
2
(j1j2)(ij)
)]
−
∑
(j1,j2)
[α2(ii)(j1j2) +
∑
j 6=i
(α2(ij)(j1j2) + α
2
(ji)(j1j2))].
Its characteristics solving the ODE x˙ = g(x) can be expected to describe the limiting
behavior of the Markov chains Xb,h(x, t) for h→ 0.
As in finite-dimensional case we can build the semigroups of transition operators
U thF (x) = EF (Xh(t, x)), U
tF (x) = EF (X(t, x)) and we are going to search for conditions
ensuring that U th → U t as h→ 0.
Let us stress again that the present models are much more general than the models
of Chapter 2. The present g cannot always be written in the form g = xQ(x) with a
Q-matrix Q describing the evolution of one player, because the possibility of birth and
death makes the tracking of a particular player throughout the game impossible.
4.3 Convergence results for evolutions in l1
As in Chapter 2 let us start with the case of smooth coefficients.
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Theorem 4.3.1. Assume the operators Lb,h are L non-increasing for a (positive non-
decreasing) Lyapunov function L on Z, and the function g : M+≤λ(L) → l1 belongs
to C2(M+≤λ(L)). Then the Markov chains Xh(t, x(h)) with x(h) ∈ M+≤λ(L) such that
x(h) → x, as h → 0, converge in distribution to the deterministic evolution X(t, x) and
moreover
‖U thF − U tF‖ = sup
x
|EF (Xh(t, x))− F (X(t, x))|
≤ 8thκ(L, λ)(‖F (2)‖+ t‖F (1)‖ ‖g(2)‖)e3t‖g‖Lip , (4.22)
where all norms are understood as the supb of the norms of functions on M+≤λ(L) ⊂ l1.
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 2.4.1.
All function-norms below are the norms of functions defined on M+≤λ(L). By (4.11),
‖(U tF )(2)‖ ≤ (‖F (2)‖+ t‖F (1)‖ ‖g(2)‖)e3t‖g‖Lip , (4.23)
because λ(t) = λ (this is precisely the simplifying assumption that all transitions do not
increase L). Hence by (4.19),
‖(Lb,h − Λb)U tF‖ ≤ 8hκ(L, λ)(‖F (2)‖+ t‖F (1)‖ ‖g(2)‖)e3t‖g‖Lip ,
implying (4.22).
Let us turn to the case of Lipschitz continuous coefficients.
Theorem 4.3.2. Assume the operators Lb,h are L non-increasing for a Lyapunov function
L on Z such that L(j)/jγ → 1 with γ > 0, as j → ∞. Let g : M+≤λ(L) → l1 belongs
to (M+≤λ(L))bLip. Then the Markov chains Xh(t, x(h)) with x(h) ∈ M+≤λ(L) such that
x(h) → x, as h → 0, converge in distribution to the deterministic evolution X(t, x) and
moreover
|EF (Xh(t, x))− F (X(t, x))| ≤ C‖F‖Lip(t‖g‖bLip + κ(L, λ))(ht)γ/(1+2γ) (4.24)
with a constant C. In particular, if L(j) = j, as is often the case in applications,
|EF (Xh(t, x))− F (X(t, x))| ≤ C‖F‖Lip(t‖g‖bLip + κ(L, λ))(ht)1/3. (4.25)
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.5.1. The new difficulty arises from
the fact that the number of pure states (which is the maximal j such that the sequence
(δji ) ∈ l1 belongs to M+≤λ(L) ∩ hZ∞+ ) increases with decrease of h, while in Theorem
2.5.1 the number of pure states d was fixed. Thus the smoothing will be combined with
finite-dimensional approximations.
Let Pj denotes the projection on the first j coordinates in R
∞, that is [Pj(x)]k = xk
for k ≤ j and [Pj(x)]k = 0 otherwise. For x ∈M≤λ(L),
‖Pj(x)− x‖l1 ≤ λ
L(j)
.
For functions on x ∈M≤λ(L) we shall use the smooth approximation Φδ,j(F ) = Φδ(F ◦Pj)
with Φδ as in Theorem 2.5.1. More precisely,
Φδ,j[V ](x) =
∫
Rj
1
δj
j∏
k=1
χ
(yk
δ
)
V (x− y)
j∏
k=1
dyk =
∫
Rj
1
δj
j∏
k=1
χ
(
xk − yk
δ
)
V (y)
j∏
k=1
dyk,
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where χ is a mollifier, a non-negative infinitely smooth even function onR with a compact
support and
∫
χ(w) dw = 1. Thus
Φδ,j[V ](x) =
∫
Rj
1
δj
j∏
k=1
χ
(yk
δ
)
V (Pj(x− y))
j∏
k=1
dyk.
Estimates (2.60) and (2.62) of Theorem 2.5.1 remain the same:
‖Φδ,j [V ]‖C1 = |Φδ[V ]‖bLip ≤ ‖V ‖bLip,
and
‖Φδ,j[V ](2)‖ ≤ ‖V ‖bLip1
δ
∫
|χ′(w)| dw (4.26)
for any δ, and (2.61) generalizes to
‖Φδ,j[V ]− V ‖ ≤ C‖V ‖Lip(jδ + λ/L(j)). (4.27)
Consequently, arguing as in Theorem 2.5.1 we obtain (using similar notations)
‖U th,δ,jf − U thf‖ ≤ Ct‖Q‖bLip‖f‖bLip(δj + λ/L(j)) exp{t‖g‖Lip},
‖U tδ,jf − U tf‖ ≤ Ct‖Q‖bLip‖f‖bLip(δj + λ/L(j)) exp{t‖g‖Lip},
‖U th,δ,jf − U tδ,jf‖ ≤ 8thκ(L, λ)(‖F (2)‖+ t‖F‖Lip‖g(2)‖)e3t‖g‖Lip .
And therefore
‖U thF − U tF‖ ≤ 8thκ‖F (2)‖e3t‖g‖Lip+
Ct‖F‖Lip‖g‖bLip
[
ht
δ
κ(L, λ) + jδ +
λ
L(j)
]
e3t‖g‖Lip .
To get rid of F (2) we also approximate F by the function Φδ,j [F ], so that
‖U thF − U tF‖ ≤ C‖F‖Lip(t‖g‖bLip + κ(L, λ))
[
ht
δ
κ(L, λ) + jδ +
λ
L(j)
]
e3t‖g‖Lip .
Choosing
j = (ht)−1/(1+2γ), δ = (ht)(1+γ)/(1+2γ),
makes all three terms in the square bracket of the same order, yielding (4.24).
Let us now write down the analog of the multi-step optimization result of Theorem
3.1.1. Namely, assume the principal is updating her strategy in discrete times {kτ}, k =
0, 1, · · · ..., n−1, with some fixed τ > 0, n ∈ N aiming at finding a strategy π maximizing
the reward (3.2), but now with x0 = x(h) ∈ hZfin ∩M+≤λ(L) and the transitions xk =
Xh(τ, xk−1, bk−1) defined by the Markov chain generated by (4.17). The Shapley operators
SN and S are defined analogously to Section 3.1, so that their iterations define the optimal
payoffs for the random evolution with fixed h and for the limiting deterministic evolution.
Theorem 4.3.3. Under the assumption of Theorem 4.3.2 let x0 = x(h) ∈ hZfin ∩
M+≤la(L) and x(h)→ x in l1. Then, for any τ ∈ (0, 1], n ∈ N and t = τn,
‖Sn[N ]V (x(h))− SnV (x)‖ ≤ C(t, ‖g‖bLip, ‖V ‖bLip)(hγ/(1+2γ)τ−(1+γ)/(1+2γ) + |x(h)− x|),
(4.28)
with a constant C depending on (t, ‖g‖bLip, ‖V ‖bLip). The r.h.s. tends to zero if h → 0
faster than τ 1+1/γ .
All other results of Chapter 3 extend automatically (with appropriate modifications)
to the case of Markov chains generated by (4.17).
CHAPTER 4. MODELS OF GROWTH UNDER PRESSURE 81
4.4 Evolutionary coalition building under pressure
As a direct application of Theorems 4.3.2, 4.3.3, let us discuss the model of evolutionary
coalition building. Namely, so far we talked about small players that occasionally and
randomly exchange information in small groups (mostly in randomly formed pairs) re-
sulting in copying the most successful strategy by the members of the group. Another
natural reaction of the society of small players to the pressure exerted by the principal
can be executed by forming stable groups that can confront this pressure in a more effec-
tive manner (but possibly imposing certain obligatory regulations for the members of the
group). Analysis of such possibility leads one naturally to models of mean-field-enhanced
coagulation processes under external pressure. Coagulation-fragmentation processes are
well studied in statistical physics, see e. g. [184]. In particular, general mass-exchange
processes, that in our social environment become general coalition forming processes pre-
serving the total number of participants, were analyzed in [129] and [131] with their law
of large number limits for discrete and general state spaces. Here we add to this analysis
a strategic framework for a major player fitting the model to the more general framework
of the previous section. Instead of coagulation and fragmentation of particles we shall use
here the terms merging and splitting or breakage of the coalitions of agents.
For simplicity, we ignore here any other behavioral distinctions (assuming no strategic
space for an individual player) concentrating only on the process of forming coalitions.
Thus the state space of the total multitude of small players will be formed by the set
Zfin+ of sequences of integers n = (n1, n2, · · · ...) with only finite number of non-vanishing
ones, with nk denoting the number of coalition of size k, the total number of small players
being N =
∑
k knk and the total number of coalitions (a single player is considered to
represent a coalition of size 1) being
∑
k nk. Also for simplicity we reduce attention to
binary merging and breakage only, extension to arbitrary regrouping processes from [129]
(preserving the number of players) is more-or-less straightforward.
As previously, we will look for the evolution of appropriately scaled states, namely the
sequences
x = (x1, x2, · · · ...) = hn = h(n1, n2, · · · ...) ∈ hZfin+
with certain parameter h > 0, which can be taken, for instance, as the inverse number to
the total number of coalitions
∑
k nk at the initial moment of observation.
If any randomly chosen pair of coalitions of sizes j and k can merge with the rates
Ckj(x, b), which may depend on the whole composition x and the control parameter b of
the major player, and any randomly chosen coalition of size j can split (break, fragment)
into two groups of sizes k < j and j − k with rate Fjk(x, b), the limiting deterministic
evolution of the state is known to be described by the system of the so-called Smoluchovski
equations
x˙k = gk(x) =
∑
j<k
Cj,k−j(x, b)xjxk−j−2
∑
j
Ckj(x, b)xjxk+2
∑
j>k
Fjk(x, b)xj−
∑
j<k
Fkj(x, b)xk.
(4.29)
In addition to the well known setting with constant Cjk and Fjk (see e. g. [24]) we
added here the mean field dependence of these coefficients (dependence on x) and the
dependence on the control parameter b.
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As one easily checks, equations (4.29) can be written in the equivalent weak form
d
dt
∑
j
φjxj =
∑
j,k
(φj+k−φj−φk)Cjk(x, b)xjxk+
∑
j
∑
k<j
(φj−k+φk−φj)Fjk(x, b)xj , (4.30)
which should hold for a suitable class of test functions φ. For instance, under the assump-
tion of bounded coefficients (see (4.35) below), the class of test functions is the class of all
functions from l∞ = {φ : supj |φj| <∞}. This implies, in particular, that the correspond-
ing semigroups (4.7) on the space of continuous functions, that is U tG(x) = G(X(t, x)),
have the generator
ΛbG(x) =
∑
k
gk(x)
∂G
∂xk
(x) =
∑
j,k
(
∂G
∂xk+j
− ∂G
∂xj
− ∂G
∂xk
)
Cjk(x, b)xjxk
+
∑
j
∑
k<j
(
∂G
∂xj−k
− ∂G
∂xj
+
∂G
∂xk
)
Fjk(x, b)xj (4.31)
of type (4.18) with
α1i(j1j2) = Fij1(x)xi for j1 + j2 = i; α
2
(i1i2)j
= Ci1i2(x)xi1xi2 for j = i1 + i2
and all other coefficients vanishing. Thus the Smoluchovski equations are particular rep-
resentatives of the characteristics of the first order PDE (4.18) or (4.21).
Let Rj(x, b) be the payoff for the member of a coalition of size j. In our strategic
setting, the rates Cjk(x, b) and Fjk(x, b) should depend on the differences of these rewards
before and after merging or splitting. For instance, the simplest choices can be
Ckj(x, b) = aj+k,k(Rk+j −Rk)+ + aj+k,j(Rk+j −Rj)+, (4.32)
with some constants alk ≥ 0 reflecting the assumption that merging may occur whenever it
is beneficial for all members concerned but weighted according to the size of the coalitions
involved. Similarly
Fkj(x, b) = a˜kj(Rj − Rk)+ + a˜k,k−j(Rk−j − Rk)+. (4.33)
A Markov approximation to dynamics (4.29) is constructed in the standard way, which
is analogous to the constructions of approximating Markov chains described in the pre-
vious section (for coagulation - fragmentation processes this Markov approximation is
often referred to as the Markus-Lushnikov process, see e.g. [184]), namely, by attaching
exponential clocks to any pair of coalitions that can merge with rates Ckj and to any
coalition that can split with rates Fkj. This leads to the Markov chain Xh(t, x, b) on
hZfin+ describing the process of coalition formation with the generator
Lcoalb,h G(x) =
1
h
∑
i,j
Cij(x, b)xixj [G(x− hei − hej + hei+j)−G(x)]
+
1
h
∑
i
∑
j<i
Fij(x, b)xi[G(x− hei + hej + hei−j)−G(x)], (4.34)
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of type (4.17) with the same identification of coefficients as above.
We shall propose here only the simplest result in this direction assuming that the
intensities of individual transition are uniformly bounded and uniformly Lipschitz, that
is
C = sup
j,k
Cjk(x, b) <∞, F = sup
j
∑
k<j
Fkj(x, b) <∞, (4.35)
C(1) = sup
b,j,k
‖Cjk(., b)‖CbLip(M+≤λ(L)) <∞,
F (1) = sup
b,j
∑
k<j
‖Fkj(., b)‖CbLip(M+≤λ(L)) <∞,
(4.36)
with the Lyapunov function L(j) = j. Notice however that the overall intensities are still
unbounded (quadratic), so that we are still far beyond the assumptions of Chapter 2.
For the function L(j) = j the Markov chains Xh(t, x, b) do not increase L. Moreover,
(4.35) implies
‖g‖ ≤ 3Cλ2 + 3Fλ,
‖g‖bLip ≤ 6Cλ+ 3F + 3(C(1)λ+ F (1))λ,
(4.37)
where we use the convention of the previous section that all functional norms are un-
derstood as supb of the norms of functions on M+≤λ(L) with some fixed λ. Hence the
following result holds.
Theorem 4.4.1. For a model of strategically enhanced coalition building subject to (4.35)
and (4.36) the conditions of Theorems 4.3.2, 4.3.3 are satisfied for operators (4.31) and
(4.34) that represent particular cases of operators (4.18) and (4.17). Hence the corre-
sponding Markov chains Xh(t, x, b) converge to the deterministic limit governed by the
equation x˙ = f(x, b) and the corresponding multi-step Markov decision problem converge
to its deterministic limit.
4.5 Strategically enhanced preferential attachment on
evolutionary background
A natural and useful extension of the theory presented above can be obtained by the in-
clusion in our pressure-resistance evolutionary-type game the well known model of linear
growth with preferential attachment (Yule, Simon and others, see [216] for review) turn-
ing the latter into a strategically enhanced preferential attachment model that includes
evolutionary-type interactions between agents and a major player having tools to control
(interfere into) this interaction.
We shall work with the general framework of Theorem 4.3.2, having in mind that the
basic examples of the approximating Markov chainsXh(t, x(h)) can arise from the merging
and splitting coalition model of the previous section (with generator (4.34)) or from mean-
field interacting particle systems of Chapters 1 and 2 (for instance, (1.10)), where the
number of possible states becomes infinite, which can be looked at as describing the
evolution of coalitions resulting from individual migrations from one coalition to another.
Denoting by j the size of coalitions (rather than the type of an agent, as in (1.10)), the
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generator of this Markov chain becomes an infinite-dimensional version of (2.33):
Lmigrb,h G(x) =
1
h
∑
i,j
κxixj [Rj(x, b)−Ri(x, b)]+[G (x− hei + hej)−G(x)], (4.38)
where Rj(x, b) is the payoff to a member of a coalition of size j = 1, 2, · · · . The Markov
chain with generator (4.38) describes the process where agents can move from one coalition
to another choosing the size of the coalition that is more beneficial under the control b of
the principal.
The most studied form of preferential attachment evolves by the discrete time injec-
tions of agents (see [27], [69], [216] and references therein). Along these lines, we can
assume that with time intervals τ a new agent enters the system in such a way that with
some probability p(x, b) (which, unlike the standard model, can now depend on the dis-
tribution x and the control parameter b of the principal) she does not enter any of the
existing coalitions (thus forming a new coalition of size 1), and with probability 1−p(x, b)
she joins one of the coalitions, the probability to join a coalition being proportional to its
size (this reflects the notion of preferential attachment coined in [27]).
A continuous time version of these evolutions can be modeled by a Markov process,
where the injection occurs with some intensity α(x, b) (that can be influenced by the
principal subject to certain costs). In other words, it can be included by adding to
generator (4.38) or (4.34) the additional term of the type
Lattb,hG(x) =
p(x, b)α(x, b)
h
[G(x+ he1)−G(x)]
+
(1− p(x, b))α(x, b)
h
∞∑
k=1
kxk[G(x− hek + hek+1)−G(x)],
or denoting a(x, b) = p(x, b)α(x, b), P (x, b) = (1− p(x, b))α(x, b),
Lattb,hG(x) =
a(x, b)
h
[G(x+he1)−G(x)]+P (x, b)
h
∞∑
k=1
kxk[G(x−hek+hek+1)−G(x)]. (4.39)
Division by h = 1/N0 in this equation makes the rate of growth of the number of agents
comparable to the total number of agents. If it were of smaller scale, it would not influence
significantly the limiting LLN evolution.
The limiting generator obtained form (4.39) as h→ 0 is the first order operator
Λattb,hG(x) = a(x, b)
∂G
∂x1
+ P (x, b)
∞∑
k=1
kxk
[
∂G
∂xk+1
− ∂G
∂xk
]
, (4.40)
with the characteristics or the kinetic equations
x˙j = δ
j
1a(x, b) + P (x, b)[(j − 1)xj−1 − jxj ]. (4.41)
Combining this with the processes given by (4.38) or (4.34) yields the model of coalition
building with the influx of new agents or the strategically enhanced preferential attachment
model on the evolutionary background. To shorten formulas let us ignore the contribution
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of individual migration (4.38) and concentrate on the combination of (4.34) and (4.40),
that is, on the chain Xh(t, x(h)) generated by the operator
Lb,h = L
att
b,h + L
coal
b,h , (4.42)
with the limiting generator Λb,h = Λ
att
b,h+Λ
coal
b,h . The corresponding characteristics represent
the controlled (via discrete or continuous-time choice of parameter b by the principal)
infinite-dimensional ODEs combining (4.41) and (4.29):
x˙k = gk(x) = δ
j
1a(x, b) + P (x, b)[(j − 1)xj−1 − jxj ]
+
∑
j<k
Cj,k−j(x, b)xjxk−j − 2
∑
j
Ckj(x, b)xjxk +2
∑
j>k
Fjk(x, b)xj −
∑
j<k
Fkj(x, b)xk. (4.43)
The proof that this system does in fact represent the dynamic LLN for the Markov
chains defined by the generator (4.42) (i.e. the proof of the convergence of these Markov
chains as h→ 0) requires advanced tools from the theory of infinite-dimensional ODEs. It
will be discussed in the next Section under very general assumption of unbounded rates,
namely under the assumption of the so called additive bounds for rates:
a(x, b) + P (x, b) ≤ c, Ckj(x, b) ≤ c(k + j),
∑
j<k
Fkj(x, b) ≤ cj (4.44)
with some constant c.
An important issue which we will not touch upon here is to understand the controlla-
bility of the limiting (now in the sense t→∞) stationary solutions, which may lead to the
possibility for developing tools for influencing the power tails of distributions (Zipf’s law)
appearing in many situations of practical interest, as well as the proliferation or extinction
of certain desirable (or undesirable) characteristics of the processes of evolution.
4.6 Unbounded coefficients and growing populations
This section goes much further in mathematical sophistication. We shall exploit the
theory of the regularity and sensitivity of ODEs in l1 with unbounded coefficients. The
key ingredient in our argument is the following well-posedness and sensitivity result for
kinetic equation (4.43).
Theorem 4.6.1. For some b let a(x, b), P (x, b), C(x, b), F (x, b) be twice continuously dif-
ferentiable in x and satisfy the additive bound condition (4.44) together with their deriva-
tives, that is, (4.44) and the estimates
|∂a(x, b)
∂xp
|+ |∂P (x, b)
∂xp
| ≤ c, |∂Ckj(x, b)
∂xp
| ≤ c(k + j),
∑
j<k
|∂Fkj(x, b)
∂xp
| ≤ cj, (4.45)
|∂a
2(x, b)
∂xp∂xq
|+ |∂
2P (x, b)
∂xp∂xq
| ≤ c, |∂
2Ckj(x, b)
∂xp∂xq
| ≤ c(k + j),
∑
j<k
|∂
2Fkj(x, b)
∂xp∂xq
| ≤ cj, (4.46)
uniformly for all x, p, q.
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Then for any x ∈ M+(L3) with the function Lj = j there exists a unique global
solution X(t, x) of equation (4.43), which also belong to M+(L3) for all times. Moreover,
the derivatives with respect to the initial data
ξp(t, x) =
∂X(t, x)
∂xp
, ηp,q(t, x) =
∂2X(t, x)
∂xp∂xq
are well defined for all times and belong to the spaces M+(L2) and M+(L) respectively,
where they are uniformly bounded on bounded times and bounded x:
sup
x
∑
j
j|ξpj (t, x)| ≤ C(λ, T )Lp, sup
x
∑
j
j2|ξpj (t, x)| ≤ C(λ, T )L2p, (4.47)
sup
x
∑
j
j|ηp,qj (t, x)| ≤ tC(λ, T )LpLq, (4.48)
uniformly for t ≤ T , where supx is over x ∈ M≤λ(L3), that is, over x satisfying the
estimates
∑
j j
3xj ≤ λ.
This theorem is a slight extension of the general sensitivity result from [136]. Its full
and detailed proof is given in Chapter 3 of [142].
We can now follow the line of arguments from Theorems 2.4.1 or 4.3.1 to prove the
convergence of the Markov chains Xh(t, x(h)) generated by (4.42), that is, to obtain the
following main result of this Chapter. Let U th be the semigroup of the Markov chain
Xh(t, x(h)), and let U
t be the semigroup generated by equation (4.43), that is U tG(x) =
G(X(t, x)).
Theorem 4.6.2. Under the assumption of Theorem 4.6.1 let the initial states x(h) of
the Markov chains Xh(t, x(h)) generated by (4.42) belong to M+≤ν(L3) with some ν and
converge to a state x so that
∑
j j|xj(h) − xj | → 0, as h → 0. Then the Markov chains
Xh(t, x(h)) converge in distribution to the deterministic evolution X(t, x) and moreover,
for any G ∈ C2(l1) and T > 0,
sup
t≤T
‖U thG(x(h))− U tG(x)‖ ≤ CT (th+
∑
j
j|xj(h)− xj |)‖G‖C2(l1), (4.49)
Proof. Recall that
‖G‖C2(l1) = sup |G(x)|+ sup
x,j
∣∣∣∣ ∂G∂xj
∣∣∣∣+ sup
x,j,k
∣∣∣∣ ∂2G∂xj∂xk
∣∣∣∣ .
Following the argument of Theorems 2.4.1 or 4.3.1, we have to obtain a bound for
the expression |(Lb,h − Λb)U tG(x)|, which is uniform for x ∈ M+≤ν(L3). Looking at the
expressions for Lb,h and Λb, we find that
‖(Lb,h − Λb)U tG(x)‖ = ha(x)∂
2φ
∂x21
+
1
2
hP (x)
∑
k
kxk
(
∂2φ
∂x2k
+
∂2φ
∂x2k+1
− 2 ∂
2φ
∂xk∂xk+1
)
+
1
2
h
∑
j,k
(
∂2φ
∂x2k+j
+
∂2φ
∂x2j
+
∂2φ
∂x2k
+ 2
∂2φ
∂xk∂xj
− 2 ∂
2φ
∂xk∂xk+j
− 2 ∂
2φ
∂xj∂xk+j
)
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+
1
2
h
∑
j,k
(
∂2φ
∂x2j−k
+
∂2φ
∂x2j
+
∂2φ
∂x2k
− 2 ∂
2φ
∂xk∂xj
+ 2
∂2φ
∂xk∂xj−k
− 2 ∂
2φ
∂xj∂xj−k
)
,
where the derivatives are taken at points in small neighborhoods of x and where φ(x) =
U tG(x) = G(X(t, x)), so that
∂φ
∂xj
=
∑
i
∂G
∂xi
(y)|y=X(t,x)ξji (t, x),
∂2φ
∂xp∂xq
=
∑
i
∂G
∂xi
(y)|y=X(t,x)ηp,qi (t, x) +
∑
i,m
∂2G
∂xi∂xm
(y)|y=X(t,x)ξpi (t, x)ξqm(t, x).
Using the estimate for the derivatives of X(t, x) from Theorem 4.6.1, all terms here
are estimated in magnitude straightforwardly by some constants. For instance, let us look
at the second term. It can be estimated as
P (x)
∑
k
kxk
∣∣∣∣∂2φ∂x2k +
∂2φ
∂x2k+1
− 2 ∂
2φ
∂xk∂xk+1
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2c‖G‖C2(l1)
∑
k
kxk
∑
i,j
(|ξki (t, x)ξkj (t, x)|+ |ξk+1i (t, x)ξk+1j (t, x)|+ |ξki (t, x)ξk+1j (t, x)|)
+2c‖G‖C2(l1)
∑
k
kxk
∑
i
(
|ηk,ki (t, x)|+ |ηk+1,k+1i (t, x)|+ |ηk,k+1i (t, x)|
)
≤ C‖G‖C2(l1)
∑
k
kxk(k
2 + (k + 1)2 + k(k + 1)) ≤ C‖G‖C2(l1),
as required with C depending on
∑
k k
3xk. Estimating analogously other terms we get
the required uniform bound for |(Lb,h − Λb)U tG(x)| and then complete the proof as in
Theorem 4.3.1.
Analogous to Section 4.3 and using the theory of stability of the kinetic equations we
can generalize this result to the case of Lipschitz coefficients.
Theorem 4.6.3. Let P (x), a(x), Qkl(x), P
m,k(x) be continuous non-negative functions on
l1 such that
P (x) + a(x) ≤ c, Ckl(x) ≤ c(k + l),
∑
j<k
F kj(x) ≤ ck, (4.50)
|P (x)−P (y)|+|a(x)−a(y)| ≤ c(L, |x−y|), |Ckl(x)−Ckl(y)| ≤ c(k+l)(L, |x−y|), (4.51)∑
j<k
|F kj(x)− F kj(y)| ≤ ck(L, |x− y|), (4.52)
for L = (1, 2, · · · ) and a constant c. Let the initial states x(h) of the Markov chains
Xh(t, x(h)) generated by (4.42) belong to M+≤ν(L3) with some ν and converge to a state
x so that
∑
j j|xj(h)− xj | → 0, as h→ 0. Then the Markov chains Xh(t, x(h)) converge
in distribution to the deterministic evolution X(t, x) and moreover, for any Lipschitz
continuous G on l1 and any T > 0,
sup
t≤T
‖U thG(x(h))− U tG(x(h))‖ ≤ CT (th)2/5‖G‖Lip. (4.53)
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Proof. The difference with the proof of Theorem 4.3.2 is that here it is more convenient
to approximate the coefficients P (x), a(x), Qkl(x), P
m,k(x) by their finite-dimensional ap-
proximations P (Pn(x)), a(Pn(x)), Qkl(Pn(x)), Pm,k(Pn(x)), rather than the whole r.h.s.
Let us denote the corresponding solution of the kinetic equations Xn(t, x) and the corre-
sponding approximating Markov chain by Xnh (t, x). As proved in Chapter 3 of [142], the
evolutions Xn(t, x) and X(t, x) are well defined and the deviation of the transition oper-
ators of the evolutions Xn(t, x) and X(t, x) is of order 1/n2 for the evolutions with the
initial conditions fromM+≤ν(L3) with any given ν. Similarly one shows the same deviation
for the transition operators of the Markov chains Xnh (t, x) and Xh(t, x). Approximating
now the coefficients P (Pn(x)), a(Pn(x)), Qkl(Pn(x)), Pm,k(Pn(x)) by the smooth functions
Pδ(Pn(x)), aδ(Pn(x)), Qδkl(Pn(x)), Pm,kδ (Pn(x)) as in Theorem 4.3.2 we get new approxi-
mations with the deviations from the transitions without δ of order δ. The required
second derivative needed to apply Theorem 4.6.2 to these last approximations is of order
n/δ again as in Theorem 4.3.2. Thus the total error term is of order
ht
δ
+ nδ +
1
n2
.
Choosing n and δ that make all terms of equal decay in ht yields the required order
(th)2/5.
So far in this Chapter we kept the parameter b of the principal in all our results, but
did not use it. However, in this chapter we extended the convergence results of Chapter
2 devoted to finite-state models to the case of countable state space. Once this is done
the results on the forward looking principal of Chapter 3, where parameter b becomes
an important controlled variable, can be extended more or less automatically to this new
setting of countable spaces, like in Theorem 4.3.3 of Section 4.3.
Chapter 5
Appendix: Notes and compliments
As a general reference for the analysis of multi-agent systems we can refer to [215] and[198].
The development of multi-agent games and multi-agent systems can be considered as a
part of big data science contributing to the understanding of smart technologies, the
systems of systems and the internet of things.
The literature on both our main methodology (dynamic law of large numbers) and the
concrete areas of applications (inspection, corruption, etc) is quite abundant and keeps
growing rapidly. In this section we try to overview at least the main trends most closely
related to our methods and objectives.
1. Dynamic LLN for optimal control.
The dynamic law of large numbers (LLN) for interacting particles is a well developed
field of research in statistical mechanics and stochastic analysis, see e.g. [136] for a review,
as well as in the kinetic models see e.g. [8] and references therein. For agents, that is,
in the framework of controlled processes and games, the LLN was strongly advanced in
the setting of evolutionary biology leading to the deep analysis of the replicator dynamics
of evolutionary games and its various versions and modifications (see e.g. [115] or [144]
for a general picture). A random multi-agent approximations for a given dynamics can
be cooked up in various ways. For instance, for the classical replicator dynamics a multi-
agent approximations was analyzed via migrations between the states preserving the total
number of agents (see e.g. [37]) or via the model arising from the standard biological
interpretation of payoffs as the reproduction rate (thus changing the number of agents,
see the last chapter in [144]).
For the model, where the pairwise interaction is organized in discrete time so that at
any moment a given fraction α(N) of a homogeneous population of N species is randomly
chosen and decomposed into matching pairs, which afterwards experience simultaneous
transformations into other pairs according to a given distribution, the convergence to a
deterministic ODE is proved in [50]. Paper [68] extends this setting to include several
types of species and the possibility of different scaling that may lead, in the limit N →∞,
not only to ODE, but to a diffusion process. In [130] the general class of stochastic dy-
namic law of large number is obtained from binary or more general kth order interacting
particle systems (including jump-type and Le´vy processes as a noise). The study of [37]
concentrates on various subtle estimates for the deviation of the limiting deterministic
evolution from the approximating Markov chain for the evolution that allows a single
player (at any random time) to change her strategy to the strategy of another randomly
chosen player. Namely, it is shown, using the methods developed in [88], that the proba-
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bility that the maximum deviation of the trajectories of the Markov chain with N players
from the limiting evolution exceeds some ǫ is bounded by the exponent 2me−ǫ
2cN , where
m is the number of states and c some constant.
A related trend of research analyzes various choices of Markov approximation to re-
peated games and their consequences to the question of choosing a particular Nash equi-
librium amongst the usual multitude of them. Seminal contribution [124] distinguishes
specifically the myopic hypothesis, the mutation or experimentation hypothesis and the
inertia hypothesis in building a Markov dynamics of interaction. As shown in [124] (with
similar result in [234]), introducing mutation of strength λ and then passing to the limit
λ → 0 allows one to choose a certain particular Nash equilibrium, called a long run
equilibrium (or statistically stable, in the terminology of [87]) that for some coordination
games turns out to coincide with the risk-dominant (in the sense of [111]) equilibrium.
Further important contributions in this direction include [79], [46], [47] showing how dif-
ferent equilibria could be obtained by a proper fiddling with noise (for instance local or
uniform as in [79]) and discussing the important practical question of ’how long’ is the
’long-run’ (for a recent progress on this question see [156]). In particular paper [47] ex-
ploits the model of ’musical chairs’, where the changes of strategies occurs according to
a model, which is similar to the children game, where the players having no spare chairs
should leave the game. This paper discusses in detail the crucial question of the effect
of applying the limits t → ∞, τ → 0 (the limit from discrete to continuous replicator
dynamics), N →∞ and λ→ 0 in various order. Further development of the idea of local
interaction leads naturally to the analysis of the corresponding Markov processes on large
networks, see [166] and references therein. Some recent general results of the link between
Markov approximation to the mean field (or fluid) limit can be found in [161] and [39].
Though in many papers on Markov approximation, the switching probabilities of a revis-
ing player depends on the current distribution of strategies used (assuming implicitly that
this distribution is observed by all players) there exist also interesting results (initiated in
[209], see new developments in [210]) arising from the assumption that the switching of a
revising player is based on an observed sample of given size of randomly chosen other play-
ers. Let us also mention papers [91], [91] devoted to refined mean-field approximations,
where next terms are derived by assuming higher regularity of the coefficients.
A slightly different (but still very close) trend of research represents the analysis of
general stochastic approximation in association with the so-called method of ordinary
differential equations, see e. g. [204] and [38] and references therein.
The convergence results for a centrally controlled Markov chains of large number of
constituents to the deterministic continuous-time dynamics given by ordinary differential
equations (kinetic equations), dealt with in detail in our Chapters 2, 3, were initiated
seemingly in papers [90] and [138] from two different approaches, on the level of trajectories
(in spirit of paper [37]) and for the averages via the semigroup methods, as we do it here,
respectively. In paper [63] the theory of coalition building was developed via the method
of [90]. An extension of the method of [138] is given in [20].
The analysis of kinetic equations with the fractional derivatives was initiated in [127].
However, the setting (and the equations discussed) of this paper is different from the one
of our Section 2.14.
Proving the convergence of the process of fluctuations of multi-agent or multi-particle
systems from their dynamic LLN, that is, the dynamic central limit theorem (CLT) is
of course harder than getting the LLN itself. In fact, proving such CLT for the model
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of coagulation (or merge and splitting) of Chapter 4 was specifically mentioned as an
important open problem in the influential review [5], the solution being provided in [134]
based on the general analytic methodology [131]. The latter methodology can be also
directly applied to finite state models of this book.
2. Mean-field games (MFGs).
Mean-field games, which are dealt with in the second part of the book, present a
quickly developing area of the game theory. Mean-field games were initiated by Lasry-
Lions [159] and Huang-Malhame-Caines [118], [119]. Roughly speaking they are dealing
with the situations of many players with similar interests, when the influence of each player
on the overall outcome becomes negligible, as the number of players tends to infinity. As
insightful illustrative examples for the theory one can mention two problems (suggested
by P.-L. Lions): 1) ’when does the meeting start?’, where agents choose time to plan to
arrive to a meeting which should start when certain fixed amount of participants arrive
and where the costs for participants arise from being too early and too late (a game of
time), and 2) ’where did I put my towel on the beach?’, where agents try to choose a
place on the beach that should be possibly closer to some point of interest (restaurant or
see shore), but possibly not too close to other agents (a congestion game).
At present there exist already several excellent surveys and monographs on various
directions of the theory, see [28], [40], [109], [99], [54], [60]. For other key recent develop-
ment let us mention papers [61], [21], [57], [58], [29], [149], [220], and references therein.
Let us mention specifically the development of the mean-field games with a major player,
see [120], [186], [228], [159], where also the necessity to consider various classes of players
is well recognized, see also [42] and [59].
The papers [95] and [96], as well as [105], [105], initiated the study of finite-state-space
mean-field games that are the objects of our analysis in the second part of the book. Paper
[95] develops the theory of discrete-time MFGs showing, in particular, the convergence
of the solutions of backward-forward MFG consistency problem to a stationary problem,
thus initiating a very fruitful discussion of the precise links between stationary and time-
dependent solutions. Paper [96] deals already with more conventional continuous-time
models proving results on the existence and uniqueness of the solutions and the con-
vergence of Nash equilibria of approximating N -player games to a solution of the MFG
consistency problem. Papers [105] and [108] are devoted specifically to state spaces be-
ing graphs of nontrivial geometry. All these finite-state models (their formulations and
results) are based on rather restrictive structure of control and payoff (for instance, the
transitions rates are linear functions of control parameter, strong convexity assumptions
for payoffs are assumed), which also yield quite specific form of the master equation, which
in some cases (for the so-called potential MFGs) is even reduced to a hyperbolic system
of quasi-linear PDEs. For models with more general dependence of dynamics and payoffs
on the control parameters, the analysis of MFGs was initiated in paper [30], [145], [146]
developed further in this book. Of course, the simplest MFGs arise from the two-state
models, for which case many things can be calculated explicitly, see e.g. papers [43] and
[98], where these two-state games are applied to the analysis of socio-economic models
of paradigm shifts in scientific research and of consumer choices of products, whose price
depends on the consumption rates. A setting for stationary problems with a finite lifetime
of agents (and thus with the varying number of agents) was suggested and analyzed in
[230].
The applications of mean-field games are developing rapidly. For instance, [73] and
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[3] analyse the problem of evacuation in a crowded building or room (say, in case of a
fire), opinion dynamics in social networks is analyzed in [32]. Paper [22] deals with the
demand management of electrical heating or cooling appliances providing desynchroniza-
tion of agents using a bang-bang switching control. Paper [23] deals with the dynamic of
characteristic functions (values of coalitions) in the transferable utility coalition games.
Optimal stopping games are dealt with in [189]. Examples with more economics content
include the standard models of the exploitation of common resources and the formation
of prices that influence the total sales (see e.g. [107] and [60] and references therein). As
an example with a biological flavor one can mention the problem of flocking of birds, see
[186] and [60].
Some preliminary ideas pointing into the direction of the MFG structure can be traced
back to paper [123] and references therein.
3. Corruption and inspection games.
Analysis of the spread of corruption in bureaucracy is a well recognized area of the ap-
plication of game theory, which attracted attention of many researchers. General surveys
can be found in [4], [122], [163], see also monographs [200] and [201]. In his Prize lecture
[121], L. Hurwicz gives an introduction in laymen terms of various problems arising in
an attempt to find out ’who will guard the guardians?’ and which mechanisms can be
exploited to enforce the legal behavior?
In a series of papers [157],[158] the authors analyze the dynamic game, where en-
trepreneurs have to apply to a set of bureaucrats (in a prescribed order) in order to
obtain permission for their business projects. For an approval the bureaucrats ask for
bribes with their amounts being considered as strategies of the bureaucrats. This model
is often referred to as petty corruption, as each bureaucrat is assumed to ask for a small
bribe, so that the large bureaucratic losses of entrepreneurs occur from a large number
of bureaucrats. This is an extension of the classical ultimatum game, because the game
stops whenever an entrepreneur declines to pay the required graft. The existence of an
intermediary undertaking the contacts with bureaucrats for a fee may essentially affect
the outcomes of this game.
In the series of works [225], [226], [182] the authors develop an hierarchical model of
corruption, where the inspectors of each level audit the inspectors of the previous level and
report their finding to the inspector of the next upper level. For a graft they may choose
to make a falsified report. The inspector of the highest level is assumed to be honest
but very costly for the government. The strategy of the government is in the optimal
determination of the audits on various levels with the objective to achieve the minimal
level of corruption with minimal cost. Related hierarchical models are developed in [102],
[103], where the stress is on the interaction of the three types of players: benevolent
dictator (the government), corrupted bureaucrat and an agent (a producer of goods), and
in particular, on the conditions allowing for the stable development of the economy
Paper [217] develops a simple model to get an insight into the problem of when unifying
efforts result in strengthening of corruption. In paper [171] the model of a network corrup-
tion game is introduced and analyzed, with the dynamics of corrupted services between
the entrepreneurs and corrupted bureaucrats propagating via the chain of intermediary.
In [181] the dichotomy between public monitoring and governmental corruptive pressure
on the growth of economy was modeled. In [162] an evolutionary model of corruption is
developed for ecosystem management and bio-diversity conservation.
In [128] a model of corruption with regard to psychological mimicry in the adminis-
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trative apparatus with three forms of corruption is constructed. It is given in terms of
the system of four differential equations describing the number of different groups. The
equilibrium states that allow to specify the dominant form of corruption and investigate
its stability, depending on the parameters of the psychological mimicry and the rigor of
anti-corruption laws are found. In [172] the corruption dynamics is analyzed by means
of the lattice model similar to the three-dimensional Ising model: agents placed at the
nodes of the corrupt network periodically choose to perform or not to perform the act
of corruption. In [173] the transportation problem of multi-agent interaction between
different goods’ transporters with a corruption component is introduced and studied. A
statistical procedure of anti-corruption control of economic activity is proposed in [195].
A model of optimal allocation of resources for anticorruption purposes is developed in
[180]. Various approaches to modeling corruption are collected in monograph [170].
The research on the political aspects of corruption develops around the Acton’s dictum
that ’power corrupts’, where the elections serve usually as a major tool of public control,
see [94] and references therein.
Closely related are the so-called inspection games, see surveys e. g. in [18], [144],
[125]. Our evolutionary approach was initiated in [148], similar ideas can be found in
[106]. Inspection games model non-cooperative interactions between two strategic parties,
called inspector and inspectee. The inspector aims to verify that certain regulations,
imposed by the benevolent principal he/she is acting for, are not violated by the inspectee.
On the contrary, the inspectee has an incentive to disobey the established regulations,
risking the enforcement of a punishment fine in the case of detection. The introduced
punishment mechanism is a key element of inspection games, since deterrence is generally
the inspector’s highest priority. Typically, the inspector has limited means of inspection
at his/her disposal, so that his/her detection efficiency can only be partial. One of the
first models was a two-person zero-sum recursive inspection game proposed by Dresher
[76], where it was supposed that a given number n of periods are available for an inspectee
to commit, or not, a unique violation, and a given number m ≤ n of one-period lasting
inspections available for the inspector to investigate the inspectee’s abidance by the rules,
assuming that a violator can be detected only if he/she is caught (inspected) in the
act. Important extensions were given in papers [71] and [117]. This work initiated the
application of inspection games to arms control and disarmament, see [16] and references
therein. This basic model was generalised in [174] to a non-zero-sum game adopting the
notion of inspector leadership and showing (among others) that the inspector’s option
to pre-announce and commit to a mixed inspection strategy actually increases his/her
payoff.
In [221]a similar framework was applied to investigate the problem of a patroller aiming
to inhibit a smuggler’s illegal activity. In their so-called customs-smuggler game, customs
patrol, using a speedboat, in order to detect a smuggler’s motorboat attempting to ship
contraband through a strait. They introduced the possibility of more than one patrolling
boats, namely the possibility of two or more inspectors, potentially not identical, and
suggested the use of linear programming methods for the solution of those scenario. A
closed-form solution for the case of two patrolling boats and three patrolling boats were
provided in [31] and [89] respectively. This research initiated the flux of literature on the
so-called patrolling games, see [10] and [9] for further development.
In a series of papers Von Stengel (see [227] and references therein) Von Stengel intro-
duced a third parameter in Dresher’s game, allowing multiple violations, but proving that
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the inspector’s optimal strategy is independent of the maximum number of the inspectee’s
intended violations. He studied several variation, (i) optimising the detection time of a
unique violation that is detected at the following inspection, given that inspection does
not currently take place, (ii) adding different rewards for the inspectee’s successfully com-
mitted violations, and (iii) extending Maschler’s inspector leadership version under the
multiple intended violations assumption. Papers [82] and [207] studied a similar three-
parameter, perfect-capture, sequential game, where: (i) the inspectee has the option to
”legally” violate at an additional cost; (ii) a detected violation does not terminate the
game; (iii) every non-inspected violation is disclosed to the inspector at the following
stage.
Non-zero-sum inspection became actively studied in the 1980s, in the context of the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The prefect-capture assumption was partly aban-
doned, and errors of Type 1 (false alarm) and Type 2 (undetected violation given that
inspection takes place) were introduced to formulate the so-called imperfect inspection
games, see e.g. [55] and references therein for the solution of imperfect, sequential and
non-sequential games, assuming that players ignore any information they collect during
their interaction, where an illegal action must be detected within a critical timespan be-
fore its effect is irreversible. Imperfect inspection and timely detection in the context of
environmental control were developed in [205].
Avenhaus and Kilgour [17] developed a non-zero-sum, imperfect (Type 2 error) inspec-
tion game, where a single inspector can continuously distribute his/her effort-resources
between two non-interacting inspectees, exempted from the simplistic dilemma whether to
inspect or not. They related the inspector’s detection efficiency with the inspection effort
through a non-linear detection function and derived results for the inspector’s optimum
strategy subject to its convexity. Paper [116] extended this model, considering a similar
N + 1 players inspection game, where the single inspection authority not only intends to
optimally distribute his/her effort among N inspectee countries, but also among several
facilities within each inspectee country. These and related models are now presented in
detail in the fundamental monograph [19].
The methodology of the dynamic LLN, which we develop in this book, can be applied
in fact to almost all these models allowing one to deal effectively with the situations when
many agents take part and some bulk characteristics of the dynamics of the game are of
interest.
4. Security and bioterrorism.
Game-theoretic papers dealing with counterterrorism modeling were briefly mentioned
in Section 1.8. Our approaches with the LLN makes the bridge between these papers and
another trend of research, where the development of the extremists activity is modelled
by some system of ODEs of low dimension, which present the variations of the models
of the propagation of infectious diseases in epidemiology. The standard abbreviations
for the population classes in the latter theory are S for susceptible, L or E for latent or
exposed (infected but yet not infectious), I for infectious and R for recovered individuals.
Depending on which classes are taken into account several standard models were developed
like SI epidemics, SEI epidemics, SIR epidemics and SEIR (or SLIR in other notations)
epidemics. For instance, the latter model studies the process of the evolution of the
number of classes S,E, I, R under the intuitively very meaningful system of 4 ODEs
S˙ = −λSI, L˙ = λXI − αL, I˙ = αL− µI, R˙ = µI
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with some constants α, µ, λ, and the SIR model is obtained by replacing the middle two
equations by the equation I˙ = λXI − µI, see reviews e.g. in [114] or [197] for various
modifications.
Modifying this class of models to the propagation of extremism, the authors of [62]
group the population in 4 classes: fanatics F , semifanatics (not fully converted) E, sus-
ceptible S and raw material (indifferent) G. With some reasonable assumption on the
propagation of influences via binary interaction the authors build a system of ODEs on
four variables with a quadratic r.h.s. (depending on certain numeric coefficients) and
study its rest points. In [213], devoted concretely to modeling ETA (Basque nationalist
organization) in Spain, the authors distinguish the following classes of population: those
against independence, E, those striving for independence but without violence, N , those
supporting the fight for independence with violence, V , and the rest, A. Again a reason-
able system of ODEs on 4 variables is built and its predictions are compared with real
figures in attempt to evaluate the key parameters. In [104] the authors group the popula-
tion in three classes: extremists E, susceptible S and reserved (isolated in jails). Moreover
they add an additional variable G measuring the level of efforts of the government G, and
build and study the system of ODEs on four variables (depending on certain numeric
coefficients). Paper [223] builds a model with three variables, the number of terrorists
T , the number of susceptible (to terrorist ideas) S and the number of nonsusceptible
N , where the efforts of society are distributed between two types of interference: direct
military or police intervention (the analog of the preemptive measures of [202] discussed
in Section 1.8) decreasing T , and propaganda or concessions decreasing S, with the usual
transitions between the groups via binary interactions. The system of ODEs suggested in
[223] looks like
T˙ = aTS − bT 2 + cT, S˙ = −aTS − eT 2S + fT + gS, N˙ = eT 2S − f1T + hN
with constants a, b, c, e, f, g, f1, h. The less intuitive quadratic and third order terms
with b and e reflect two methods above of the influence of the society. Rest points of
this dynamics are classified depending on the ’control parameters’ b and e. Paper [214]
builds a model with terrorist groups of size T1 and T2 acting in two neighboring country
with counterterrorist measures in these country, N1, N2, measured in some units, the
corresponding system of ODEs being
T˙1 = −a1N1T1 − b1T˙1 + g12T2, T˙2 = −a2N2T2 − b2T˙2 + g21T1, N˙1 = −γ1T1, N˙2 = −γ2T2.
We showed just some examples of models. Their variety manifests that mathematical
modeling of these very complex processes is effectively in the initial state without any
consensus about the relevant parameters and the ways of their estimations.
All these models can be enhanced by our methodology by linking their evolutions
with more real multi-agent models and by considering the efforts of the government as a
strategic parameter (in spirit of Chapter 3) or including some optimization objective for
the individuals of each group (in spirit of Chapters 1 or ??), leading to the estimates of
the investments needed to control the situation.
An extensive introduction to various approaches for analysing terrorism can be found
in [80] including statistical parameter estimations, linear regression, utility minimiza-
tion on R2+ (for the choice between proactive and defensive measures) and several game-
theoretic formulations, for example, as social dilemmas (static 2 player games) or as
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dynamic modelling in the spirit of the entry deterrence games. The latter consider the
question of committing or not a terrorist attack under the same setting as entering or not
the market occupied by a monopolist.
Let us also mention paper [231] (and several references therein) that uses the methods
of deterministic optimal control to analyse governmental investments in the detection and
interdiction of terrorist’s attacks. The main model of this paper looks at the evolution of
the number of undetected X and detected Y plots of attacks subject to the ODEs
X˙ = α− µX − δ(f − Y )X, Y˙ = δ(f − Y )X − ρY,
where α and f are the control parameters of terrorists and the government respectively.
An extensive empirical analysis of crime models from the point of view of statistical
physics is developed in [190] and [191].
Similar models can be used for the analysis of the propagation of scientific ideas. Pa-
per [36] uses all basic versions of deterministic epidemics above (SEI, SIR, SEIR) to
assess the propagations of the method of Feynmann’s diagrams through the community
of physicists, the method that had many influential opponents at its initiation, like Op-
penheimer in USA and Lev Landau in USSR. Yet another twist of the problem concerns
the illegal consumption of energy resources, see [6] and references therein.
Recently more attention has been paid to the models of cyber-security, as was discussed
in Section 1.8 with reference to [41] for a review.
5. Optimal resource allocation. Approaches to the optimal allocation of resources
are numerous and are applied in various frameworks. For instance, one can distinguish
resource allocation in the framework of reliability theory, where one looks for the optimal
amount of redundant units to sustain the work of complex systems without interruption
(see e.g. [224]), the approaches based on the mechanism design methodology (distin-
guishing market and non-market mechanisms for allocations, see e.g. [67] and references
therein) and on the Bayesian statistical inference (see e.g. [236] and references therein).
An approach from the swarm intelligence (see [48]) models the allocation of tasks and
resources by the analogy with the procedures found in the insect communities (ants or
bees), and the market-based control by the analogy with the market bidding - clearing
mechanisms (see [66] and [168]). Closely related are the questions of the exploitation of
limited common resources, often formulated as the fish wars, (see e.g. [175], [176], [154]),
project management problems (see e. g. [183]), distribution of investments between
economic sectors (see [219]) and general control of crowd behavior and the information
propagation through the crowds (see [26], [53] and references therein). Our approach to
optimal allocation, taken from [140], deals with the distribution of the efforts of the prin-
cipal for better management of mean-field interacting particle systems and is also close
in spirit to [188].
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